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Chapter 1
Introduction
This doctoral thesis in economic theory studies the interaction between socio-economic
agents. On the one hand, it focuses on the fundamentals of strategic interaction, on
the other it analyzes the induced socio-economic structures, in particular the forma-
tion of networks.
When it comes to strategic interaction in economic settings, several questions arise
immediately. Why and how do agents interact? Which strategies will they pursue? To
what extent do agents want to acquire additional information if there is uncertainty?
How does the behavior of counterparts inﬂuence rational agents’ (re)actions? Is it
possible that no one has incentives to deviate from a given behavior? And if so, what
are the characteristics of such a situation that is either called stable or an equilibrium?
Beyond these questions concerning strategic interaction, we can also ask what these
interactions imply. Which kinds of networks of agents typically emerge in certain
settings? Which properties do they have? What eﬀects does the formation of these
networks have on socio-economic outcomes? To what extent do theoretic results ﬁt
real-world data?
These are major questions which this doctoral thesis considers in detail within
the framework of three diﬀerent models being developed and analyzed. Thus, it
contributes to a variety of research ﬁelds in economics but also in sociology and
mathematics.
1.1 Scientific Context
Thinking about strategic interaction, one is at the very heart of game theory. “The
study of mathematical models of conﬂict and cooperation between intelligent rational
1
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decision-makers”, as Myerson (1991, p. 1) describes it, is central to economic sciences
nowadays. The important concepts of game theory ﬁnd application wherever a cer-
tain outcome does not only depend on one’s own decision but also on the behavior
of others. Common economic examples are decisions about prices or quantities by
competing ﬁrms, the choice of technological standards or the behavior of competitors
in auctions, to mention only a few.
First recorded steps towards the development of this ﬁeld trace back to a discus-
sion about the card game “Le Her” initiated by Charles Waldegrave in a letter he
wrote to Pierre Rémond de Montmort in the early 18th century (see e.g. de Montmort,
1713; Bellhouse, 2007). However, it took until the 20th century for the mathematical
theory of games to get established as a unique ﬁeld by von Neumann (1928) (see also
von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). A natural way to think about these situa-
tions of conﬂict or cooperation is to seek for a status quo where each agent’s strategy
is individually optimal such that no one wants to deviate from it. This leads to
the solution concept of “Nash equilibria” which was invented by Nash (1950b, 1951)
and reﬁned by Selten (1965) through his work on “subgame perfect equilibria” in a
dynamic context.1
Until then, in the game-theoretic literature, it was assumed that agents involved
in a situation of strategic interaction are always perfectly informed about the state
of the world. In sequential games, this means that each agent always knows all
developments and decisions made at previous stages. In many real-world examples,
however, this is very rarely the case. It was Harsanyi (1967, 1968a,b) who developed
the concepts of incomplete information and Bayesian games giving rise to the solution
concept of “Bayesian Nash equilibrium”.2 Hereby, Harsanyi also provided a theoretical
foundation for the economics of information.
During that time, the concepts of game theory also found their way into other
disciplines such as biology. Since then and initiated by the paper of Maynard Smith
and Price (1973), much research has been devoted to evolutionary game theory used
as a tool to analyze Darwinian competition. Some of the results derived in this
context are now used by the more recent literature on the evolution of preferences in
more concrete economic settings. Güth and Yaari (1992) and Güth (1995) were the
1From 1972 until 1984, Reinhard Selten worked at the Center for Mathematical Economics at
Bielefeld University.
2For their contributions to economic game theory, John Nash, John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten
were awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1994. With Robert Aumann and
Thomas Schelling, two further game theorists received the prize in 2005. Two years later, Leonid
Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson received the prize for having laid the foundations of
mechanism design theory, which is closely related to game theory.
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ﬁrst to work on this.
In general, both the literature on Bayesian games and on the evolution of pref-
erences posit an exogenously given structure of information. However, in settings
of strategic behavior where an agent’s information typically has an impact on her
payoﬀs, it seems appropriate and enlightening to consider individual information ac-
quisition as an endogenous decision variable. Yet, not much work has been done in
this direction. Chapter 2 of this doctoral thesis takes up this idea and contributes
to a better understanding of endogenized acquisition of information or, as we call it,
“cognitive empathy” in conﬂict situations.
Beyond that, another important application of game theory in general is the one
to bargaining problems. In such problems, typically two or more agents try to ﬁnd
an agreement regarding how to distribute an object or a monetary amount. For ex-
ample, this is the case when the personnel director of a company negotiates wages
with workers’ unions, ﬁrms bargain with other ﬁrms over prices or collaborations, or
politicians over environmental or trade agreements. In such situations, each agent
usually seeks for an outcome which is as favorable as possible for herself, however,
without threatening an agreement. A ﬁrst notable idea to tackle this problem in
economics was the axiomatic, cooperative approach by Nash (1950a) (see also Nash,
1953, for a non-cooperative approach). Given agents’ disagreement points, feasible
utility values and bargaining power, this provides what we today call the “(gener-
alized) Nash bargaining solution”. In reality, however, agents might use elaborate
bargaining tactics and, moreover, there is no certainty that an agreement will be
reached. While the above approaches abstract away from this, these open points
were already addressed to some extent by the work of Schelling (1956). From today’s
perspective, however, the strategic approach introduced by Rubinstein (1982) (see
also Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1985) was probably the most important contribution
in this regard. It proposes a reasonable dynamic speciﬁcation of the bargaining game
and provides a unique, subgame perfect equilibrium as a solution. While most other
approaches are even completely silent on the origin of agents’ bargaining power, here,
it is simply determined by her level of patience.
In general, however, bargaining power can be inﬂuenced by many diﬀerent fac-
tors. In a context where bilateral agreements can be reached with diﬀerent bargaining
partners, one’s bargaining power should heavily depend on the number and kinds of
alternatives among which one can choose. Such a structure of bilateral links between
agents can be interpreted as a network. As an example for this, one could con-
sider a setting of project collaborations between companies. Given such a bargaining
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network, a link between two agents would then represent a potential collaboration
between the two. Capturing this idea, Manea (2011) sets up and analyzes a model
which can be regarded as a microfoundation of the above seminal papers. As a main
result, he establishes that all subgame perfect equilibria of the network bargaining
game are payoﬀ equivalent. Here, networks are assumed to be exogenously given.3 In
a setting of strategic interaction where agents’ expected payoﬀs are determined by the
structure of their network, however, it seems reasonable to assume that each agent
would strive to maximize her anticipated proﬁt by optimizing her network position.
This is where Chapter 3 on strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks
comes into play so as to examine such network structures with regard to stability and
eﬃciency.
Network theory and, in particular, strategic network formation is a relatively
young research ﬁeld in economics which is, however, not restricted to bargaining
frameworks by far. To name just a few, modeling trade and exchange of goods in
non-centralized markets (see e.g. Goyal and Joshi, 2006), ﬁrms involved in R&D
networks (see e.g. Goyal and Joshi, 2003) or personal contacts in the context of
job search (see e.g. Calvó-Armengol, 2004) are further insightful applications. Early
works of Boorman (1975), Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Myerson (1991) mark
the beginning of the economic literature on strategic network formation. However,
only after Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced the seminal equilibrium concept
of “pairwise stability”, this ﬁeld became a most active research area.4 In models of
this literature, networks are assumed to induce explicit beneﬁts and costs for each
contained agent. Usually, this then gives rise to individual incentives to add or delete
links unless the network is stable.5 Furthermore, considering the collective of all
agents in the network provides a measure of (utilitarian) welfare. Based on this,
analyzing the tension between stable networks and “(strongly) eﬃcient” ones, that is
networks being optimal from a society’s perspective, often yields further interesting
insights (see again Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996).6
Prior to this, social networks have already been an object of research in other
ﬁelds and disciplines such as labor economics and sociology. However, research ques-
3At least, this applies for the actual paper. For details concerning Manea (2011, Online Appendix)
see Chapter 3.
4Jackson (2005), Jackson (2008b, Chapter 6) and Goyal (2012, Chapter 7) provide a nice overview
of the literature and basic concepts.
5Apart from pairwise stability, several variations, reﬁnements and alternative notions of stabil-
ity such as, for example, “Nash stability”, “pairwise Nash stability” and “pairwise stability with
transfers” have been developed. For an overview see Bloch and Jackson (2006).
6Note that an eﬃcient network always exists whereas this is not guaranteed for pairwise stable
ones.
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tions diﬀer substantially from the strategic approach considered above. Here, the
focus is rather on features of given networks and socio-economic implications thereof.
Moreover, in a large part of this literature, it is either not feasible or considered
unnecessary to take explicit representations of whole networks in a graph-theoretic
sense as a basis (see above and below). Abstracting from this notion, sociological
studies have shown, for example, that social contacts and interactions play an im-
portant role in ﬁnding jobs and ﬁlling vacancies (see e.g. Rees, 1966; Granovetter,
1973, 1995). Starting with Montgomery (1991), labor economic models then try to
explain why this is the case and what consequences it has for earnings, abilities of
employees, ﬁrms’ proﬁts, unemployment, etc. Beyond that, certain stylized facts
about real-world networks are well-established: They typically exhibit “homophily”,
that is the tendency of individuals to connect to similar others, “clustering” and the
“small-world phenomenon” (see e.g. Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954; Milgram, 1967;
McPherson et al., 2001).7 These properties have also been incorporated into some
economic papers (see e.g. Currarini et al., 2009). However, in these models, ho-
mophily is usually captured by a binary or discrete measure, thus rather in terms of
equality than similarity. Further simpliﬁcations are often due to the abstract notion
of networks mentioned above. One should be very careful about such simpliﬁcations
as it is probably not very rare that “the structure of the social network then turns
out to be a key determinant” (p. 12 Jackson, 2005).
Another discipline in which networks play an important role is the mathematical
ﬁeld of graph theory. Considering this literature leads us back to an explicit notion
of graphs (synonymously for networks) consisting of vertices and edges. There also
exists a strand of literature here which investigates network formation. However, in
contrast to the strategic approach mentioned above, it considers networks which form
at random. This means that the formation of links does not result from individual
incentives and strategic interaction but is assumed to follow some probabilistic rule.8
On the one hand, such random network models serve as an approximating tool to
examine and handle real-world networks which are usually quite large and remain
unknown for an analysis. On the other hand, random networks can be used, for
example, to understand and predict diﬀusion processes in societies. This might be
7More precisely, a network is called homophilous if for any two individuals the likelihood to be
linked is the higher the more similar they are in terms of one or several characteristics. A network is
said to exhibit clustering if two individuals with a common neighbor have an increased probability
of being linked. Finally, the small-world phenomenon describes the observation that even in large
networks on average there exist relatively short paths between two individuals.
8For a general introduction into graph theory see Bollobás (1998) and West (2001). Moreover,
see Bollobás (2001) and Jackson (2008b, Chapter 4) as well as Jackson (2006, Section 3.1) to get an
overview of random graphs respectively networks.
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of importance if one wants to estimate how information or a disease will spread.
To provide meaningful results, such a model should be designed as realistically as
possible, that is in a way to ensure it complies with the stylized facts known from
sociology (see above).9 One that is frequently considered until today and which was
already examined in the seminal paper of Erdős and Rényi (1959) is the “Bernoulli
Random Graph model” in which links are formed uniformly at random. This popular
model exhibits the small-world phenomenon but fails on homophily and clustering
(see e.g. Bollobás, 2001). Chapter 4 of this doctoral thesis addresses this issue and
proposes a tractable random network model which can be seen as a generalization
of the Bernoulli Random Graph model exhibiting all of the stylized facts mentioned
above.
1.2 Contributions
In Chapter 2, we build a simple model of strategic interaction with two players hav-
ing the option to acquire information about their respective opponent’s preferences
which are ex ante uncertain. We show that, for suﬃciently small positive costs of in-
formation acquisition, in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the resulting conﬂict game
of incomplete information the probability of getting informed about the opponent’s
preferences is bounded away from zero and one. For the evolutionary population
interpretation of the game this result implies that we would expect that there are
people who are “cognitively empathic”, i.e. who know their opponents’ preferences,
and that there are others who are not. Even if the cost of empathy acquisition is
zero, besides a full empathy equilibrium, the game still has such an equilibrium with
mixing between acquiring empathy and not acquiring it. Moreover, we show that for
small costs there is always an equilibrium in which the lower bound on the probabil-
ity of empathy acquisition is achieved for both players. Finally, we establish that in
certain cases the partial empathy equilibrium is the only equilibrium.
In the model, each of the two players can be one of a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent
preference types. The distribution over all preference types is commonly known (to
avoid that our results confound with higher-order belief eﬀects). Both players, before
learning their own types (this is for convenience), simultaneously decide whether or
not to pay a small amount of cost in order to acquire empathy, that is to learn the
opponent’s type. Anyway, players do not observe their opponent’s choice of empathy
9For formal deﬁnitions of these stylized facts in a random network setting see Jackson (2010,
Section 3.3).
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acquisition. After learning their own and, if appropriate, their opponent’s type,
players then choose their (possibly mixed) action as a function of what they know.
For the main results, we investigate “two-action Bayesian conﬂict games”. Here, both
players have two actions available and, if we assume players’ types to be common
knowledge, then any such complete information “realized type game” must have a
unique Nash equilibrium and that Nash equilibrium must be in completely mixed
strategies.
There are at least two diﬀerent interpretations we can give for our model. One is
that players are highly rational but have some small costs of reasoning about their
respective opponent’s preferences. Our model could then be about two individuals
engaged in the penalty kick, two ﬁrms engaged in conﬂict or military generals engaged
in war. In this context we talk about players “acquiring information” about their
opponents. On the contrary, in its evolutionary interpretation, there is mother nature
(or evolution) who works on everyone of her subjects independently and has their
material interests at her heart. Nature knows that her subjects will be involved in all
sorts of conﬂict situations throughout their life. She individually decides whether or
not she should spend some small amount of ﬁtness cost to endow her subjects with
cognitive empathy, which would then allow the respective subject to always learn
(in fact, to always know) the opponent’s preferences. In this context we talk about
“acquiring (cognitive) empathy”.
This chapter is joint work with Christoph Kuzmics. He initially contributed the
general research idea and at the end contributed to the actual writing of the main
parts of the paper. We worked together on ﬁnding and concretizing the actual ﬁnal
choice of model and on identifying which results we want to pursue. I provided the
proofs for essentially all results and worked through all examples (thus, identifying
possible results we can pursue). In the ﬁnal stages of the project, I concentrated
on the content and technical proofs and Christoph Kuzmics concentrated on the
marketing of our paper. However, all this has been carried out in close consultation
and double-checking each other’s work.
In Chapter 3 (of which I am the sole author), we analyze a model of strate-
gic network formation prior to a Manea (2011) bargaining game. Assuming patient
players, we provide a complete characterization of non-singularly pairwise stable net-
works. More precisely, we show that speciﬁc unions of separated pairs, odd circles
and isolated players constitute this class. As a byproduct, this implies that a pairwise
stable network always exists, that is at each level of linking costs. We also show that
many generic structures are not even singularly pairwise stable. As an important
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implication, this reveals that the diversity of possible bargaining outcomes is sub-
stantially narrowed down provided pairwise stability. Moreover, we establish that for
suﬃciently high linking costs, the networks being eﬃcient in terms of the utilitarian
welfare criterion coincide with the pairwise stable ones. However, this does not hold
if costs are low or at an intermediate level. As a robustness check, we ﬁnally study
the case of time-discounting players as well.
Our model consists of two stages. First, players are assumed to form undirected
bilateral links among each other which results in a network. These players are as-
sumed to be ex ante homogeneous, meaning that they are equal apart from their
potentially diﬀering network positions. Further, we consider explicit linking costs
which players have to bear for each link they form. In this context, one shall think
of one-time initiation or communication costs. Beneﬁts from linking are induced by
the network in the second stage. Here, given the network that has formed in the
ﬁrst stage, players are supposed to play an inﬁnite horizon network bargaining game
à la Manea (2011). Thus, they sequentially bargain with neighbors for the division
of a mutually generated unit surplus. According to Manea (2011) all subgame per-
fect equilibria of this bargaining game are payoﬀ equivalent. Players anticipate these
outcomes during the preceding stage of network formation and choose their actions
accordingly. To state our results, we introduce a novel classiﬁcation of pairwise stable
networks. A network is said to be singularly (non-singularly) pairwise stable if it has
this property at exactly (more than) one cost level. As only non-singularly pairwise
stable networks can be robust with respect to slight changes of costs, we focus on
this class throughout our analysis.
As a possible application of our model, we outline a setting of project collabo-
ration. Here, players represent similar ﬁrms which can mutually generate an (ad-
ditional) surplus within bilateral projects by exploiting synergy potentials. For in-
stance, this possibility might be based on capacity constraints or cost-saving oppor-
tunities. In this context, one-time costs might arise to prepare each two ﬁrms for
mutual projects (adjustment of IT, joint training for workers, etc.).
In Chapter 4, we propose and examine a random network model incorporating
heterogeneity of agents and a continuous notion of homophily. As a main result, we
show that for any positive level of homophily, our “Homophilous Random Network
model” exhibits clustering. Moreover, simulations indicate that the small-world phe-
nomenon is preserved even at high levels of homophily. Finally, we provide a possible
application within a stylized labor market setting. We consider a ﬁrm which has to
choose whether to hire a new employee via the social network or via the formal job
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market and obtain a simple decision rule.
Our model is a two-stage random process. First, agents are assigned character-
istics independently drawn from a continuous interval. Second, a random network
realizes where linking probabilities are contingent on a homophily parameter and the
pairwise distance between agents’ characteristics. More precisely, the probability of
linkage between two agents continuously decreases in the distance of their character-
istics and the homophily parameter directly determines the strength of this eﬀect. In
the limit case of no homophily, we reproduce the Bernoulli Random Graph model.
Insofar, our setting can be regarded as a generalization of this seminal model.
Our approach enables us to account for homophily in terms of similarity rather
than equality of agents, capturing the original sociological deﬁnition instead of the
stylized version that has been commonly used in the economic literature up to now.
In this regard, observe that in reality people are in many respects neither completely
“equal” nor completely “diﬀerent”. We therefore believe that a notion that provides
an ordering of the “degree of similarity” with respect to which an agent orders his
preference for connections can capture real-world eﬀects more accurately. Besides,
a major distinction of our approach compared to the literature is the sequential
combination of two random processes, where agents’ characteristics are considered
as random variables that inﬂuence the random network formation. We thus account
for the fact that in many applications in which the network remains unobserved, it
seems unnatural to assume that individual characteristics, which in fact may depict
attitudes, beliefs or abilities, are perfectly known.
This chapter is joint work with Jakob Landwehr. I contributed the original re-
search idea which was closely related to the application of our model we provide for
the labor market. However, we started discussing this idea at an early stage, changed
the focus and jointly developed the model. During our six-month research stay at the
University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, we worked together on identifying the results
we want to pursue, proved them and ﬁnally wrote the paper. Here, Jakob Landwehr’s
expertise in using MATLAB (2014) was of great beneﬁt. As essentially all the work
was carried out jointly, both authors contributed equally to this project.
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Chapter 2
Cognitive Empathy in Conflict
Situations
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the
result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also suﬀer a defeat. If you know
neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”
— Sun Tzu, The Art of War, approximately 500BC
2.1 Introduction
It is probably rare in a conﬂict situation that we know the exact cardinal preferences
of our opponent.10 Consider, for instance, a penalty kick in soccer. This is as close
as one can imagine to a pure conﬂict (i.e. zero-sum) situation. The kicker wants
to score, the goalkeeper wants to prevent that. Now imagine that the goalkeeper
incurred, earlier in the game, a slight injury, a bruising on her left side, which might
induce her to have a slight additional preference of jumping to the right.
If we now assume that there is a distribution of such preferences, commonly known
to both players, perhaps “centered” around the original zero-sum preference, then we
get as a Nash equilibrium of the game (the unique one if we think of the original
10In the quote from Sun Tzu stated above, it is diﬃcult to know what he meant with “knowing
yourself” and “knowing your enemy”. The last sentence of the quote seems to suggest that it is in
fact impossible that both warring generals know neither themselves nor their enemy, as presumably
we cannot have that both “succumb” in the battle between them.
11
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zero-sum game as the classic game of matching pennies) a “puriﬁed” version of the
original Nash equilibrium (see Harsanyi, 1973).11,12
We are here interested, however, in the possibility of the players, here especially
the kicker, to possibly acquire, at some small cost, information about the opponent’s
true preferences, here about the goalkeeper’s small injury. Alternatively, one can
think of there being a small cost for the players to think about the opponent’s pref-
erences. The latter interpretation leads us to the term “cognitive empathy” in our
title, as deﬁned in psychology as the process of understanding another person’s per-
spective (see e.g. Davis, 1983), which can be traced back to at least Köhler (1929),
Piaget (1932), and Mead (1934).13 Building this possibility of empathy acquisition
(or, respectively, information acquisition) into such a conﬂict game with incomplete
information, we are then interested in the following questions. To which extent do
players acquire empathy in equilibrium? In the context of the penalty kick, sup-
pose the kicker is aware of the goalkeeper’s small injury. Does she reason through
what consequences this fact has for the goalkeeper’s preferences and strategy? How
does the possibility of empathy acquisition aﬀect players’ action choices in the game?
Finally, how do the answers to these questions depend on the value of the cost of
empathy acquisition?
To answer these questions we build a simple model. There are two players and
(for the main result) two actions for each player. Each player can be one of a ﬁnite
number of diﬀerent preference types. The distribution over all preference types is
commonly known (to avoid confounding our results with higher-order belief eﬀects).
Both players, before learning their own types (this is for convenience), simultaneously
decide whether or not to pay a small amount of cost c ≥ 0 (simply subtracted
from their payoﬀs) in order to learn the opponent’s type. Players do not observe
their opponent’s choice of empathy acquisition. After learning their own and, if
appropriate, their opponent’s type, players then choose, as a function of what they
11In a “puriﬁed” equilibrium (almost) all types of players use a pure strategy, albeit diﬀerent
types use diﬀerent pure strategies. Nevertheless all players face a mixed strategy because they do
not know their opponent’s type.
12In other contexts, that of coordination games, uncertainty over the opponents’ preferences,
provided it is severe enough (to include dominant strategy types), has lead to the “global games”
literature on bank runs, etc. (see e.g. Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin, 1998),
and technically, to a reﬁnement of even pure Nash equilibria of the original full information game.
See also Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) on the possibility of getting almost any possible reﬁnement
depending on how the model is closed in terms of its higher-order belief assumptions.
13This is in contrast to “aﬀective empathy” which is deﬁned as a person’s emotional response to the
emotional state of others (see again Davis, 1983) and the two are not necessarily related. Shamay-
Tsoory et al. (2009) ﬁnd that diﬀerent areas of the human brain are responsible for “cognitive” and
“aﬀective” empathy. Rogers et al. (2007) ﬁnd that people with Asperger syndrom lack “cognitive”
but not “aﬀective” empathy.
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know, one of the two actions (or a mixed action). We investigate Bayesian Nash
equilibria of this game.
We ﬁrst provide, as a point of reference, an example of a non-conﬂict game, in
which in equilibrium all players always acquire empathy as long as the corresponding
costs are not too large. In this game, each player has three preference types, two
dominant strategy preference types (one for each action) and one coordination pref-
erence type. It is easy to see that the coordination preference type clearly beneﬁts
from learning her opponent’s type.
We then investigate two-player two-action Bayesian conﬂict games. These are
such that if the types of players were common knowledge, then any such complete
information “realized type game” must have a unique Nash equilibrium and that
Nash equilibrium must be in completely mixed strategies. For such games we show
that, for suﬃciently low positive costs of empathy acquisition, the probability of em-
pathy acquisition is strictly bounded away from zero and one in any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of this game (Theorem 2.1).14 These bounds do not depend on the cost
of empathy acquisition beyond the requirement that this cost is suﬃciently small.
In other words, in any equilibrium of this game, players randomize strictly between
acquiring empathy and not acquiring it. It turns out that even if the cost is zero, the
game, besides a “full empathy equilibrium” (Proposition 2.1), still has such an equi-
librium with mixing between acquiring empathy and not acquiring it. Beyond that,
we show that there is, for small costs, always an equilibrium in which the lower bound
on the probability of empathy acquisition is achieved for both players (Proposition
2.2). This equilibrium is referred to as the “partial empathy equilibrium”. Finally, we
establish that for two-action Bayesian conﬂict games with either two types for both
players or a single type for one player this partial empathy equilibrium is the only
equilibrium if costs are suﬃciently small but positive (Proposition 2.3).
There are at least two diﬀerent interpretations we can give for our model. One,
along the lines as suggested above, is such that players are highly rational but have
some small costs of reasoning about their respective opponent’s preferences. This
model could then be about the two individuals engaged in the penalty kick, but
could also be about ﬁrms engaging in conﬂict or indeed, as in the quote by Sun
Tzu above, military generals engaged in war. In this context we talk about players
“acquiring information” about their opponents.
We prefer to think of this model, however, in its evolutionary interpretation.
That is there is mother nature (or evolution) who works on everyone of her subjects
14In fact, for a player’s equilibrium probability of empathy acquisition to be strictly greater than
zero, her opponent must have (at least two) distinct payoﬀ types.
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independently and has their material interests at her heart. Nature knows that her
subjects will be involved in all sorts of conﬂict situations throughout their life. She
individually decides whether or not she should spend some small amount of ﬁtness
cost to endow her subjects with cognitive empathy, which would allow the respective
subject to always learn (in fact, to always know) the opponent’s preferences. In this
context we talk about “acquiring (cognitive) empathy”. For convenience and to avoid
confusion, this is the phrasing which we mainly use throughout the chapter.
Under the latter interpretation, our results imply that, in general, nature (who
is assumed to guide play to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium) endows some but not all
of her subjects with cognitive empathy even if the costs of doing so are essentially zero.
Various strands of literature have motivated us to write down and study the model
we analyze in this chapter.
One strand is the literature on the evolution of preferences for strategic interaction,
initiated by the now sometimes called “indirect evolutionary approach” of Güth and
Yaari (1992) and Güth (1995). Individuals who are randomly matched to engage in
some form of strategic interaction (some game) are ﬁrst given a preference (or utility
function) by mother nature. Mother nature works on every player separately and does
this with the view in mind to maximize this player’s material preferences (number of
oﬀspring or ﬁtness). Players then evaluate outcomes of play given these preferences
given to them by mother nature. There are two kinds of results in this literature.
Assuming that individuals (automatically) observe their opponents’ preferences, in
many settings non-material preferences arise as mother nature’s optimal choice (see
e.g. Koçkesen et al., 2000a,b; Heifetz et al., 2007a,b; Dekel et al., 2007; Herold and
Kuzmics, 2009). On the other hand, assuming that individuals cannot observe their
opponents’ preferences essentially only allows material preferences as mother nature’s
optimal choice (see e.g. Ely and Yilankaya, 2001; Ok and Vega-Redondo, 2001). This
induced Robson and Samuelson (2010) to wish that the potential observability of
preferences is also subject to evolutionary forces.15 Some work in that direction has
recently been begun by Heller and Mohlin (2015a,b).16 Our model can be seen as to
tackle the question of the evolution of observability of preferences without evolution.
15Similarly, Samuelson (2001, p. 228) states “Together, these papers highlight the dependence
of indirect evolutionary models on observable preferences, posing a challenge to the indirect evolu-
tionary approach that can be met only by allowing the question of preference observability to be
endogenously determined within the model.”
16The former is a model in which, while individual preferences evolve, so do individuals’ abilities to
deceive their opponents. The latter asks the question whether cooperation can be a stable outcome
of the evolution of preferences in the prisoners’ dilemma when players can observe and condition
their play on some of their opponent’s past actions (in encounters with other people).
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One such model is given in Robalino and Robson (2012, 2015). In their model,
individuals are interacting in ever changing environments. An individual with “the-
ory of mind” (synonymous to cognitive empathy) is able to use past experiences of
opponent play to predict more quickly how her opponent will play. Thus, even if it is
somewhat costly, in such a setting there is a strict beneﬁt from having a “theory of
mind”. One could argue that the incomplete information (about opponents’ prefer-
ences) in our model is somewhat akin to the ever changing environment in Robalino
and Robson (2015). Our model has no explicit learning. One could perhaps argue it is
implicit in our use of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Our example of a non-conﬂict game
provides a similar result as that in Robalino and Robson (2015) in that any Bayesian
Nash equilibrium must exhibit “full” cognitive empathy, i.e. with probability one. In
contrast, when we focus on conﬂict games alone, we ﬁnd a starkly contrasting result
in that any Bayesian Nash equilibrium must exhibit “partial” cognitive empathy, i.e.
the probability of acquiring empathy is bounded from below as well as from above,
even when costs of acquiring empathy tend to zero.
Another strand of literature started with Aumann and Maschler (1972), who pro-
vide an example of a complete information bimatrix game, due to John Harsanyi, that
can be used to discuss the relative normative appeal of maxmin and Nash equilibrium
strategies. The game is a two-player two-action game and not quite zero sum with a
unique Nash equilibrium which is in completely mixed strategies. In this game, Nash
equilibrium strategies and maxmin strategies diﬀer for both players. Yet the expected
payoﬀ to a given player in the Nash equilibrium is the same as the expected payoﬀ
that this player can guarantee herself by playing her maxmin strategy. Pruzhansky
(2011) provides a large class of complete information bimatrix games that has this
feature. If this is the case, would one not, for this class, recommend players to use
their maxmin strategies? In our model, in which players have uncertainty about their
opponent’s preferences, and therefore in some sense greater uncertainty about their
opponent’s strategy, one might think that the appeal of maxmin strategies is even
greater. Yet, in our model there may be a strict beneﬁt from deviating from maxmin
strategies.
The literature on level-k thinking typically ﬁnds that individuals engaged in game
theory experiments do not all reason in the same way as they have diﬀerent “theories
of mind”. See e.g. Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995); Nagel (1995); Ho et al. (1998);
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001); Crawford (2003); Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006);
Crawford and Iriberri (2007). In that sense, our work can be loosely interpreted as
a model to understand why there may be individuals of diﬀerent levels of strategic
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thinking.
There is a purely decision theoretic literature on “rational inattention” (e.g. Sims,
2003, 2006; Matêjka and McKay, 2012, 2015). In these models, individuals can obtain
costly information, where costs are proportional to some measure of informativeness
of the possible information to be acquired, before making their ultimate decisions.
Our work can be interpreted as an attempt to introduce these considerations into
a model of strategic interaction. The individuals in our model can, however, only
choose between having perfect information or none.
Moreover, there is a literature on information acquisition in oligopoly models as in
e.g. Li et al. (1987), Hwang (1993), Hauk and Hurkens (2001), Dimitrova and Schlee
(2003), and Jansen (2008), where ﬁrms can acquire information about the uncertain
market demand before engaging in oligopoly competition. Market demand enters all
agents’ proﬁt functions, whereas in our model the information a player might acquire
is exclusively about the opponent’s preferences. More general models in which players
acquire information about an uncertain parameter aﬀecting all players’ preferences
are given in Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), Myatt and Wallace (2012), and Amir
and Lazzati (2014), as well as in Persico (2000) and Bergemann et al. (2009) in a
mechanism design context.
Solan and Yariv (2004) consider a sequential model of two-player two-action in-
teraction in which one player chooses a (possibly mixed) action ﬁrst, then a second
player can buy, at some cost, information about the ﬁrst player’s (realized) action
before ﬁnally then also choosing an action herself. The second player can also choose
the precision of the information purchased. The structure of the game is common
knowledge. In particular the ﬁrst player is fully aware that she might be spied upon.
Thus “spying” in their model is about the opponent’s already determined action with
complete information regarding payoﬀs, whereas in our model “spying” (or cognitive
empathy as we call it) is about the opponent’s preferences.
Closest is perhaps Mengel (2012), who studies a model in which individuals play
many games and ex ante do not know which game they are playing. Individuals can
partition the set of games in any way they like, with the understanding that any two
games in the same partition element cannot be distinguished. The individual can
condition her action only on the partition element. Adopting a partition comes at
some cost, called reasoning costs, and ﬁner partitions are more costly than coarser
ones. One diﬀerence between Mengel (2012) and what we do here is, therefore, that
in our model players always learn their own payoﬀ type, while in Mengel (2012) indi-
viduals do not necessarily even learn their own payoﬀ type. Another diﬀerence is in
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the choice of solution concept, we study Bayesian Nash equilibria while Mengel (2012)
studies asymptotically stable strategy proﬁles under some evolutionary process. Both
these diﬀerences are probably only superﬁcial. The real diﬀerence between the two
papers is the class of games they study within their respective models. Our main
results deal with the case of conﬂict games. Mengel (2012) does not explicitly study
this class. Therefore, the nature of our results is also diﬀerent.17
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 states the model.
Section 2.3 provides an example of a non-conﬂict game. Section 2.4 then deﬁnes and
focuses Bayesian conﬂict games and provides the main result. In this section we also
characterize equilibrium strategy proﬁles further and provide a uniqueness result.
Finally, Section 2.5 concludes with a discussion of further properties of equilibria in
Bayesian conﬂict games as well as a discussion of possible variations of the model.
The more complex proofs of results in this chapter are delegated to the appendix,
while sketches of these proofs are provided as part of the main text.
2.2 The Model
There are two players p ∈ {B,R}. One might think for example of a blue and a red
player. Each player p can have one of a ﬁnite number np of possible (payoff) types
θp ∈ Θp. There are commonly known full support probability distributions over types
given by µp : Θp → (0, 1] for both players p ∈ {B,R}. Abusing notation slightly we
sometimes write µθ
p
instead of µp(θp). The types of the two players are drawn from
the respective distribution statistically independently from each other. Every type
of every player has the same ﬁnite set of possible actions at her disposal, given by
A = {a1, ..., am}.18 Payoffs to player p ∈ {B,R} are given by the utility function
17The main results in Mengel (2012) are that strict Nash equilibria, while (evolutionarily) stable
if the game is commonly known, can be made unstable under learning across games; that weakly
dominated strategies, while unstable if the game is commonly known, can be stable under learning
across games; and that, if all games have distinct Nash equilibrium supports, learning across games
under small reasoning costs leads to individuals holding the ﬁnest partition with probability one.
Our paper is silent on all these results as our conﬂict games do not have strict Nash equilibria, do not
have weakly dominated strategies, and are such that all (what we call realized type) games are such
that their Nash equilibria all have full support. All our results, thus, add to the results in Mengel
(2012). One could probably translate our main result into the language of Mengel (2012) as follows.
If having the ﬁnest partition in the model of Mengel (2012) is essentially the same as acquiring
cognitive empathy in our model, then our result, that in conﬂict games we expect proper mixing
between acquiring empathy and not acquiring it, suggests that, in conﬂict games, learning across
games as in Mengel (2012) would lead to individuals properly mixing between diﬀerent partitions,
including the ﬁnest as well as the coarsest.
18In principle, one could consider action sets of diﬀerent cardinality for both players. However, in
this chapter we focus on what we call “conﬂict games” later on and Remark 2.2 (see Appendix 2.C)
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uθ
p
: A × A → R, where the ﬁrst argument depicts the action taken by player p
and the second the one taken by her opponent −p. Note that diﬀerent types have
diﬀerent utility functions and that utility functions only depend on the chosen action
pair and not directly on the opponent’s type.
Before players learn their own type, i.e. at the complete ex-ante stage, each of them
can independently and secretly invest a cost of c ≥ 0 in order to acquire cognitive
empathy. This cost, which we refer to as the cost of empathy acquisition, is simply
subtracted from the player’s payoﬀ. A player who acquires empathy then, at the
interim stage, learns not only her own type but also the type of her opponent. These
player types are then called informed. Note, however, that an informed type is not
able to observe her opponent’s choice of empathy acquisition. We further assume that
there is only no empathy or full empathy. When we speak of a player having “partial
empathy” we mean that this player randomizes between no and full empathy.19 A
player who does not acquire empathy learns, at the interim stage, only her own type.
The corresponding player types are then called uninformed.
A strategy of player p ∈ {B,R} is then given by a pair
(
ρp, (σθ
p
)θp∈Θp
)
where
ρp ∈ [0, 1] is the information strategy, which we usually refer to as the probability of
empathy acquisition, and σθ
p
: Θ−p ∪{∅} → ∆(A), the action strategy, is the (mixed)
action to be played by player p of type θp ∈ Θp against any opponent of known type
θ−p ∈ Θ−p, when informed, and of unknown type (which is indicated by the player
receiving the uninformative “signal” ∅), when uninformed.
Our solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Our favorite interpretation
of equilibrium is that it is the outcome of a long and slow evolutionary process. It
is by now well-known that if any strategy proﬁle is the outcome of a reasonable
evolutionary process, it must be an equilibrium.20 As our main result holds for all
equilibria of the game, it is therefore true for all candidates of an evolutionary stable
outcome. 21
shows that for this class of games it is inevitable that players’ action sets have the same cardinality.
19Throughout this chapter, “partial empathy” usually comprises the case that the corresponding
player acquires empathy with probability zero while always excluding empathy acquisition with
probability one.
20See e.g. Weibull (1995) for a textbook treatment for this and all other statements in this para-
graph.
21It is also well-known that not all games have evolutionary stable outcomes. There can, for
instance, be cycles in behavior. Such cycles tend to cycle around equilibria (see e.g. Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998, Chapter 7.6).
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2.3 A Non-Conflict Example
In this section we provide, as a point of contrast to our main results, a non-conﬂict
example.
Example 2.1. Consider a symmetric setup in which both players p ∈ {B,R} can
have one of three types ΘB = ΘR = {θ1, θ2, θ3} chosen uniformly (i.e. µθ = 13 for all
θ ∈ Θp) for the two players. Both players can choose between two actions H and T .
Type θ1 finds action H strictly dominant, type θ3 finds action T strictly dominant,
and type θ2 has pure coordination preferences. These payoffs can be written in matrix
form as given in Figure 2.1.
H T
uθ1 :
H 1 1
T 0 0
H T
uθ2 :
H 1 0
T 0 1
H T
uθ3 :
H 0 0
T 1 1
Figure 2.1: Payoﬀs of the non-conﬂict game in Example 2.1
It is straightforward to see that for costs of empathy acquisition suﬃciently low (in
fact for c < 1
9
) the Bayesian game has no Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which a player
acquires empathy with probability less than one. Suppose a player (say blue) does
not acquire empathy and ﬁx her opponent’s (red) strategy. Then blue does not learn
red’s preferences. Red, however, makes her choice of action dependent on her own
type. Obviously, dominant action types play their dominant actions. Now consider
the coordination type of blue. The best she can do in terms of payoﬀs is to play a
best response to the given (mixed) action of the coordination type of red. W.l.o.g.
let this best response action be H. The coordination type of blue then receives a
payoﬀ of zero against the red type having dominant action T . For blue switching to
acquiring empathy and playing T against the T dominant action type of red is then
beneﬁcial if c < 1
9
. Thus, for c < 1
9
any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game has
both players acquiring empathy with probability one.22
22 Suppose we reverse the timing of learning one’s type and acquiring empathy in this example.
That is individuals choose whether or not to acquire empathy after they learn their own type. Of
course the two dominant action types do not acquire empathy now but for the coordination type the
result is much the same as before: For c < 13 coordination types acquire empathy with probability
one in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game.
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2.4 Equilibrium Empathy Acquisition
For any pair of types θB ∈ ΘB and θR ∈ ΘR we deﬁne the realized type game as the
complete information game that would result if it were common knowledge among
the two players that they are of exactly these two types.
We call the Bayesian game described in Section 2.2 a Bayesian conflict game if
every possible realized type game has a unique Nash equilibrium and if this Nash
equilibrium is in completely mixed strategies.23 We ﬁrst show that for positive costs
of empathy acquisition there cannot be an equilibrium of a conﬂict game in which
both players choose to acquire empathy with probability one.
Proposition 2.1. Consider a Bayesian conflict game. If costs of empathy acquisition
are positive, then no strategy profile with full empathy, i.e. with (ρB, ρR) = (1, 1), can
be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. On the contrary, if costs are zero, there is such a
full empathy equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Suppose a conﬂict game has an equilibrium with (ρB, ρR) =
(1, 1). Then whenever two types θB ∈ ΘB and θR ∈ ΘR meet, it is common knowl-
edge that this is the case and, as this happens with positive probability, they must
play a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding realized type game. Any realized type
game by deﬁnition has a unique Nash equilibrium and this Nash equilibrium is in
completely mixed strategies. Thus, every type of every player in every situation is
always indiﬀerent between all her pure actions. Hence, when costs are positive, any
player would be better oﬀ not acquiring empathy, thus saving c > 0, and playing any
(mixed) action. Arriving at a contradiction, we therefore have the proof for c > 0.
Observe however that this saving opportunity disappears for c = 0, meaning that
in this case the above strategy proﬁle is indeed an equilibrium of the conﬂict game.
Throughout the chapter we refer to this as the full empathy equilibrium.
Note that Proposition 2.1 leaves open the possibility that one (and only one)
player acquires empathy with probability one. Turning to a population interpretation
of (mixed) equilibrium (as in evolutionary game theory), Proposition 2.1 can be read
to say that we expect at least a fraction of the population for at least one player
position to not acquire empathy in equilibrium. For instance, if these games are
23In our main theorem and propositions we write “Bayesian conﬂict game”, to ensure that a
reader who only browses the chapter understands that the conﬂict games studied in this work have
incomplete information. Everywhere else in the chapter we simply write “conﬂict game” with the
understanding that we are nevertheless dealing with a Bayesian conﬂict game. Analogously, we refer
to Bayesian Nash equilibria of Bayesian conﬂict games simply as equilibria of conﬂict games.
2.4 Equilibrium Empathy Acquisition • 21
always played between one man and one woman (both randomly drawn from their
respective population), then for at least one of these two populations we expect that,
if costs of empathy acquisition are positive, some individuals do not have cognitive
empathy.
Suppose we consider symmetric conﬂict games, such as a Bayesian version of
the well-known rock-scissors-paper game. Suppose we are interested in the single
population evolutionary model. That is, there is one population of individuals from
which repeatedly two are randomly drawn to play the game. Then the appropriate
solution concept is symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium and Proposition 2.1 implies
that this population has a fraction of individuals without cognitive empathy.
In what follows we focus on two-action Bayesian conflict games, that is on conﬂict
games in which each player has two actions available. In two-action conﬂict games
we must have that one player always wants to coordinate actions while the other
wants to mis-coordinate actions. Throughout the chapter, the former is player B (or
blue) and the latter is player R (or red) for convenience. The Bayesian uncertainty
is then only about the intensity of these preferences. One could thus alternatively
describe a two-action conﬂict game as a non-zero-sum version of matching pennies
with incomplete information. One such game is given in the following example.
Example 2.2. Consider the two-action Bayesian conflict game with action set A =
{H,T}, type sets ΘB = {θB1 , θB2 } and ΘR = {θR1 , θR2 }, probability distributions over
types µB = µR =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
, and the payoffs as given in Figure 2.2 (where player B
chooses rows and R chooses columns).
H T
uθ
B
1 :
H 1 −1
T −1 1
H T
uθ
R
1 :
H −1 1
T 1 −1
H T
uθ
B
2 :
H 3 −1
T −1 1
H T
uθ
R
2 :
H −2 1
T 1 −1
Figure 2.2: Payoﬀs of the conﬂict game in Example 2.2
Note that the blue player has coordination preferences for all her types, while
the red player has mis-coordination preferences. Any realized type game, thus, has
only one Nash equilibrium, and that is in completely mixed strategies. The game
considered in the example is, therefore, a two-action conﬂict game. We are interested
in the Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game as a function of the cost of empathy
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acquisition. We know from Proposition 2.1 that, for positive costs, in equilibrium at
least one player does not acquire empathy with probability one. We are particularly
interested in how the probability of empathy acquisition in equilibrium changes when
we change the corresponding costs. Again from Proposition 2.1, we know that for
zero costs the conﬂict game has an equilibrium in which both players acquire empathy
with probability one. Therefore, one would expect that as costs tend to zero, the
probability of empathy acquisition of both players in all equilibria of the conﬂict
game tends to one. Surprisingly, this is not the case. This can be seen in the example
by computing the (unique) equilibrium of the conﬂict game for various cost levels.24
These are given in the following table.25
c ρB ρR σ
θB1
H (∅) σθ
B
2
H (∅) σθ
R
1
H (∅) σθ
R
2
H (∅)
10 0 0 0 1 2
3
0
1 0 0 0 1 2
3
0
9
10
0 1
6
2
45
43
45
4
5
0
4
5
1
10
1
6
4
81
68
81
98
125
2
125
1
2
1
10
1
6
16
81
56
81
16
25
4
25
1
10
1
10
1
6
32
81
40
81
56
125
44
125
0 1
10
1
6
4
9
4
9
2
5
2
5
Table 2.1: Equilibria of the conﬂict game in Example 2.2 for diﬀerent cost levels
c ≥ 0. We here provide only the equilibrium (mixed) action strategies players use
when they do not acquire empathy. For c ≤ 4
5
both players acquire empathy with
positive probability and the corresponding types, when informed, always play pure
actions.
For high costs, empathy acquisition is strictly dominated and players therefore
do not acquire empathy in equilibrium. Moreover, for every player p ∈ {B,R}
there seems to be a positive cost level Cp below which this player in equilibrium
acquires empathy with positive probability. This equilibrium probability of empathy
acquisition ρp seems to be strictly greater than zero and strictly less than one and
to remain constant for all cost levels lower than Cp. Even in the limit as costs tend
to zero the equilibrium still has the same probability of empathy acquisition. Also
there seems to be a unique equilibrium for all positive cost levels. In the remainder of
24Uniqueness follows from Proposition 2.3.
25These equilibria were computed using the game theory software Gambit by McKelvey et al.
(2014).
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this chapter we aim to see which of these statements are generally true in two-action
conﬂict games.
An informed and concerned reader might wonder how it is possible that for all
positive cost levels all equilibria of this conﬂict game have a probability of empathy
acquisition that is bounded away from one, given that we know that for zero costs
there is an equilibrium with probability one of empathy acquisition and given that
we know that the Nash equilibrium correspondence is upper hemi continuous in the
space of games (see e.g. Ritzberger, 2002, p. 292). The answer must be that indeed
even in the conﬂict game with zero costs there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in
which players acquire empathy with a probability that is less than one (see Table
2.1).
While, at this point, it is not at all clear why there would be a unique equilib-
rium in this game (as long as costs are positive and suﬃciently small), one can at
least understand the nature of this equilibrium. The key is to understand how the
indiﬀerence principle, i.e. the fact that in any mixed equilibrium a player must be
indiﬀerent between all actions in its support, applies here. By randomizing between
acquiring empathy and not doing so, a player does not make her opponent indiﬀerent
between acquiring empathy or not. If that were the case, the equilibrium probability
of acquiring empathy ρp would have to depend on the cost c (the opponent’s cost in
fact). But this is apparently not the case. In this equilibrium a player mixes between
acquiring empathy and not doing so apparently in order to make the uninformed
opponent types indiﬀerent between the two actions (see Lemma 2.1). On the other
hand, player types, when uninformed, randomize between the two actions in order
to make the opponent indiﬀerent between acquiring empathy and refraining from
doing so. This is apparent if we consider the mixed actions of the uninformed player
types. These mixed actions very much depend on the cost of empathy acquisition.
The higher the cost the more diverse are the mixed actions of the uninformed types.
This is done in such a way as to keep the player just indiﬀerent between acquiring
empathy at costs c and not doing so (see again Table 2.1).
The following theorem is the main result of this chapter. It establishes that in any
equilibrium of a two-action conﬂict game for any of the two players the probability of
empathy acquisition is bounded away from zero (if the considered player’s opponent
has at least two distinct types) and, even more importantly, bounded away from one
for all suﬃciently small positive costs. In order to state this theorem we require one
additional piece of notation. In a two-action conﬂict game, for any player p ∈ {B,R}
of any type θp ∈ Θp denote by x(θp) the probability of action H that, if played by the
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opponent, makes θp indiﬀerent between the two actions.26 One could call x(θp) the
indifference probability of type θp. Note that by assumption we have x(θp) ∈ (0, 1) for
all θp ∈ Θp and p ∈ {B,R}. Further, denote by θpmax (θpmin) the type which maximizes
(minimizes) the indiﬀerence probability x(θp).27
Theorem 2.1 (Bounds on Empathy). Consider a two-action Bayesian conflict game.
There exists C > 0 such that for all p ∈ {B,R} we have in any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium that
(i) ρp ≥ x(θ−pmax)− x(θ−pmin) if c ∈ [0, C) and
(ii) ρp < max
{
x(θ−pmax), 1− x(θ−pmin)
}
if c ∈ (0, C).
The proof of this theorem is somewhat lengthy and, like all other more complex
proofs, provided in the appendix. The proof rests on two lemmas that are of some
independent interest. We shall now state these lemmas, one after the other, give their
respective proof (or a sketch thereof with the full proof in the appendix), and then
sketch how they combine with some additional work to establish that equilibrium
empathy acquisition probabilities are bounded away from zero and one.
We ﬁrst show that in equilibrium any uninformed player type must be indiﬀerent
between both actions. Just as we do this for the indiﬀerence probabilities, we omit
the subscript H for ease of notation when considering action strategies in two-action
conﬂict games from here on.
Lemma 2.1. Consider a two-action Bayesian conflict game. Then there exists C > 0
such that for all c ∈ [0, C), p ∈ {B,R} and θp ∈ Θp it is
∑
θ−p∈Θ−p
µθ
−p
(
ρ−pσθ
−p
(θp) + (1− ρ−p)σθ−p(∅)
)
= x(θp) (2.1)
in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Sketch of Proof of Lemma 2.1. Suppose there is a player, w.l.o.g. blue, of some type
that is uninformed and not indiﬀerent between her two actions. Suppose, w.l.o.g. that
she prefers action H. As she is uninformed, she is facing a (mixed) action that is a
convex combination of all (mixed) actions of all opponent (red player) types. As she
prefersH against this mixture, and as blue is the coordination type, this mixture must
place a relatively high probability on H. But as this mixture is a convex combination
of mixed actions of all red types there must be one red type who also plays H with
26For a player p ∈ {B,R} we call two types θp1 , θp2 ∈ Θp distinct if it is x(θp1) 6= x(θp2).
27If any of these extreme types is not unique, simply choose one maximizer (minimizer) arbitrarily.
2.4 Equilibrium Empathy Acquisition • 25
higher probability. Thus, the same blue player type, when informed and facing that
red type, also plays H. But then the red player, the mis-coordination player, of this
type, when informed and playing against the considered blue type, must play T as
she is facing the pure action H. This ﬁnally can be used to argue that this implies on
the one hand that the red player is not acquiring empathy with high probability and
on the other hand that she is not playing close to T when of the considered type and
uninformed. But then, as costs are small, she should deviate to acquiring empathy
with probability one and playing T when meeting this given blue type.
The second intermediate result we need is that in equilibrium for each of the two
players there must be at least one type who, when informed and playing against
certain opponent types, cannot be indiﬀerent between both actions as long as costs
are positive.
Lemma 2.2. Consider a two-action Bayesian conflict game.28 If c > 0, then for any
Bayesian Nash equilibrium and p ∈ {B,R} with ρp > 0 there must exist θ¯p ∈ Θp and
θˆ−p, θ˜−p ∈ Θ−p such that
ρ−pσθˆ
−p
(θ¯p) + (1− ρ−p)σθˆ−p(∅) > x(θ¯p), (2.2a)
ρ−pσθ˜
−p
(θ¯p) + (1− ρ−p)σθ˜−p(∅) < x(θ¯p). (2.2b)
For p = B
(
p = R
)
this induces σθ¯
B
(θˆR) = 1 and σθ¯
B
(θ˜R) = 0
(
σθ¯
R
(θˆB) = 0 and
σθ¯
R
(θ˜B) = 1
)
.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. This proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.1. Suppose a
player p ∈ {B,R} acquires empathy with some positive probability ρp > 0 in equilib-
rium while costs are positive, i.e. c > 0. Now assume that every type θp of player p,
when informed, is indiﬀerent between the two actions H and T against any opponent
type θ−p. Then player p could beneﬁt strictly from deviating to acquiring empathy
with probability zero (thus, saving costs c > 0 with probability ρp > 0) and playing
any (mixed) action (not losing anything because of the complete indiﬀerence). Ar-
riving at a contradiction, we therefore have that there must be at least one player
type θ¯p strictly preferring H or T against some opponent type here. Together with
Lemma 2.1 this concludes the proof.
28The reader may feel that we use an overabundance of diﬀerent types in the statement of this
lemma. This is, unfortunately, necessary. There are three diﬀerent types for each player, denoted
θ¯p, θˆp, and θ˜p. It is important to realize that generally it may well be that all three types on each
side are diﬀerent from each other. In the case where there are only two types for one player, some
of these three types naturally must coincide. This additional structure allows us to prove more in
such cases. See Proposition 2.3.
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Note that, for the special case that the opponent −p only has one possible type,
Lemma 2.2 implies that for any positive cost of empathy acquisition player p does
not acquire empathy, i.e. ρp = 0, in any equilibrium. This must be true as in this
case player p already knows her opponent’s only possible type (this is implicit in the
assumption of common knowledge of the conﬂict game).
Consider ﬁrst Part (i) of Theorem 2.1, which states that there is a speciﬁc lower
bound on the equilibrium probabilities of empathy acquisition.
Sketch of Proof of Theorem 2.1(i). The key to this part is Lemma 2.1. It states that
every type of any player, when uninformed, must be indiﬀerent between both actions
as long as costs are suﬃciently small. Consider, w.l.o.g., the red player and assume
that x(θRmax) > x(θ
R
min) (otherwise the lower bound is trivially satisﬁed). Now both
player types θRmax and θ
R
min must be indiﬀerent between both actions when uninformed.
These two red types, however, face the same distribution over actions if the blue
player’s probability of empathy acquisition is zero. Why? If the blue player did not
acquire empathy, she cannot recognize the red player’s type and cannot condition
her action strategy on that information. On the other hand, the two (extreme)
red types cannot be both indiﬀerent between the two actions if they are facing the
same distribution. Thus, arriving at a contradiction, it must be that the blue player
acquires empathy with positive probability. In fact the exact lower bound can be
obtained by taking the diﬀerence between equation(s) (2.1) for the extreme types
θRmax and θ
R
min.
The key statement in Part (ii) of the theorem is that it establishes an upper bound,
strictly below one, for each player’s equilibrium probability of empathy acquisition.
What this upper bound is, is less important. In the appendix we, in fact, prove two
results that imply the existence of an upper bound strictly below one. One is as
stated in Theorem 2.1(ii), the other is stated in the appendix as Theorem 2.1(ii)’.
The respective statements are similar but neither implies the other. The former is
more elegant in its expression, the latter is more intuitive in its proof. Therefore, we
choose to present the sketch of proof for the more intuitively explainable Theorem
2.1(ii)’ here.
Sketch of Proof of Theorem 2.1(ii)’. Let us, w.l.o.g., focus on the blue player (the
coordination preference player). Assume that the blue player acquires empathy with
a probability greater than the stated bound, say close to one. By Lemma 2.2 we
know that, in equilibrium, there must be a type of blue player who, when informed,
has the strict preference to play H against some type of red player. This type of red
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player, when informed herself and meeting the given type of blue player, then faces
with high likelihood an informed blue player who plays H. Her best response then
(being the mis-coordination player) is to play T against this blue type. But as the
informed blue type’s equilibrium action against this red type is H, two things must
be true about the red player. First, she cannot be too informed, i.e. her probability
of acquiring empathy must be low, and second, when she is of the considered type
and uninformed, she must play H with a high probability. But this means, as the
cost of empathy acquisition is small, that the red player could strictly beneﬁt from
deviating to acquiring empathy and then, when she is of this red type, play T against
this blue type. Arriving at a contradiction, in any equilibrium the assumption of a
highly empathic blue player cannot hold. A similar argument can be made for the
red player.
While generally we do not know whether there can be equilibria in two-action
conﬂict games in which a player’s probability of empathy acquisition is close to the
upper bound(s) stated in Theorem 2.1, we can establish that there is, for small costs,
always an equilibrium in which the lower bound is achieved.
Proposition 2.2. For every two-action Bayesian conflict game there exists C > 0
such that for all c ∈ [0, C) it has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium with
ρp = x(θ−pmax)− x(θ−pmin)
for both p ∈ {B,R}.
The proof of this proposition is constructive and given in the appendix. The
key to reaching the lower bound for the probability of empathy acquisition is to let
all informed types of player p ∈ {B,R} play H against opponent type θ−pmax and T
against type θ−pmin. Taking into account Lemma 2.1, this immediately pins down the
equilibrium probability of empathy acquisition of player p and it is exactly the lower
bound. The equilibrium is then further constructed by letting uninformed types mix
in a way that makes the opponent −p indiﬀerent between acquiring empathy and not
doing so. This is similar as in the discussion of the equilibria in Example 2.2.
With more than two types for one player and at least two for the other, this kind
of equilibrium can be constructed in diﬀerent ways. In general, this gives rise to a
continuum of equilibria that diﬀer in terms of players’ action strategies but not in
terms of their information strategies. See Corollary 2.3 in Appendix 2.B (and the
proof of Proposition 2.2 which additionally captures the case in which a player does
not have distinct types) for a characterization of this class of equilibria. In what
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follows, any representative of this class is called a partial empathy equilibrium. Note,
however, that a player acquires empathy with probability zero in such an equilibrium
if her opponent does not have distinct types.
We do not know whether general two-action conﬂict games with positive costs of
empathy acquisition can actually have equilibria in which a player’s probability of
empathy acquisition is strictly greater than this lower bound. For any such game
with either two types for both players or a single type for one player we can show,
however, that the partial empathy equilibrium considered in the proof of Proposition
2.2 is indeed the only equilibrium.29
Proposition 2.3. For every two-action Bayesian conflict game with only one type
for one player and more than one type for the other player or with exactly two types
for both players there exists C > 0 such that for all c ∈ (0, C) and p ∈ {B,R} the
probability of empathy acquisition is ρp = x(θ−pmax) − x(θ−pmin) in any Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. In these cases the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is uniquely determined
by the strategy profile considered in the proof of Proposition 2.2 if there is a unique
maximal type θpmax and a unique minimal type θ
p
min for both players p ∈ {B,R}. 30
The proof is again given in the appendix. The key for this proposition is to realize
that with a limited number of types for at least one player we can pin down behavior
of all types of this player fairly quickly with the help of Theorem 2.1. Things turn
out to be much more complex if both players have many types, as then all we know
is, for instance, that there is one type of player red who plays H against some type of
player blue, but we do not know which types these are. If there are only two types on
both sides, for instance, then by starting with one type who does something speciﬁc
against one opponent type all other types’ behavior follows.
Finally, note that applying Proposition 2.3 to the game considered in Example
2.2 implies that the partial empathy equilibrium we listed in Table 2.1 for c = 1
10
, 1
2
, 4
5
is unique for c > 0 suﬃciently small.
29While, generally, Corollary 2.3 characterizes a continuum of equilibria, it is easy to see that, in
the case with two (distinct) types per player, this condenses to the equilibrium considered in the
proof of Proposition 2.2.
30In the case in which one player p ∈ {B,R} has a single type the equilibrium is in fact unique
up to variations of the action strategies σθ
−p
(θp) of the informed opponent types which are played
with probability ρ−p = 0.
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this work, we study two-player conﬂict situations with ex-ante uncertainty over
(the exact) opponent preferences for both players. We allow players, before learning
their own payoﬀ type, to acquire cognitive empathy at some (small) cost. Cognitive
empathy enables a player to learn the preferences of her opponent in all situations.
There are at least two ways we can interpret this model. The ﬁrst interpretation
is that there are indeed two strategic opponents (the two soccer players from the
introduction, two ﬁrms, two military generals, etc.) who are involved in a conﬂict
situation and who can acquire information about their opponent’s ex ante unknown
preferences. Given this interpretation, we ﬁnd that in equilibrium these strategic
players do not fully acquire information about their opponent’s preferences, even if
the cost of doing so is vanishingly small. A second interpretation is that there are
many individuals who are often and somewhat randomly engaged in pairwise conﬂict
situations and mother nature can endow these individuals (each individual separately)
with cognitive empathy, i.e. with the ability to understand opponents’ preferences,
at some positive cost (e.g. by providing an additional brain function). Under the
assumption that nature guides play to an evolutionary stable state, which must be a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game, our results can be read to imply that nature
endows some but not all of her subjects with cognitive empathy, even if the costs of
doing so are essentially zero.
Our model is simple and sparse and many alterations and additions are conceiv-
able. In what follows we discuss additional consequences of our results as well as
some possible modiﬁcations of our model and what we know or believe about how
these change our main results.
2.5.1 Empathy Acquisition at Zero Costs
In this subsection we provide a corollary to (the proof of) Proposition 2.2 for the
special case of zero costs of empathy acquisition that allows us to provide additional
intuition for our main result.
Corollary 2.1. Any two-action Bayesian conflict game with c = 0 has a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium with partial empathy, i.e. ρp ∈ [0, 1), and
ρpσθ
p
(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅) = x(θ−p)
for all p ∈ {B,R}, θp ∈ Θp, θ−p ∈ Θ−p.
30 • 2 Cognitive Empathy in Conﬂict Situations
Why is this of interest? This corollary implies that an outside observer who
can observe the two players’ types would observe, for any pair of types, a frequency
of actions exactly as given by the Nash equilibrium of the realized type game (in
which that game is common knowledge). In other words, even though when the
two types meet, players are far from having common knowledge that the two are of
these particular types, they nevertheless manage to play “as if” they had common
knowledge of this fact.31 Expressed diﬀerently, the two equilibria we identify for two-
action conﬂict games with zero costs are, in this sense, observationally equivalent.
That is to say an outside observer who observes all types would see the same frequency
of actions (as a function of type pairs) in both equilibria.
In another sense, the two equilibria are observationally distinct. Consider the evo-
lutionary interpretation of this game. Then individuals would either have empathy or
not and both kinds would exist in the partial empathy equilibrium but not in the full
empathy equilibrium. In the partial empathy equilibrium, an outside observer, who
observes all types and could follow individuals’ behavior in many conﬂict situations,
could quickly identify which of the individuals are empathic (always uses the same
pure action against certain opponent types) and which are not (these always mix
between pure actions against the same type of opponent). In the full empathy equi-
librium the observer would note that all types always mix (in a certain way). Thus,
the observer could tell whether one or the other equilibrium is played (provided the
observer can observe many interactions of the same individuals).
2.5.2 Equilibrium Payoffs
In this subsection we turn to a discussion of equilibrium payoﬀs in two-action conﬂict
games with the (costly) possibility of empathy acquisition. Note that, when we talk
about the payoﬀ to an (informed) type, we mean the payoﬀ without taking into ac-
count the costs of empathy acquisition that players have to bear. In contrast, these
costs are included when considering players’ ex-ante expected payoﬀs. In what fol-
lows, the full empathy equilibrium under zero costs, which we know from Proposition
2.1, is referred to as the benchmark case. Consider ﬁrst the case of costs being small.
Corollary 2.2. Consider a two-action Bayesian conflict game. There exists C > 0
such that for all c ∈ (0, C) we have that in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(i) every player obtains an ex-ante expected payoff equal to her ex-ante expected
payoff in the benchmark case,
31This insight could be useful if one were to attempt to generalize our result to more than two
actions.
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(ii) every uninformed type for each player obtains the same expected payoff as she
does in the benchmark case, and
(iii) for each player acquiring empathy with positive probability there is at least one
type who, when informed, obtains a strictly higher expected payoff than she
obtains in the benchmark case.
This set of statements is a corollary to Lemma 2.1, Theorem 2.1, and Proposition
2.1. In particular, Part (i) follows from the fact that all types, when uninformed,
are indiﬀerent between both actions in any equilibrium by Lemma 2.1 and all players
acquiring empathy with positive probability are ex ante indiﬀerent between acquiring
empathy and not doing so by Theorem 2.1(ii). Part (ii) follows from Lemma 2.1 alone.
Part (iii) follows from Part (i) and the fact that players have to bear a cost of c > 0
for acquiring empathy.
This corollary, thus, states that there is a sense in which in two-action conﬂict
games for all cost levels, provided they are small enough, all equilibria are ex ante
payoﬀ equivalent (if we consider payoﬀs net of costs). As costs are positive, this
implies that some types of players must, when informed, expect higher payoﬀs than
they expect when they are uninformed. However, unlike in the proof of Proposition
2.2, this must not be the case for all types. According to Corollary 2.3 there are
in general even equilibria in which only one type of a player obtains a payoﬀ being
strictly greater than in the benchmark case.
Before we turn to the case of large costs, it is fruitful to partition the class of
conﬂict games into two subclasses. These are inspired by Pruzhansky (2011). For
every type θp ∈ Θp of a player p ∈ {B,R} deﬁne the type-induced zero-sum game as
the complete information game in which player p has preferences given by her type,
i.e. given by uθ
p
, and her opponent has preferences −uθp . We call a type immuniz-
able if the type-induced zero-sum game has no strictly dominated (mixed) strategy
for both players. Moreover, we call a type robustly immunizable if the type-induced
zero-sum game has no weakly dominated (mixed) strategy for both players.32 Let
us further call a conﬂict game immunizable if every type of every player is immu-
nizable. On the contrary, if in a conﬂict game there is at least one type being not
immunizable, then this game is called non-immunizable. Example 2.2 is an example
of an immunizable (two-action) conﬂict game. There are, however, conﬂict games
that are non-immunizable. Consider again Example 2.2 and modify the preferences
32Note that in a conﬂict game no type has a dominated action strategy. A type in a conﬂict game
is therefore (robustly) immunizable if her ﬁctitious zero-sum opponent in the type-induced zero-sum
game has no strictly (weakly) dominated strategy.
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of the second type of player B as given in Figure 2.3.
H T
H 3 -1
T 2 1
Figure 2.3: Modiﬁed payoﬀs to player θB2 in the conﬂict game provided in Example
2.2.
The game, so modiﬁed, is still a conﬂict game (i.e. every realized type game has
a unique Nash equilibrium and that is in mixed strategies). However, the game is
non-immunizable as the modiﬁed second type of player B is not immunizable: the
type-induced zero-sum game for this modiﬁed second type of player B is such that,
for the ﬁctitious zero-sum opponent, action T strictly dominates action H.
We choose the label “immunizable” because of a result due to Pruzhansky (2011,
p. 355). He shows that in any complete information game with two immunizable
players (in the above sense) both players have “equalizer” strategies. If a player
adopts an “equalizer” strategy, she gets the same expected payoﬀ regardless of the
action taken by the opponent. He then shows in his Lemma 1, that in any complete
information game with immunizable players on both sides every equalizer strategy
is a maxmin strategy. Moreover, he shows in his Lemma 2 that equalizer strategies
guarantee the player the Nash equilibrium payoﬀ in such games. This generalizes the
insight found by Aumann and Maschler (1972) in their example.
With this partition of conﬂict games in hand we can now turn to the discussion
of payoﬀs in equilibria for large costs of empathy acquisition.
Remark 2.1. Consider a two-action Bayesian conflict game with costs of empathy
acquisition so high that any strategy including empathy acquisition is dominated by
one without empathy acquisition. If this game is immunizable, then in any Bayesian
Nash equilibrium we have that
(i) for every player every (necessarily uninformed) type obtains an expected payoff
that is at least as large as in the benchmark case, and
(ii) every player p ∈ {B,R} having at least two robustly immunizable types θp1, θp2 ∈
Θp with x(θp1) 6= x(θp2) obtains an ex-ante expected payoff strictly larger than
her ex-ante expected payoff in the benchmark case.
Further, if this game is non-immunizable, then in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium we
have that
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(iii) for every player every (necessarily uninformed) type being not immunizable ob-
tains an expected payoff that is strictly larger than her maxmin payoff.
However, in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of such a non-immunizable game there can
be
(iv) (necessarily uninformed) types of a player who obtain an expected payoff that is
strictly larger, respectively strictly lower, than her expected payoff in the bench-
mark case, and even
(v) players who have an ex-ante expected payoff that is strictly larger, respectively
strictly lower, than her ex-ante expected payoff in the benchmark case.
To see Part (i) of the remark one can use the result of Pruzhansky (2011) (see
above) that in such games any type of any player’s maxmin payoﬀ is equal to her
Nash equilibrium payoﬀ in any realized type game. The latter payoﬀ is the payoﬀ this
type of player obtains in the benchmark case. As she can always guarantee herself
this payoﬀ by playing her maxmin action strategy, she can certainly never receive
less in any equilibrium for any cost level. Moreover, as players are uninformed here,
each type faces the same average opponent action strategy. Under the additional
assumption of Part (ii) this means that in any equilibrium at least one of the two
robustly immunizable types must have incentives to play a pure action strategy which
makes her strictly better oﬀ than in the benchmark case. This, together with Part
(i), proves Part (ii).
Part (iii) of the remark follows from the observation that in a two-action conﬂict
game, to prevent a player type that is not immunizable from obtaining more than
the maxmin payoﬀ (which she can of course guarantee herself), the opponent needs
to play a pure action. However, one can show that in any equilibrium of such a game
the opponent, on average, does not use a pure action strategy. Therefore every such
player type must receive a payoﬀ being strictly larger than her maxmin payoﬀ.
Finally, to see Parts (iv) and (v) of the remark, we consider the following example.
Example 2.3. Consider the two-action Bayesian conflict game with action set A =
{H,T}, type sets ΘB = {θB1 , θB2 } and ΘR = {θR1 , θR2 }, probability distributions over
types µB = µR =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
, and the payoffs as given in Figure 2.4 with a, b ∈ R (where
player B chooses rows and R chooses columns).
In this example, if we set a = −1 and b = 1 we obtain Example 2.2. Now consider
a = 2 and b = −3
2
. Note ﬁrst that this is still a conﬂict game but that it is non-
immunizable as, given these parameter values, types θB2 and θ
R
2 are not immunizable.
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H T
uθ
B
1 :
H 1 −1
T −1 1
H T
uθ
R
1 :
H −1 1
T 1 −1
H T
uθ
B
2 :
H 3 −1
T a 1
H T
uθ
R
2 :
H −2 b
T 1 −1
Figure 2.4: Payoﬀs of the conﬂict game in Example 2.3.
Further, note that the indiﬀerence probabilities are given by x(θB1 ) =
1
2
, x(θB2 ) =
2
3
,
x(θR1 ) =
1
2
, and x(θR2 ) =
4
5
.
One can verify that the following is an equilibrium of this game under large costs.
Obviously, we need to have ρB = ρR = 0, i.e. no empathy is acquired. Furthermore,
let σθ
B
1 (∅) = σθR2 (∅) = 1 and σθB2 (∅) = σθR1 (∅) = 0.
One can then verify that type θB2 receives an equilibrium payoﬀ of
3
2
while in
any realized type game her payoﬀ in the unique Nash equilibrium would be 5
3
. Her
payoﬀ in the considered equilibrium of the conﬂict game under large costs is thus
strictly lower than her payoﬀ in the benchmark case. On the other hand, type θR2
receives an equilibrium payoﬀ of −1
2
which is strictly larger than her payoﬀ of −7
5
which she obtains in any realized type game and, thus, in the benchmark case. As in
the considered equilibrium all other types expect the same payoﬀ (of zero) as in the
benchmark case, player B receives a lower ex-ante expected payoﬀ here than in the
benchmark case, while for player R the opposite is true.
2.5.3 The Timing of Decisions
Given the evolutionary interpretation of our model and the idea that nature’s subjects
play many conﬂict games with often diﬀerent preferences throughout their life, it
seems appropriate that nature makes the decision about empathy acquisition at the
very beginning. Also in the other interpretation, in which players are consciously
strategic about their choice of information acquisition, it can make sense to have
the information acquisition decision before knowing the exact nature of the conﬂict
situation. A soccer team may study the opposing goalkeeper for the eventuality of a
penalty kick before knowing whether the goalkeeper will incur an injury or which of
their own players will actually take the penalty kick. A military general might want
to spy on her opponent’s preferences before knowing the future strength of the own
troop or on which terrain, in which place, at which state of the war etc. the actual
battle will take place. A ﬁrm might decide on research activities on another ﬁrm’s
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motives before they know whether they are facing a merger or a hostile takeover.
There are certainly cases, however, in which the reverse timing is just as plausible.
That is we could envision a version of our model in which players consider acquiring
the information about their opponent’s preferences only after they know their own
preferences.
In Footnote 22 we have already thought about this issue and found that, for
the given non-conﬂict example (see Example 2.1), the main insight does not change.
We have also looked at the reverse-timing model for the conﬂict example given as
Example 2.2. We shall not go through this here but it suﬃces to say that, while small
details change, the main result, that for small positive costs of empathy acquisition
any equilibrium has partial cognitive empathy, seems to remain unchanged.33 In
fact, all types acquire partial empathy in this example: the probability of empathy
acquisition is, as in our main result, bounded from below and above. It is, however,
unlike in our model with two actions and two types, not constant for all small costs
of empathy acquisition. Still, we expect our main theorem to hold in principal also
in the model in which the timing of empathy acquisition and of learning one’s type
is reversed.
2.5.4 Degrees of Cognitive Empathy
Another issue, especially for the evolutionary interpretation of our model, is this. If
nature has to make her decision on cognitive empathy at the beginning once and
for all possible situations, then these “all possible situations” should probably cover
more than just conﬂict games. And, if these situations include, for instance, the
three possible types (for both players) as given in our non-conﬂict example, then for
small costs nature would always endow her subjects with full empathy. One could
now state that it is therefore a question of which is smaller, the cost of empathy
acquisition or the probability of these three types, but this is not where we want to
go in this discussion. Instead, we think that a better model in such cases would be
one in which nature can give her subjects degrees of empathy. For instance, nature
could give us enough cognitive empathy to always check whether or not our opponent
has a dominant action strategy, but if our opponent does not, nature may not give
us more cognitive empathy to diﬀerentiate our opponent’s preferences further. The
result would then be as in our model.
A similar response could be made to the ultimate implication of the following
33To be precise, we used Gambit by McKelvey et al. (2014) and found exactly one equilibrium.
We have not attempted to prove that this equilibrium is unique but we conjecture that it is.
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consideration. Consider, for convenience, our result for two-action conﬂict games
with two types per player. For these games Proposition 2.3 implies that a player’s
probability of empathy acquisition is exactly given by the diﬀerence of the two indif-
ference probabilities of her two opponent types. This means that the more similar
her two opponent types are, the more similar are their indiﬀerence probabilities and
the less empathy is acquired by her. This is also true for the lower bound established
for the probability of empathy acquisition in our main theorem. In particular, this
also implies that the more diﬀerent kinds of situations a person faces, i.e. the bigger
the possible diﬀerence between the possible opponent types, the more empathy is
acquired. If this goes as far as to include even dominant strategy types, she has to
acquire full empathy. To tackle this issue one could build a model of empathy acqui-
sition more like that of “rational (in)attention” as in the decision theoretic models of
Sims (2003, 2006); Matêjka and McKay (2012, 2015). Adapting these models to our
strategic interaction setting could be done by allowing players to buy signals about
their opponent’s preferences of any precision but where the costs of these signals are
increasing in the information content of these signals, as measure, for instance, by
their entropy. Another model would be to allow individuals to acquire multiple sig-
nals of whatever precision, one after the other, about their opponent’s preferences,
before making their ﬁnal action decision. While we do not think that the main in-
sight of our work would change in such a model, it might nevertheless add substantial
additional insights, the pursuit of which we leave to future research.
Appendix 2.A Proofs
Throughout this section we again abuse notation of action strategies in two-action
conﬂict games slightly by denoting by σθ
p
(·) ∈ [0, 1] the probability of H chosen
by player p of type θp. For ease of notation, when it comes to the arguments of
utility functions uθ
p
, we also only mention the probabilities of action H. And ﬁnally,
let UθpInfo denote the (interim) expected payoﬀ of a type θp ∈ Θp of player p if she
acquired empathy and before she learns her opponent’s type. Similarly, UθpN denotes
the expected payoﬀ of a type θp of player p who did not acquire empathy.
2.A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
For p ∈ {B,R}, θp ∈ Θp we deﬁne
CBH (θB, θR) := uθ
R
(0, 1)− uθR(x(θB), 1),
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CBT (θB, θR) := uθ
R
(1, 0)− uθR(x(θB), 0),
CRH (θB, θR) := uθ
B
(1, 1)− uθB(x(θR), 1), and
CRT (θB, θR) := uθ
B
(0, 0)− uθB(x(θR), 0).
Notice that CB·(θB, θR) > 0
(
CR·(θB, θR) > 0
)
for all θB ∈ ΘB, θR ∈ ΘR as player R
wants to mis-coordinate (as player B wants to coordinate). Based on this let
C := min
a∈{BH ,BT ,RH ,RT }
min
θB ,θR
µθ
B
µθ
R
Ca(θB, θR).
W.l.o.g. we consider player p = B and assume that we have
∑
θR
µθ
R
(
ρRσθ
R
(θ¯B) + (1− ρR)σθR(∅)
)
> x(θ¯B)
for some θ¯B ∈ ΘB.34 Since player B wants to coordinate actions, this implies σθ¯B(∅) =
1 (if ρB < 1). Furthermore, if a probability weighted sum of terms exceeds x(θ¯B),
then at least one term must exceed x(θ¯B) as well. Thus, there must exist a type θ¯R
such that
ρRσθ¯
R
(θ¯B) + (1− ρR)σθ¯R(∅) > x(θ¯B). (2.3)
In turn, this implies σθ¯
B
(θ¯R) = 1 (if ρB > 0), meaning that
ρBσθ¯
B
(θ¯R) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) = 1 > x(θ¯R).
Moreover, it is obvious that this equality and inequality also hold for ρB = 0 and
ρB = 1. As player R wants to mis-coordinate, this implies σθ¯
R
(θ¯B) = 0 (if ρR > 0).
Inserting the latter into inequality (2.3) gives
(1− ρR)σθ¯R(∅) > x(θ¯B).
Again, it is obvious that this inequality is satisﬁed for ρR = 0 as well. It follows
from this that 1 − ρR > x(θ¯B) and σθ¯R(∅) > x(θ¯B). Hence, for c ∈ [0, C) player
R can improve her payoﬀ by deviating to a strategy with ρˆR = 1 and obtaining an
34Observe that the subsequent line of argument is almost identical for the reversed inequality as
well as for p = R. Thus, we can omit these cases.
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additional payoﬀ of at least
(1− ρR)
(
µθ¯
R
µθ¯
B
(
uθ¯
R
(0, 1)− uθ¯R(σθ¯R(∅), 1)
)
− c
)
> x(θ¯B)
(
µθ¯
R
µθ¯
B
(
uθ¯
R
(0, 1)− uθ¯R(x(θ¯B), 1)
)
− c
)
> 0.
We thus arrive at a contradiction.
2.A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
We need one additional, purely technical lemma, in order to prove Theorem 2.1.
Lemma 2.3. Consider α, β′, β′′, γ ∈ R where β′ − β′′ ≤ α. Then (at least) one of
the following three conditions must be satisfied:
α+ (1− α)γ = β′ and (1− α)γ = β′′, (2.4a)
α+ (1− α)γ > β′ or (2.4b)
(1− α)γ < β′′. (2.4c)
Proof of Lemma 2.3. Suppose none of the three conditions is satisﬁed. Then we
obtain
α+ (1− α)γ < (≤)β′ and
(1− α)γ ≥ (>)β′′.
In either case, subtracting the second from the ﬁrst inequality yields
α < β′ − β′′ ≤ α,
a contradiction.
Having established this lemma, we can now turn to the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. In the following we distinguish between the two parts.
Part (i): Lower Bound
From Lemma 2.1 and equation (2.1) it follows immediately that for all p ∈ {B,R},
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θp ∈ Θp
ρp
(∑
θp
µθ
p
σθ
p
(θ−pmax)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
−∑
θp
µθ
p
σθ
p
(θ−pmin)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
)
= x(θ−pmax)− x(θ−pmin).
Hence, we have that ρp ≥ x(θ−pmax)− x(θ−pmin).
Part (ii): Upper Bound
We here prove the upper bound for player p. The statement is trivially satisﬁed if
ρp = 0. Thus, suppose that ρp > 0. We need to distinguish two diﬀerent cases.
Case 1: ρ−p = 0
Given the lower bound we proved in Part (i), we then must have that x(θpmax) =
x(θpmin). Lemma 2.2 then implies that there are two opponent types θˆ
−p and θ˜−p such
that
σθˆ
−p
(∅) > x(θp),
σθ˜
−p
(∅) < x(θp)
for all θp. For p = B
(
p = R
)
this induces σθ
p
(θˆ−p) = 1 and σθ
p
(θ˜−p) = 0
(
σθ
p
(θˆ−p) =
0 and σθ
p
(θ˜−p) = 1
)
for all θp ∈ Θp. Applying Lemma 2.1 yields
ρp
(∑
θp
µθ
p
σθ
p
(θˆ−p)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 (=0)
−∑
θp
µθ
p
σθ
p
(θ˜−p)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (=1)
)
= x(θˆ−p)− x(θ˜−p).
Taking into account Part (i) this gives
ρp = x(θ−pmax)− x(θ−pmin) < min
{
x(θ−pmax), 1− x(θ−pmin)
}
(2.5)
≤ max
{
x(θ−pmax), 1− x(θ−pmin)
}
.
Case 2: ρ−p > 0
The reasoning is very similar for both players and w.l.o.g. we consider the case p = B.
Again, Lemma 2.2 implies that there is a type θ¯B and that there are two opponent
types θˆR and θ˜R such that
α+ (1− α)γ = ρBσθ¯B(θˆR) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅),
(1− α)γ = ρBσθ¯B(θ˜R) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅)
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with α = ρB and γ = σθ¯
B
(∅). As we have already seen that x(θRmax) − x(θRmin) is a
lower bound for ρB, according to Lemma 2.3 one of the following three subcases must
apply:
Subcase 2(a): ρBσθ¯
B
(θˆR) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) = x(θˆR) and
ρBσθ¯
B
(θ˜R) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) = x(θ˜R)
This subcase is straightforward. We simply have
ρB = x(θˆR)− x(θ˜R) ≤ x(θRmax)− x(θRmin) < max
{
x(θRmax), 1− x(θRmin)
}
.
Subcase 2(b): ρBσθ¯
B
(θˆR) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) > x(θˆR)
This subcase implies that σθˆ
R
(θ¯B) = 0. Moreover, by Lemma 2.1 there must exist
θ˘B 6= θ¯B such that
ρBσθ˘
B
(θˆR) + (1− ρB)σθ˘B(∅) < x(θˆR). (2.6)
This induces σθˆ
R
(θ˘B) = 1. Furthermore, according to inequality (2.2a) we have
x(θ¯B) < ρR σθˆ
R
(θ¯B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+(1− ρR)σθˆR(∅) = (1− ρR)σθˆR(∅).
Applying Lemma 2.3 again – here with α = ρR, β′ = x(θ˘B), β′′ = x(θ¯B), and
γ = σθˆ
R
(∅) – then gives
x(θ˘B) < ρR + (1− ρR)σθˆR(∅) = ρRσθˆR(θ˘B) + (1− ρR)σθˆR(∅). (2.7)
In turn, this induces σθ˘
B
(θˆR) = 1. By inserting the latter into inequality (2.6) we get
ρB + (1− ρB)σθ˘B(∅) < x(θˆR),
which implies
ρB < x(θˆR) ≤ max
{
x(θRmax), 1− x(θRmin)
}
.
Subcase 2(c): ρBσθ¯
B
(θ˜R) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) < x(θ˜R)
This subcase is in large parts quite similar to the previous one. It implies that
σθ˜
R
(θ¯B) = 1. Moreover, again by Lemma 2.1 there must exist θ˘B 6= θ¯B such that
ρBσθ˘
B
(θ˜R) + (1− ρB)σθ˘B(∅) > x(θ˜R). (2.8)
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This induces σθ˜
R
(θ˘B) = 0. According to inequality (2.2b) it is
x(θ¯B) > ρR σθ˜
R
(θ¯B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+(1− ρR)σθ˜R(∅) = ρR + (1− ρR)σθ˜R(∅).
Applying again Lemma 2.3 – here with α = ρR, β′ = x(θ¯B), β′′ = x(θ˘B), and
γ = σθ˜
R
(∅) – then gives
x(θ˘B) > (1− ρR)σθ˜R(∅) = ρRσθ˜R(θ˘B) + (1− ρR)σθ˜R(∅). (2.9)
In turn, this induces σθ˘
B
(θ˜R) = 0. By inserting the latter into inequality (2.8) we get
(1− ρB)σθ˘B(∅) > x(θ˜R)
⇔ σθ˘B(∅)− x(θ˜R) > ρBσθ˘B(∅)
⇒ ρB < 1− x(θ˜R) ≤ max
{
x(θRmax), 1− x(θRmin)
}
.
2.A.3 An Alternative to Theorem 2.1
Theorem 2.1(ii)’. Consider a two-action Bayesian conflict game. For all ǫ > 0
there exists C > 0 such that for all p ∈ {B,R} and c ∈ (0, C) we have
ρp < min
{
x(θ−pmax), 1− x(θ−pmin)
}
+ ǫ
in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2.1(ii)’. From inequality (2.5) in Case 1 of the proof of Part (ii) of
Theorem 2.1 we already know for p ∈ {B,R} that
ρp < min
{
x(θ−pmax), 1− x(θ−pmin)
}
in any equilibrium with ρ−p = 0. Therefore, we only need to consider the case
ρ−p > 0.
For p ∈ {B,R}, θp ∈ Θp we deﬁne
CBH (ǫ, θB, θR) := uθ
R
(0, x(θR) + ǫ)− uθR(x(θB), x(θR) + ǫ),
CBT (ǫ, θB, θR) := uθ
R
(1, x(θR)− ǫ)− uθR(x(θB), x(θR)− ǫ),
CRH (ǫ, θB, θR) := uθ
B
(1, x(θB) + ǫ)− uθB(x(θR), x(θB) + ǫ), and
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CRT (ǫ, θB, θR) := uθ
B
(0, x(θB)− ǫ)− uθB(x(θR), x(θB)− ǫ).
Notice that, as in the proof of Lemma 2.1, we have CB·(ǫ, θB, θR) > 0
(
CR·(ǫ, θB, θR) >
0
)
for all θB ∈ ΘB, θR ∈ ΘR as player R wants to mis-coordinate (as player B wants
to coordinate). Based on this let
C(ǫ) := min
a∈{BH ,BT ,RH ,RT }
min
θB ,θR
µθ
B
µθ
R
Ca(ǫ, θB, θR).
Now assume that the statement of the theorem does not hold. Then there must exist
c ∈ (0, C(ǫ)) such that
(a) ρp ≥ x(θ−pmax) + ǫ or
(b) ρp ≥ 1− x(θ−pmin) + ǫ
for some p ∈ {B,R} in an equilibrium. Again, the reasoning is almost identical for
both players and w.l.o.g. we consider p = B.
Case (a): ρB ≥ x(θRmax) + ǫ
As we are in the situation of Lemma 2.2, we know that there exist types θ¯B ∈
ΘB, θˆR ∈ ΘR such that σθ¯B(θˆR) = 1. We then have
ρBσθ¯
B
(θˆR) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) ≥ x(θˆR) + ǫ > x(θˆR). (2.10)
This implies that σθˆ
R
(θ¯B) = 0 as player R wants to mis-coordinate and as ρR > 0.
Inserting this into inequality (2.2a) gives
(1− ρR)σθˆR(∅) > x(θ¯B).
From this we deduce that 1 − ρR > x(θ¯B) and σθˆR(∅) > x(θ¯B). Now consider an
alternative strategy for player R with ρ˘R = 1 and σθ
R
(θB) a best response for all
θB ∈ ΘB, θR ∈ ΘR. Taking into account inequality (2.10) we ﬁnd that by deviating
to this strategy player R would obtain an additional payoﬀ of at least
(1− ρR)
(
µθ¯
B
µθˆ
R
(
uθˆ
R
(0, ρBσθ¯
B
(θˆR) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅))
− uθˆR(σθˆR(∅), ρBσθ¯B(θˆR) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅))
)
− c
)
≥ (1− ρR)
(
µθ¯
B
µθˆ
R
(
uθˆ
R
(0, x(θˆR) + ǫ)− uθˆR(σθˆR(∅), x(θˆR) + ǫ)
)
− c
)
> x(θ¯B)
(
µθ¯
B
µθˆ
R
(
uθˆ
R
(0, x(θˆR) + ǫ)− uθˆR(x(θ¯B), x(θˆR) + ǫ)
)
− c
)
> 0
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as we have c ∈ (0, C(ǫ)). We, thus, arrive at a contradiction.
Case (b): ρB ≥ 1− x(θRmin) + ǫ
Notice ﬁrst that this inequality is equivalent to 1− ρB ≤ x(θRmin)− ǫ. The approach
here is similar to Case (a). Here, we have from Lemma 2.2 that there exist types
θ¯B ∈ ΘB, θ˜R ∈ ΘR with σθ¯B(θ˜R) = 0. This implies
ρBσθ¯
B
(θ˜R) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) ≤ x(θ˜R)− ǫ < x(θ˜R). (2.11)
Hence, we have σθˆ
R
(θ¯B) = 1. Inserting this into inequality (2.2b) gives
ρR + (1− ρR)σθ˜R(∅) < x(θ¯B).
From this we deduce that ρR < x(θ¯B) and σθ˜
R
(∅) < x(θ¯B). The former is equivalent
to 1 − ρR > 1 − x(θ¯B). Again, we ﬁnd that player R could improve by deviating to
a strategy with probability of empathy acquisition one and obtaining an additional
payoﬀ of at least
(1− ρR)
(
µθ¯
B
µθ˜
R
(
uθ˜
R
(1, ρBσθ¯
B
(θ˜R) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅))
− uθ˜R(σθ˜R(∅), ρBσθ¯B(θ˜R) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅))
)
− c
)
≥ (1− ρR)
(
µθ¯
B
µθ˜
R
(
uθ˜
R
(1, x(θ˜R)− ǫ)− uθ˜R(σθ˜R(∅), x(θ˜R)− ǫ)
)
− c
)
> (1− x(θ¯B))
(
µθ¯
B
µθ˜
R
(
uθ˜
R
(1, x(θ˜R)− ǫ)− uθ˜R(x(θ¯B), x(θ˜R)− ǫ)
)
− c
)
> 0
as we have c ∈ (0, C(ǫ)). This is again a contradiction.
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.2
The proof is by construction. We identify a particular strategy proﬁle(
ρp, (σθ
p
)θp∈Θp
)
p∈{B,R}
with the desired property and show that it is an equilibrium.
Let
ρp = x(θ−pmax)− x(θ−pmin), (2.12a)
σθ
p
(∅) = 1
1− ρpx(θ
−p
min) ∀θp ∈ Θp\{θpmax, θpmin} (2.12b)
σθ
p
(θ−p) =


1
ρp
(
x(θ−p)− x(θ−pmin)
)
if ρp > 0
0 if ρp = 0
∀θp ∈ Θp, θ−p ∈ Θ−p. (2.12c)
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Note that σθ
p
(θ−pmax) = 1 and σ
θp(θ−pmin) = 0 for all p ∈ {B,R} and θp ∈ Θp if
x(θ−pmax) > x(θ
−p
min).
35 The strategy proﬁle is, thus, almost fully speciﬁed. It only
remains to be chosen how extreme types play when they are uninformed. In case
that x(θpmax) > x(θ
p
min) let σ
θpmax(∅) and σθpmin(∅) be chosen to satisfy
∑
θ−p
µθ
−p
(
uθ
−p
(1, ρpσθ
p
max(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθpmax(∅))
− uθ−p(0, ρpσθpmax(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθpmax(∅))
)
=
c
µθ
p
max
(2.13)
and
µθ
p
max
µθ
p
max + µθ
p
min
σθ
p
max(∅) + µ
θp
min
µθ
p
max + µθ
p
min
σθ
p
min(∅) = 1
1− ρpx(θ
−p
min). (2.14)
For x(θpmax) = x(θ
p
min) however let
σθ
p
max(∅) = σθpmin(∅) = 1
1− ρpx(θ
−p
min). (2.15)
For the remainder of the proof we distinguish these two cases.
Case 1: x(θpmax) > x(θ
p
min)
Before we move on to prove that the considered strategy proﬁle is indeed an equi-
librium in this case, we need to make sure that it is well-deﬁned. For this we need
to show that equation (2.13) has a feasible solution for c = 0 and c > 0 suﬃciently
small. Consider
σθ
p
max(∅) = 1
1− ρp
(
x(θ−pmin) + ǫ
p
)
=
x(θ−pmin) + ǫ
p
1− x(θ−pmax) + x(θ−pmin)
,
where ǫp ∈ R. For c = 0 let ǫp = 0. We then have σθpmax(∅) ∈ (0, 1) and
LHS of (2.13) =
∑
θ−p
µθ
−p
(
uθ
−p
(1, x(θ−p))− uθ−p(0, x(θ−p))
)
= 0 = RHS of (2.13)
since player −p of type θ−p is indiﬀerent between both actions if the opponent plays
x(θ−p). Equation (2.14) then implies σθ
p
min(∅) = σθpmax(∅).
Now consider c > 0. Notice ﬁrst that the left-hand side of (2.13) is a linear
function in ǫp which is strictly decreasing (increasing) for p = B (p = R). To see
this, consider temporarily and w.l.o.g. −p = B and some type θB whose payoﬀs are
35This means that in case that they are informed, both players of any type play pure action
strategies against extreme type opponents.
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represented by the matrix
H T
H uH,H uH,T
T uT,H uT,T
where uH,H , uH,T , uT,H , uT,T ∈ R. As player B wants to coordinate actions, we must
have uH,H > uT,H and uT,T > uH,T . Further, we calculate x(θ
B) =
uT,T−uH,T
uH,H−uT,H+uT,T−uH,T
.
Our claim follows immediately as this gives
uθ
B
(1, x(θB) + ǫR)− uθB(0, x(θB) + ǫR)
= uH,H(x(θ
B) + ǫR) + uH,T (1− x(θB)− ǫR)− uT,H(x(θB) + ǫR)
− uT,T (1− x(θB)− ǫR)
= (uH,H − uT,H + uT,T − uH,T )(x(θB) + ǫR)− (uT,T − uH,T )
= (uH,H − uT,H + uT,T − uH,T︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)ǫR.
So, generally speaking, we have that for every c > 0 suﬃciently small there exists a
unique ǫB < 0 (ǫR > 0) such that both equations (2.13) and (2.14) are fulﬁlled and
σθ
p
max(∅), σθpmin(∅) ∈ [0, 1].
After this is done we turn towards proving that the proposed strategy proﬁle is
indeed an equilibrium. Suppose that in the conﬂict game both players B and R are
playing a strategy as considered above. Then player −p ∈ {B,R} cannot improve by
deviating if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
• σθ−p(θp) is a best response to ρpσθp(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅) for all θp ∈ Θp, θ−p ∈
Θ−p,
• σθ−p(∅) is a best response to ∑θp µθp(ρpσθp(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅)) for all θ−p ∈
Θ−p,
• ∑θ−p µθ−pUθ−pInfo = ∑θ−p µθ−pUθ−pN + c.
In the following let c = 0 or c > 0 suﬃciently small as mentioned above. Further let
p = B (p = R). Consider ﬁrst the action strategies that types of player −p face when
they are informed. We calculate for θ−p ∈ Θ−p, θp ∈ Θp\{θpmax, θpmin}:
ρpσθ
p
max(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθpmax(∅) = x(θ−p) + ǫp ≤ (≥)x(θ−p),
ρpσθ
p
min(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθpmin(∅) = x(θ−p)− µθ
p
max
µ
θ
p
min
ǫp ≥ (≤)x(θ−p),
ρpσθ
p
(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅) = x(θ−p).
(2.16)
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Hence, σθ
−p
(θpmax) = 1 and σ
θ−p(θpmin) = 0 are indeed best responses in each case
p ∈ {B,R}, θ−p ∈ Θ−p. Against all other types θp ∈ Θp\{θpmax, θpmin}, any informed
type θ−p ∈ Θ−p is indiﬀerent between both actions.
Beyond that, any uninformed player type θ−p ∈ Θ−p faces
∑
θp
µθ
p
(
ρpσθ
p
(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅)
)
= µθ
p
max
(
x(θ−p) + ǫp
)
+ µθ
p
min
(
x(θ−p)− µ
θpmax
µθ
p
min
ǫp
)
+
∑
θp /∈{θpmax,θ
p
min
}
µθ
p
x(θ−p)
= x(θ−p)
and is therefore indiﬀerent between both actions.
Finally, we have to examine the expected payoﬀs. For an uninformed player type
θ−p ∈ Θ−p we have
Uθ−pN = uθ
−p
(
σθ
−p
(∅),∑
θp
µθ
p
(
ρpσθ
p
(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅)
))
= uθ
−p
(
σθ
−p
(∅), x(θ−p)
)
.
If θ−p is informed, then her expected payoﬀ (ex costs) is given by
Uθ−pInfo
=
∑
θp
µθ
p
uθ
−p
(
σθ
−p
(θp), ρpσθ
p
(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅)
)
= µθ
p
maxuθ
−p
(
1, ρpσθ
p
max(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθpmax(∅)
)
+ µθ
p
minuθ
−p
(
0,
1
µθ
p
min
(
x(θ−p)− ∑
θp 6=θp
min
µθ
p
(
ρpσθ
p
(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅)
)))
+
∑
θp /∈{θpmax,θ
p
min
}
µθ
p
uθ
−p
(
σθ
−p
(θp), x(θ−p)
)
= µθ
p
max
(
uθ
−p
(
1, ρpσθ
p
max(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθpmax(∅)
)
− uθ−p
(
0, ρpσθ
p
max(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθpmax(∅)
))
+ uθ
−p
(
0, x(θ−p)
)
Notice that according to (2.16) we have Uθ−pInfo ≥ uθ−p
(
0, x(θ−p)
)
= Uθ−pN for all
θ−p ∈ Θ−p. Taken together we get
(2.13)⇔∑
θ−p
µθ
−p
(
µθ
p
max
(
uθ
−p
(
1, ρpσθ
p
max(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθpmax(∅)
)
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− uθ−p
(
0, ρpσθ
p
max(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθpmax(∅)
))
+ uθ
−p
(
0, x(θ−p)
))
=
∑
θ−p
µθ
−p
uθ
−p
(
σθ
−p
(∅), x(θ−p)
)
+ c
⇔∑
θ−p
µθ
−pUθ−pInfo =
∑
θ−p
µθ
−pUθ−pN + c.
This means that player −p is indeed indiﬀerent between acquiring empathy and
not acquiring it. Thus, we established for the conﬂict game that player −p has no
incentives to deviate from the considered strategy in this case.
Case 2: x(θpmax) = x(θ
p
min)
Suppose again that both players B and R are playing a strategy as considered above.
As according to equation (2.12a) we have ρ−p = 0 in this case, player −p cannot
improve by deviating if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
• σθ−p(∅) is a best response to ∑θp µθp(ρpσθp(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅)) for all θ−p ∈
Θ−p,
• ∑θ−p,θp µθ−pµθpuθ−p(sθ−p(θp), ρpσθp(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅)) ≤ ∑θ−p µθ−pUθ−pN + c
for all
(
sθ
−p
(θp)
)
θ−p,θp
∈ ∆(A)n−p×np .
Taking into account equations (2.12) and (2.15), concerning the ﬁrst condition we
simply have
∑
θp
µθ
p
(
ρpσθ
p
(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅)
)
=
∑
θp
µθ
p
x(θ−p) = x(θ−p).
Hence, this condition is obviously fulﬁlled as any uninformed type θ−p is indiﬀerent
between both actions.
The second condition states that the ex ante expected payoﬀ of player −p from
not acquiring empathy must be greater than or equal to the maximal payoﬀ (minus
costs) she could get instead from acquiring empathy and playing freely choosable
action strategies which can be conditioned on the opponent’s type. For all θ−p,(
sθ
−p
(θp)
)
θp
we have
∑
θp
µθ
p
uθ
−p
(
sθ
−p
(θp), ρpσθ
p
(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=x(θ−p)
)
= uθ
−p
(
·, x(θ−p)
)
.
On the contrary, type θ−p receives
Uθ−pN = uθ
−p
(
σθ
−p
(∅), x(θ−p)
)
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if she is uninformed. Thus, we have
∑
θ−p,θp
µθ
−p
µθ
p
uθ
−p
(
sθ
−p
(θp), ρpσθ
p
(θ−p) + (1− ρp)σθp(∅)
)
=
∑
θ−p
µθ
−pUθ−pN
for all
(
sθ
−p
(θp)
)
θ−p,θp
∈ ∆(A)n−p×np . This concludes Case 2 and the proof as a whole.
2.A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Recall the proof of Theorem 2.1. In Case 1 of Part (ii) we already established that
we must have
ρp = x(θ−pmax)− x(θ−pmin) (2.17)
if ρ−p = 0 for p ∈ {B,R}. Notice that ρp > 0 then implies x(θ−pmax) > x(θ−pmin). Taking
into account Theorem 2.1(i) in this situation we also have that
0 = ρ−p ≥ x(θpmax)− x(θpmin) ≥ 0,
and thus ρ−p = x(θpmax) − x(θpmin). In what follows we distinguish the two cases
considered in the proposition.
Part 1: nB = 1 and nR > 1 (nB > 1 and nR = 1, respectively)
W.l.o.g. consider the case nB = 1 (such that ΘB = {θB}) and nR > 1 and let
c ∈ (0, C) suﬃciently small. Assume that ρR > 0 in an equilibrium. Then according
to Lemma 2.2 there must exist θ¯R and θˆB, θ˜B fulﬁlling inequalities (2.2). This however
implies θˆB 6= θ˜B which is a contradiction as we have nB = 1. Thus, we must have
ρR = 0 which (together with the above considerations) establishes uniqueness of the
empathy levels for this part of the proof.
By assumption we have that x(θRmax) > x(θ
R) > x(θRmin) for all θ
R ∈
ΘR\{θRmax, θRmin}. We now show that the equilibrium considered in the proof of Propo-
sition 2.2 is unique up to variations of the action strategies σθ
R
(θB) which are played
with probability ρR = 0. Notice ﬁrst that according to Lemma 2.1 we must have
ρBσθ
B
(θR) + (1− ρB)σθB(∅) = x(θR) (2.18)
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for all θR ∈ ΘR. Taking into account equation (2.17) this gives
(x(θRmax)− x(θRmin))(σθ
B
(θRmax)− σθ
B
(θRmin)) = ρ
B(σθ
B
(θRmax)− σθ
B
(θRmin))
= x(θRmax)− x(θRmin).
Hence, we must have σθ
B
(θRmax) = 1 and σ
θB(θRmin) = 0. Again according to Lemma
2.1 this implies that
σθ
B
(θR) = σθ
B
(θR)− σθB(θRmin) =
1
ρB
(x(θR)− x(θRmin)) ⇔ (2.12c)
for all θR ∈ ΘR. Moreover, by equation (2.18) this induces
σθ
B
(∅) = 1
1− ρB x(θ
R
min) ⇔ (2.12b).
As x(θRmax) > x(θ
R) > x(θRmin) we have σ
θB(θR) ∈ (0, 1) for all θR ∈ ΘR\{θRmax, θRmin}.
This means that θB must be indiﬀerent against any opponent type θR ∈
ΘR\{θRmax, θRmin} if she is informed. Thus, we must have
σθ
R
(∅) = x(θB)
for all θR ∈ ΘR\{θRmax, θRmin}. Equation (2.1) of Lemma 2.1 then transforms to
∑
θR
µθ
R
σθ
R
(∅) = x(θB)
⇔ µ
θRmax
µθRmax + µθ
R
min
σθ
R
max(∅) + µ
θR
min
µθRmax + µθ
R
min
σθ
R
min(∅) = x(θB) ⇔ (2.14).
Together with equation (2.13) (for p = R) this then uniquely determines σθ
R
max(∅)
and σθ
R
min(∅).
Obviously, the reasoning is the same for nB > 1, nR = 1.
Part 2: nB = nR = 2
In this case we haveΘp = {θpmax, θpmin} for p = B,R. We already know that uniqueness
of the empathy levels follows immediately if we have ρp = 0 for some p ∈ {B,R}. So
in this regard we only need to consider the case that ρB, ρR > 0. Again, we recall the
proof of Theorem 2.1 and take Case 2 with p = B as a starting point. Consider its
three subcases.
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Subcase (a): ρBσθ¯
B
(θˆR) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) = x(θˆR) and
ρBσθ¯
B
(θ˜R) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) = x(θ˜R)
This subcase is again straightforward as we simply have ρB = x(θˆR) − x(θ˜R) and
know already that it is ρB ≥ x(θRmax)− x(θRmin). Therefore it must be θˆR = θRmax and
θ˜R = θRmin.
Subcase (b): ρBσθ¯
B
(θˆR) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) > x(θˆR)
Recall inequality (2.7). Lemma 2.1 then implies that
ρRσθ˜
R
(θ˘B) + (1− ρR)σθ˜R(∅) < x(θ˘B)
as here it is {θR ∈ ΘR | θR 6= θˆR} = {θ˜R}. In turn, this induces σθ˘B(θ˜R) = 0.
Moreover, recall that it is σθ¯
B
(θ˜R) = 0, σθ¯
B
(θˆR) = 1 and σθ˘
B
(θˆR) = 1. Further, we
know again by Lemma 2.1 that it must be
ρB
(∑
θB
µθ
B
σθ
B
(θRmax)−
∑
θB
µθ
B
σθ
B
(θRmin)
)
= x(θRmax)− x(θRmin).
If it were θˆR = θRmin, θ˜
R = θRmax, then this would imply ρ
B = x(θRmin) − x(θRmax) ≤ 0.
So it must be θˆR = θRmax, θ˜
R = θRmin which implies ρ
B = x(θRmax)− x(θRmin).
Subcase (c): ρBσθ¯
B
(θ˜R) + (1− ρB)σθ¯B(∅) < x(θ˜R)
The procedure is very similar to Subcase (b). By recalling (2.9) and applying Lemma
2.1 we can show that here it is σθ˘
B
(θˆR) = 1. Together with σθ¯
B
(θˆR) = 1, σθ¯
B
(θ˜R) = 0
and σθ˘
B
(θ˜R) = 0 this leads to the same result as in Subcase (b).
Obviously, by choosing p = R one can show in a very similar way that ρR =
x(θBmax) − x(θBmin) is satisﬁed as well in each case. Also, we get that σθR(θBmax) = 1
and σθ
R
(θBmin) = 0 for all θ
R ∈ ΘR.
It remains to show that the equilibrium considered in the proof of Proposition
2.2 is indeed unique as long as x(θ−pmax) > x(θ
−p
min) for both p ∈ {B,R}. Notice
that we therefore only need to consider the case ρB, ρR > 0. So far, we found that
the equations (2.12) must necessarily be satisﬁed here. If we insert σθ
−p
(θpmin) = 0,
θ−p ∈ Θ−p, into the indiﬀerence condition (2.1) with θp = θpmin which we established
in Lemma 2.1, we end up with equation (2.14). Finally, both players p ∈ {B,R} must
be indiﬀerent between acquiring empathy and not acquiring it as we have ρB, ρR > 0.
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Therefore, we must also have
∑
θp
µθ
pUθpInfo =
∑
θp
µθ
pUθpN + c⇔(2.13)
as in Case 1 of the proof of Proposition 2.2. Again, these conditions then uniquely
determine σθ
B
max(∅), σθBmin(∅), σθRmax(∅), and σθRmin(∅). This concludes this part of the
proof.
Appendix 2.B A Continuum of Bayesian Nash
Equilibria
In the proof of Proposition 2.2 we construct a certain equilibrium for general two-
action conﬂict games with small costs. Here, we show, however, that such a partial
empathy equilibrium can in general be constructed in many diﬀerent ways. In fact,
this gives rise to a continuum of equilibria which have in common that they achieve
the lower bound of empathy acquisition established in Theorem 2.1. Thus, they do
not diﬀer in terms of players’ information strategies but in their action strategies.
In a partial empathy equilibrium in which we have ρp > 0 for some player p ∈
{B,R}, i.e. p is mixing properly between acquiring empathy and not acquiring it,
this player must be indiﬀerent between these two possibilities. As she has to bear
the cost for acquiring empathy, the (weighted) sum of the expected payoﬀs of her
types being informed must be larger than in the case when they are uninformed.
In the proof of Proposition 2.2 this is achieved by letting extreme type opponents,
when uninformed, play in such a way that the considered player is indeed indiﬀerent
between acquiring empathy and not acquiring it. In this equilibrium, moreover, all
types of the opponent −p, when informed and facing an extreme type θpmax or θpmin,
play pure action strategies. In general, i.e. if player p has more than two types, this
leaves open the possibility to redesign strategies in such a way that the extreme type
opponents, now however the ones being informed and playing against a non-extreme
type of the player, are (still) indiﬀerent between both actions and then choose their
(mixed) actions such that the player is again indiﬀerent between acquiring empathy
and not acquiring it. In doing so, it is however important to retain that all player
types, when uninformed, are indiﬀerent between both actions (see Lemma 2.1). With
this idea in mind (and given that costs are positive and at least one player has
more than two types) we are now able to construct a continuum of partial empathy
equilibria.
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To ease notation in the following, at least to some extent, we deﬁne
λp :=
µθ
p
max
µθ
p
max + µθ
p
min
for p ∈ {B,R}. In principle, the following statement is then a corollary to the proof
of Proposition 2.2.
Corollary 2.3. Consider a two-action Bayesian conflict game. There exists C > 0
such that all strategy profiles satisfying the following conditions for all p ∈ {B,R}
constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game if c ∈ [0, C).36
• ρp = x(θ−pmax)− x(θ−pmin),
• σθp(θ−pmax) = 1 and σθp(θ−pmin) = 0 for all θp ∈ Θp,
• σθp(θ−p) = 1
ρp
(
x(θ−p) − x(θ−pmin)
)
for all θp ∈ Θp\{θpmax, θpmin}, θ−p ∈
Θ−p\{θ−pmax, θ−pmin},
• σθp(∅) = 1
1−ρp
x(θ−pmin) for all θ
p ∈ Θp\{θpmax, θpmin}.
Further, σθ
p
max and σθ
p
min are determined such that on the one hand
• λpσθpmax(θ−p) + (1 − λp)σθpmin(θ−p) = 1
ρp
(
x(θ−p) − x(θ−pmin)
)
for all θ−p ∈
Θ−p\{θ−pmax, θ−pmin},
• λpσθpmax(∅) + (1− λp)σθpmin(∅) = 1
1−ρp
x(θ−pmin),
where σθ
p
max(θ−p) ≤ (≥) 1
ρp
(
x(θ−p) − x(θ−pmin)
)
≤ (≥)σθpmin(θ−p) and σθpmax(∅) ≤ (≥
) 1
1−ρp
x(θ−pmin) ≤ (≥)σθ
p
min(∅) for p = B (p = R), and on the other hand
• ∑θ−p µθ−pUθ−pInfo = ∑θ−p µθ−pUθ−pN + c.
Note that, in general, there exist (inﬁnitely many) diﬀerent strategy proﬁles ful-
ﬁlling these requirements. However, for c = 0 this continuum collapses to a sin-
gle strategy proﬁle, namely the one where we have σθ
p
max(θ−p) = σθ
p
min(θ−p) and
σθ
p
max(∅) = σθpmin(∅) for all p ∈ {B,R} and all θ−p ∈ Θ−p.
36For ease of notation we assume here that it is |{argmaxθp x(θp)}| = |{argminθp x(θp)}| = 1 and
np > 1 for all p ∈ {B,R}.
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Appendix 2.C On the Uniqueness of Completely
Mixed Nash Equilibria
In this chapter, we consider a certain class of games with incomplete information.
Within this class we focus on what we call conﬂict games. By deﬁnition these games
are such that any realized type game, which is in each case simply a complete infor-
mation normal form game with two players, has a unique Nash equilibrium and that
Nash equilibrium must be in completely mixed strategies. Throughout the chapter,
we consider all types of both players having the same ﬁnite action set A available.
One could therefore wish for a generalization of our model and results that allows
two opposing types to possibly choose their (mixed) actions from action sets with dif-
ferent cardinalities. The following remark, however, establishes that in any realized
type game of a conﬂict game the action sets of the opposing types necessarily have to
have the same cardinality. Given this ﬁnding, it is of course w.l.o.g. to assume that,
in a conﬂict game, types of both players have the same action set to choose from.
Remark 2.2. Consider a complete information normal form game
Γ =
(
{B,R},∆(AB) × ∆(AR), (uB, uR)
)
such that for the finite action sets it is
|AB| 6= |AR|. If this game has a completely mixed Nash equilibrium, then this Nash
equilibrium is not unique. In fact, this game then even has a continuum of Nash
equilibria.
Proof of Remark 2.2. First, we introduce some notation. Let AB := {aB1 , ..., aBmB}
and AR := {aR1 , ..., aRmR} and assume w.l.o.g. that mB < mR. Let
UB := (bji )i=1,...,mB ;j=1,...,mR with b
j
i := uB(a
B
i , a
R
j ) denote the payoﬀ matrix of player
B and let bj := (bj1, ..., b
j
mB). Using this notation, it is rank U
B ≤ mB < mR,
meaning that the columns of UB are not linearly independent, that is there exists
(λ1, ..., λmR) ∈ RmR\{0} such that
mR∑
j=1
λjb
j = 0. (2.19)
By assumption the game Γ has a completely mixed Nash equilibrium (αB, αR) ∈
∆(AB) × ∆(AR). Then we can distinguish two cases: Either (λ1, ..., λmR) can be
scaled such that λj ≤ αRj for all j ∈ {1, ...,mR} and λk = αRk , λl < αRl for some
k, l ∈ {1, ...,mR} or otherwise it must be (λ1, ..., λmR) = γ¯αR for some γ¯ ∈ R\{0}.
Consider the ﬁrst of the two cases and let (λ1, ..., λmR) be scaled as mentioned.
Since the Nash equilibrium is assumed to be completely mixed, player B must be
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indiﬀerent between all of her actions, meaning that there exists γ ∈ R such that∑mR
j=1 α
R
j b
j = γ(1, ..., 1). Taking into account (2.19), we also have
mR∑
j=1
αRj b
j =
mR∑
j=1
(αRj − λj)bj.
We deﬁne γ˜ :=
∑mR
j=1(α
R
j − λj). Then it is γ˜ > 0 and
mR∑
j=1
αRj − λj
γ˜
bj =
γ
γ˜
(1, ..., 1).
Notice that we have
αR
j
−λj
γ˜
≥ 0 and ∑mRj=1 αRj −λjγ˜ = 1. Moreover, it is easy to see that
(
αR1 − λ1
γ˜
, ...,
αRmR − λmR
γ˜
)
6= (αR1 , ..., αRmR)
as we have
αR
k
−λk
γ˜
= 0 6= αRk . Thus, we found another strategy for player R against
which player B is indiﬀerent between all of her actions. Hence, the completely mixed
Nash equilibrium is not unique in this case.
Now we consider the second of the two cases. This case implies that for all
(λ1, ..., λmR) ∈ RmR\{0} fulﬁlling equation (2.19) we need to have λj 6= 0 for all
j ∈ {1, ...,mR} since otherwise we would be back in the ﬁrst case. However, this
means that b1, ..., bm
R−1 are linearly independent. As we have mR − 1 ≥ mB, this
implies span
(
(bj)j=1,...,mR−1
)
= Rm
B
and it even must be mR − 1 = mB. So there
exists (λ′1, ..., λ
′
mB) ∈ Rm
B\{0} with λ′j ≤ αRj for all j ∈ {1, ...,mB} and a scalar
γ′ 6= 0 such that
mB∑
j=1
λ′jb
j = γ′(1, ..., 1).
Further, deﬁne λ′mR := 0 and γ˜
′ :=
∑mR
j=1(α
R
j − λ′j). Notice that γ˜′ ≥ αRmR − λ′mR =
αRmR > 0. Hence, taking into account equation (2.19) and recalling the scalar γ¯ ∈
R\{0}, we have
mR∑
j=1
αRj − λ′j
γ˜′
bj =
1
γ˜′
mR∑
j=1
(λj
γ¯
− λ′j
)
bj =
1
γ˜′
(
1
γ¯
mR∑
j=1
λjb
j
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
mR∑
j=1
λ′jb
j
)
= −γ
′
γ˜′
(1, ..., 1).
Notice that, similarly to the ﬁrst case, we have
αR
j
−λ′
j
γ˜′
≥ 0 and ∑mRj=1 αRj −λ′jγ˜′ = 1. Also,
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realize that (
αR1 − λ′1
γ˜′
, ...,
αRmR − λ′mR
γ˜′
)
6= (αR1 , ..., αRmR).
This is because we either have γ˜′ 6= 1 implying α
R
mR
−λ′
mR
γ˜′
=
αR
mR
γ˜′
6= αRmR or γ˜′ = 1 which
means that
αR
j
−λ′
j
γ˜′
= αRj −λ′j 6= αRj for some j ∈ {1, ...,mB} since it is (λ′1, ..., λ′mB) 6= 0.
Consequently, we found again another strategy for player R against which player B
is indiﬀerent between all of her actions.
Finally, notice that in both cases, any convex combination of the alternative
strategy and αR is again a strategy against which player B is indiﬀerent between all
of her actions. Thus, we even proved existence of a continuum of Nash equilibria.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Formation of
Homogeneous Bargaining
Networks
3.1 Introduction
People often engage in bi- and multilateral bargaining: ﬁrms bargain with workers’
unions over contracts, ﬁrms with other ﬁrms over prices or collaborations, politicians
over environmental or trade agreements, or even friends and family members over
household duties or other arrangements. However, in most of the situations that
come to mind not everyone will be able or willing to bargain with anyone else. This
idea can be expressed by means of a network. One’s bargaining power in negotiations
then commonly depends on the number and types of alternative partners as they
present outside options. Agents typically intend to maximize their expected proﬁt
from bargaining, which suggests that beforehand they might want to inﬂuence and
optimize their network of potential bargaining partners. This motivates that the
underlying network should not be regarded as being exogenously given but as the
outcome of strategic interaction among agents. However, establishing a connection
to someone else usually costs some time and eﬀort, which should be taken into account
as well. This gives rise to an interesting trade-oﬀ between the costs of forming links
and potential beneﬁts from it. This consideration is the topic of this chapter.
We set up and analyze a sequential model of strategic network formation prior to a
Manea (2011) inﬁnite horizon network bargaining game. We consider ex ante homoge-
neous players who in the ﬁrst stage strategically form undirected, costly links. In this
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context, one might think of one-time initiation or communication costs that players
have to bear. In the second stage, we take the resulting network as given and players
sequentially bargain with a neighbor for the division of a mutually generated unit
surplus. According to Manea (2011) all subgame perfect equilibria of the bargaining
game are payoﬀ equivalent. Players are supposed to anticipate these outcomes during
the preceding network formation game and to choose their actions accordingly. We
examine players’ strategic behavior regarding network formation, characterize stable
and eﬃcient network structures, and determine induced bargaining outcomes.
After giving a description of the model including a summary of the underly-
ing Manea (2011) bargaining game and his decisive results, we consider the seminal
concept of pairwise stability established by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In the bar-
gaining game, we assume players to be inﬁnitely patient. For all levels of linking costs
we state and prove suﬃcient conditions for a network to be pairwise stable (Theorem
3.1). While costs are relatively high, the only structures we ﬁnd to be pairwise stable
are speciﬁc unions of separated pairs and isolated players. When costs decrease, odd
circles of increasing size can additionally emerge. At a transition point also lines of
length three can be contained in a pairwise stable network. This result also estab-
lishes existence of pairwise stable networks at each level of linking costs. For each
combination of the above subnetworks we establish precisely for which cost range it
is pairwise stable and for which it is not (Corollary 3.1). Furthermore, we provide
a complete characterization of pairwise stable equitable networks, i.e. of structures
inducing homogeneous payoﬀs among players, by showing that in such a network
any non-isolated player has to be contained in a separated pair or in an odd circle
(Theorem 3.2). Then we focus on the remaining networks which must induce hetero-
geneous payoﬀs within a component and establish that any of these can at most be
singularly pairwise stable, that is at most at a single cost level (Theorem 3.3). This
concludes the complete characterization of non-singularly pairwise stable networks,
which is a principal achievement of this chapter (Corollary 3.3). All non-singularly
pairwise stable networks even prove to be pairwise Nash stable (Corollary 3.5).
As a second main result, we deduce that pairwise stability narrows down the diver-
sity of induced bargaining outcomes among players substantially. However, though
players are ex ante homogeneous, they do not have to be completely equal in this
respect (Corollary 3.6). Beyond that, we ﬁnd that singularly pairwise stable networks
other than the few ones we identify might only occur at linking costs below a certain
threshold (Corollary 3.4). Also, we reveal that networks containing a tree (with more
than three players) or a certain kind of “cut-player” cannot even be singularly pair-
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wise stable (Propositions 3.2 and 3.3). Moreover, we establish that, for suﬃciently
high linking costs, the networks being eﬃcient in terms of a utilitarian welfare crite-
rion coincide with the pairwise stable ones. As long as costs are low, however, the
former networks constitute a proper subset of the latter while there also exists an
intermediate cost range which does not even yield such a subset relation (Theorem
3.4 and Corollary 3.7). As a robustness check, we ﬁnally relax the assumption that
players are inﬁnitely patient and show that pairwise stability in this framework does
not necessarily imply pairwise stability for the original case and vice versa (Examples
3.1 and 3.2).
For a concrete economic application which is captured by our model and which
might contribute to a better understanding of the framework one can have the fol-
lowing in mind. Consider a number of similar ﬁrms beginning operation at the same
time. They can mutually generate an (additional) surplus within bilateral projects
by exploiting synergy potentials. For instance, this possibility might be based on ca-
pacity constraints or cost-saving opportunities. However, the underlying cooperation
network is not existent yet and will therefore be the outcome of strategic interaction
between ﬁrms. In charge of that are project managers who receive bonus payments
proportional to their employer’s proﬁt from the project. Here, one-time costs might
arise to prepare each two ﬁrms for mutual projects (adjustment of IT, joint training
for workers etc.). We assume that each project manager keeps her job until she ﬁ-
nalizes a joint project successfully by ﬁnding an agreement with the corresponding
counterpart and leaves or is promoted afterwards and then gets replaced by a succes-
sor. Thus, the network remains unchanged after it has initially been established by
the ﬁrst project managers.
To take the suitable framework and convenient results established by Manea
(2011) as a starting point in this context is fairly obvious.37 To my best knowledge,
it is the only work which purely focuses on the impact of explicit network structures
on players’ bargaining power and outcomes in a setting of decentralized bilateral bar-
gaining without ex ante imposing any restrictions to the class of networks considered.
Therefore, there are no distorting eﬀects present in this setting as they might arise
37Thus, the fact that O’Donnell (2011) chooses the same approach and pursues objectives similar
to ours is not very surprising. Note, however, that the work at hand has been set up autonomously
and independently from this (not publicly available) “honours thesis”. Moreover, the two works
diﬀer mainly in three respects. First, the ways we choose to derive a complete characterization of
(non-singularly) pairwise stable networks are distinct in large parts. Second, there are substantial
shortcomings in O’Donnell’s (2011) line of argumentation as we point out in Appendix 3.C. This
goes as far as, based on O’Donnell (2011), our main results can only be considered as conjectures.
And third, our analysis is in some parts more advanced as, for instance, we additionally consider
the case of less than inﬁnitely patient players (see Section 3.5).
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from ex-ante heterogeneity among players and it is more general than buyer-seller sce-
narios which impose bipartite network structures. Moreover, Manea’s (2011) network
bargaining game remains analytically tractable and has some important properties.
For any level of time discount there may exist several subgame perfect equilibria but
he shows that all of these are payoﬀ equivalent. Further, he develops an equally
convenient and sophisticated algorithm determining the limit equilibrium payoﬀs for
a given network of inﬁnitely patient players. We make extensive use of this algorithm
and contribute to a profound understanding of its features throughout this chapter.
The analysis of bargaining problems has a long tradition in the economic literature
and dates back to the work of Nash (1950a, 1953). A Nash bargaining solution is based
on factors like players’ bargaining power and outside options, whereas their origin is
not part of the theory. This also applies for Rubinstein (1982), who analyzes perfect
equilibrium partitions in a two-player framework of sequential bargaining in discrete
time with an inﬁnite horizon, as well as for Rubinstein andWolinsky (1985) who set up
a model of bargaining in stationary markets with two populations. The work of Manea
(2011), to which we add a preceding stage of strategic interaction, can be regarded as
an extension or microfoundation of these seminal papers. Here, bargaining power is
endogenized in a natural and well-deﬁned manner as an outcome of the given network
structure and the respective player’s position herein. Further important contributions
to the literature on decentralized bilateral bargaining in exogenously given networks
have been made by Abreu and Manea (2012) and Corominas-Bosch (2004) where the
latter considers the special case of buyer-seller networks.
Second, this chapter contributes to the more recently emerging literature on
strategic network formation which was mainly aroused by the seminal paper of Jack-
son and Wolinsky (1996). Further prominent works which have been carried out since
then, however not in a bargaining framework, are the ones by Bala and Goyal (2000);
Calvó-Armengol (2004); Galeotti et al. (2006); Goyal and Joshi (2003, 2006); Watts
(2001), just to name a few. Besides, some eﬀort has been dedicated to gaining rather
general insights regarding the existence, uniqueness and structure of stable networks.
Hellmann (2013) and Hellmann and Landwehr (2014) are examples for this.38
So far there exist only few papers combining these two ﬁelds of research. Calvó-
Armengol (2003) studies a bargaining framework à la Rubinstein (1982) embedded in
a network context and considers stability and eﬃciency issues. However, the mecha-
38In Appendix 3.B we demonstrate that crucial conditions are not met in our model which implies
that the results of Hellmann (2013) and Hellmann and Landwehr (2014) are in general not applicable
to our framework.
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nism determining bargaining partners is diﬀerent from Manea (2011) and the network
bargaining game ends after the ﬁrst agreement has been found. As a consequence,
in Calvó-Armengol’s (2003) model a player’s network position does not aﬀect her
bargaining power as such but only the probability that she is selected as proposer
or responder. This leads to a characterization of pairwise stable networks in which
the players’ neighborhood size is the only relevant feature of the network structure.
Thus, it diﬀers substantially from our results though both works have in common
the assumption that links are costly. In contrast, Manea (2011, Online Appendix)
abstracts from explicit linking costs when approaching the issue of network formation
as an extension of his model. He shows that for zero linking costs a network is pair-
wise stable if and only if it is equitable. Though results diﬀer and get more complex
for positive linking costs, we will see that the work at hand is in line with this ﬁnd-
ing such that both works complement one another.39 Our additional considerations
regarding eﬃciency and time discount further contribute to this. Most other papers
studying strategic network formation in a bargaining context focus on buyer-seller
networks, which is as well complementary to our more general approach. Kranton
and Minehart (2001) and Polanski and Vega-Redondo (2013) are examples for this.
Again, the latter does not involve explicit linking costs.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we introduce
the model including the decisive results of Manea (2011). The main results are
developed in Section 3.3 which focuses on the structure of stable networks and induced
bargaining outcomes in the case that players are inﬁnitely patient. In Section 3.4 we
examine networks with regard to eﬃciency. In Section 3.5 we state commonalities and
diﬀerences regarding stability if players discount time to some degree. Finally, Section
3.6 concludes. Rather complex and lengthy proofs as well as closer considerations of
certain related papers are presented in the appendix.
3.2 The Model
Let time be discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, .... For the initial period t = 0
consider a ﬁnite set of players N = {1, 2, ..., n}. A connection or (undirected) link
between two players i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, is denoted by {i, j} which we abbreviate for
39In fact, we show that only “skeletons” of equitable networks, that is certain unions of separated
pairs and odd circles survive if costs are positive. However, non-equitable networks such as, for
instance, unions of odd circles and an isolated player can additionally be pairwise stable in our
setting.
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simplicity by ij = ji := {i, j}. A collection of such links is an undirected graph or
network g ⊆ gN := {ij | i, j ∈ N, i 6= j} where gN is called the complete network.
Let Ni(g) := {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g} denote the set of player i’s neighbors in g and let
ηi(g) := |Ni(g)| be its cardinality which is also referred to as the degree of player i.
Furthermore, for a network g, a set C ⊆ N is said to be a component if there
exists a path between any two players in C and it is Nj(g)∩C = ∅ for all j /∈ C.40,41
The set of all components of g then gives a partition of the player set N . Moreover,
a subnetwork g′ ⊆ g is said to be component-induced if there exists a component C
of g such that g′ = g|C . In general, for any set K ⊆ N , we denote g|K := {ij ∈
g | i, j ∈ K} and we commonly consider such a subnetwork as being deﬁned on the
player set K instead of N (thus, disregarding isolated players in K∁). Besides, for
two networks g, g′ ⊆ gN let g − g′ := g\g′ (g + g′ := g ∪ g′, respectively) denote the
network obtained by deleting the set of links g′ ∩ g from (adding the set of links g′\g
to) the network g.
In our model, ex ante, i.e. apart from their potentially diﬀering network positions,
players are assumed to be identical.42 These players are then assumed to strategically
form links in period t = 0. The outcome of this network formation game is a network
g. The interpretation of a link ij ∈ g is that players i, j ∈ N are able to mutually
generate a unit surplus. On the contrary, each link causes constant costs of link
formation c > 0 for both players involved. Thus, player i has to bear total costs of
ηi(g)c in t = 0.
We take this as a starting point for an inﬁnite horizon bargaining game à la Manea
(2011). In each period t = 0, 1, 2, ... nature randomly chooses one link ij ∈ g which
means that i and j are matched to bargain for a mutually generated unit surplus.
One of the two players is randomly assigned the role of the proposer while the other
one is selected as responder. Then the proposer makes an oﬀer how to distribute
the unit surplus and the responder has the choice: If she rejects, then both receive a
payoﬀ of zero and stay in the game whereas if she accepts, then both leave with the
shares agreed on. In the latter case both players get replaced one-to-one in the next
40We say that there exists a path between two players i′, i′′ ∈ N in g if there exist players
i1, i2, ..., im¯ ∈ N , m¯ ∈ N, such that i1 = i′, im¯ = i′′ and imim+1 ∈ g for m = 1, 2, ..., m¯− 1.
41One can alternatively deﬁne the component Ci(g) ⊆ N of player i ∈ N in g as the minimal set
of players such that both i ∈ Ci(g) and Ni′(g) ⊆ Ci(g) for all i′ ∈ Ci(g).
42In the literature, this is sometimes referred to as a “homogeneous society” (see e.g. Hellmann
and Landwehr, 2014).
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period such that the initially formed network remains unchanged.43,44 This implies
that each of the (initial) players 1, 2, ..., n will bargain successfully one time at most.
A player’s strategy in this setting pins down the oﬀer she makes as proposer and the
answer she gives as responder after each possible history of the game. Based on this,
a player’s payoﬀ is then speciﬁed as her discounted expected agreement gains. A
strategy proﬁle is said to be a “subgame perfect equilibrium” of the bargaining game
if it induces Nash equilibria in subgames following every history (see Manea, 2011).
Players are assumed to discount time by a uniform discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).45
The key result from Manea is that all subgame perfect equilibria are payoﬀ equiv-
alent and that each player’s equilibrium payoﬀ exclusively depends on her network
position and the discount factor δ (see Manea, 2011, Theorem 1). Moreover, the equi-
librium payoff vector which we denote as v∗δ(g) = (v∗δi (g))i∈N is the unique solution
to the equation system
vi =

1− ∑
j∈Ni(g)
1
2d#(g)

 δvi + ∑
j∈Ni(g)
1
2d#(g)
max{1− δvj, δvi}, i ∈ N, (3.1)
where d#(g) denotes the total number of links in the network g. If we have δ
(
v∗δi (g)+
v∗δj (g)
)
< 1 for ij ∈ g, then this means that player i and j ﬁnd an agreement when
their mutual link is selected whereas δ
(
v∗δi (g) + v
∗δ
j (g)
)
> 1 means that each of them
prefers to wait for a potentially better deal with a weaker partner.46 This gives
rise to the deﬁnition of the so called equilibrium agreement network g∗δ :=
{
ij ∈
g | δ
(
v∗δi (g) + v
∗δ
j (g)
)
≤ 1
}
.
We assume that players 1, 2, ..., n know the whole structure of the network g.
They are therefore able to anticipate equilibrium payoﬀs and are assumed to play
a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy proﬁle. Given a network g and a discount
factor δ, we for simplicity refer to v∗δi (g) as player i’s payoff. Throughout this chapter
it is important to distinguish this precisely from a player’s profit which is given by
43This replacement is primarily due to technical reasons. The implication that the network struc-
ture does not change over time makes the model analytically tractable. However, recalling the
motivating example on bilateral project cooperation from Section 3.1 gives a hint that there are
indeed situations in reality which are roughly captured by that.
44This is why Manea carefully distinguishes between network positions and (potentially) diﬀerent
players being in one and the same position in diﬀerent periods. However, as we examine solely the
stage of network formation at time t = 0 here, we can neglect this distinction.
45One might argue that players should be allowed to form (or delete) links in periods t = 1, 2, ...
as well. However, as the game has an inﬁnite horizon, in any period any player faces just the same
situation as (the player who was in her network position) in the previous period. Therefore, there
do not arise additional or altered incentives regarding link formation over time.
46In the case δ
(
v∗δi (g) + v
∗δ
j (g)
)
= 1 both players are indiﬀerent.
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her payoﬀ minus linking costs. Thus, given g and δ the proﬁt of player i ∈ N is
u∗δi (g) := v
∗δ
i (g)− ηi(g)c.
Note that a non-isolated player’s proﬁt is therefore always strictly smaller than her
payoﬀ as we assume linking costs to be positive.
For our main results we focus on the limit case of δ → 1 which means that players
are inﬁnitely patient. For this case Manea (2011, Theorem 2) ﬁnds that for all δ
being greater than some bound the corresponding equilibrium agreement networks
are equal. This network g∗ is then deﬁned as the limit equilibrium agreement network.
Moreover, we again take from Manea (2011, Theorem 2) that the so called limit
equilibrium payoff vector v∗(g) = limδ→1 v
∗δ(g) is well-deﬁned, i.e. it always exists.
Beyond that, Manea (2011, Proposition 2) shows that the sum of the payoﬀs of
two players being linked cannot be smaller than one, i.e. v∗i (g) + v
∗
j (g) ≥ 1 for all
ij ∈ g, and they must sum up to one if the link is contained in the limit equilibrium
agreement network, i.e. we have v∗i (g) + v
∗
j (g) = 1 if ij ∈ g∗. We utilize this during
our analysis as well.
Manea develops a smart algorithm to determine the limit equilibrium payoﬀ vector
v∗(g) and we make heavily use of this computation method. To prepare for the
implementation of the algorithm we need to introduce some additional notation. For
any set of players M ⊆ N and any network g let Lg(M) := {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g, i ∈M}
be the corresponding partner set in g, that is the set of players having a link in
g to a player in M .47 Further, a set M ⊆ N is called g-independent if we have
g|M := {ij ∈ g | i, j ∈ M} = ∅, i.e. if no two players contained in M are linked in g.
Moreover, let I(g) ⊆ P(N) denote the set of all non-empty g-independent subsets of
N . Then the algorithm determining the payoﬀ vector v∗(g) is the following.
Definition 3.1 (Manea (2011)). For a given network g on the player set N , the
algorithm A(g) provides a sequence (rs, xs,Ms, Ls, Ns, gs)s=1,...,s¯ which is defined re-
cursively as follows. Let N1 := N and g1 := g. For s ≥ 1, if Ns = ∅ then stop and
set s¯ = s. Otherwise, let
rs = min
M⊆Ns,M∈I(g)
|Lgs(M)|
|M | . (3.2)
If rs ≥ 1 then stop and set s¯ = s. Otherwise, set xs = rs1+rs . Let Ms be the union of
all minimizers M in (3.2). Denote Ls := L
gs(Ms). Let Ns+1 := Ns\(Ms ∪ Ls) and
47Although it does not make a big diﬀerence, do not confuse with the notation of Manea who
refers to Lg
∗
(M) instead.
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gs+1 := g|Ns+1.
Given such a sequence (rs, xs,Ms, Ls, Ns, gs)s=1,...,s¯ being the outcome of the de-
scribed algorithm A(g), the limit equilibrium payoﬀ vector for this network can be
determined by applying a simple rule. Note that this rather sophisticated result of
Manea (2011, Theorem 4) is absolutely fundamental for our work.
Payoff Computation (Manea (2011)). Let (rs, xs,Ms, Ls, Ns, gs)s=1,...,s¯ be the out-
come of A(g) for a given network g. Then the limit equilibrium payoffs are given
by
v∗i (g) = xs for all i ∈Ms, s < s¯,
v∗j (g) = 1− xs for all j ∈ Ls, s < s¯,
v∗k(g) =
1
2
for all k ∈ Ns¯.
(3.3)
Let us ﬁgure out what the algorithm A(g) in combination with the payoﬀ calcu-
lation rule actually does. Starting with the network g and player set N , at each step
s it identiﬁes the so called minimal shortage ratio rs among the remaining players Ns
in the network gs = g|Ns . There is a largest g-independent set Ms which minimizes
this shortage ratio such that
rs =
|Ls|
|Ms| ,
where Ls is the partner set of Ms. The limit equilibrium payoﬀ of the players in
Ms is then given by xs =
rs
1+rs
= |Ls|
|Ms|+|Ls|
< 1
2
while their partners in Ls receive
1 − xs = |Ms||Ms|+|Ls| > 12 . These players and their links are then deleted from the
network and the algorithm moves forward to the next step. It stops when there are
either no more players left or if the minimal shortage ratio is greater than or equal
to one. In the latter case the limit equilibrium payoﬀ of all remaining players is 1
2
.
Manea (2011, Proposition 3) shows that the sequence of minimal shortage ratios (rs)s
and therefore also (xs)s are strictly increasing.
In the framework with δ → 1 the described algorithm A(g) together with the
previous considerations then determines the proﬁt u∗i (g) = v
∗
i (g) − ηi(g)c of each
player i ∈ N . Broadly speaking, the algorithm quantiﬁes the main forces that,
in terms of payoﬀs, each player beneﬁts from being linked to other players while
preferring neighbors who are sparsely connected or rather who are only connected to
other players who are in stronger positions than oneself. It is important to note that
the proﬁle of payoﬀs and therefore also the proﬁle of proﬁts u∗ = (u∗i )i∈N is component-
decomposable, that is u∗i (g) = u
∗
i (g|Ci(g)) for all players i ∈ N and networks g where
Ci(g) ⊆ N is the component of player i in g. Thus, a player’s proﬁt is not aﬀected by
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the existence or structure of subnetworks induced by components she is not contained
in.
Beyond that, note that Manea develops the algorithm A(g) under the assumption
that there are no isolated players in the underlying network g. However, it is easy to
see that equations (3.3) are still fulﬁlled if one relaxes this restriction. It is clear that
isolated players have a limit equilibrium payoﬀ of zero since they have no bargaining
partner they could generate a unit surplus with. At the same time the algorithm
A(g) provides r1 = 0 such that x1 = 0. In this case, M1 is the set of all isolated
players in the network and we have L1 = ∅. Then according to (3.3) and as required,
all players in M1 are assigned a limit equilibrium payoﬀ of x1 = 0.
Throughout the next section we assume that each player can inﬂuence the network
structure by altering own links in t = 0, i.e. before the bargaining game starts. This
means that the network is no longer exogenously given as in the work of Manea but
the outcome of strategic interaction between players. This gives rise to questions
regarding the stability of networks and leads to the main results of this chapter. Our
analysis is mainly based on the seminal concept of pairwise stability which has been
introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Definition 3.2 (Pairwise Stability, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)). Consider the
player set N and a profile of network utility or profit functions (ui)i∈N . Then a
network g is said to be pairwise stable if both
(i) for all ij ∈ g: ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and
(ii) for all ij /∈ g: if ui(g + ij) > ui(g), then uj(g + ij) < uj(g).
So, according to this deﬁnition, a network is pairwise stable if no player can
improve by deleting a single link and also no two players can both individually beneﬁt
from adding a mutual link. The analysis of our model demands to distinguish between
networks being pairwise stable only at a single cost level and those fulﬁlling the
conditions for two or more values of linking costs. For this purpose we introduce the
following terminology.
Definition 3.3 (Singular and Non-Singular Pairwise Stability). In the considered
framework with network profit function u = u∗ and linking costs c > 0, a network g
is called
• singularly pairwise stable if g is pairwise stable at cost level c > 0 but nowhere
else,
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• non-singularly pairwise stable if there exists another cost level c′ > 0, c′ 6= c,
such that g is pairwise stable at c and c′.
For a singularly pairwise stable network it is obviously very rare (even a singu-
larity) to encounter precisely the parametrization where it is pairwise stable. For
instance, this notion is therefore not robust with respect to any slight change of the
cost level. Thus, we are predominantly interested in networks being non-singularly
pairwise stable. In what follows, we therefore focus on this latter subclass of pair-
wise stable networks. Note that, in general, networks being pairwise stable for a
continuum of cost levels constitute a subset of this subclass.48 As an outcome of our
analysis, however, it turns out that, in our model, all non-singularly pairwise stable
networks are even pairwise stable on a cost interval of positive length.
Observe that the notions of stability considered so far focus exclusively on one
link deviations. One might argue that in many contexts at least severing links does
not cost any eﬀort as it does not require coordination between players. Thus, one
should allow for the possibility of multiple link deletion. This gives rise to the concept
of pairwise Nash stability where in Deﬁnition 3.2 condition (i) is simply replaced by
(i)’ for all i ∈ N , li ⊆ {ij ∈ g | j ∈ N}: ui(g) ≥ ui(g − li)
(see e.g. Bloch and Jackson, 2006). As opposed to stability issues, in Section 3.4 we
focus on networks being eﬃcient, that is on structures which yield maximal utilitarian
welfare.
Definition 3.4 (Utilitarian Welfare and Eﬃciency, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)).
Consider the player set N and a profile of network utility or profit functions (ui)i∈N .
• The utilitarian welfare yielded by a network g is defined as
U(g) :=
∑
i∈N
ui(g).
• A network g is said to be eﬃcient if for all g′ ⊆ gN we have
U(g) ≥ U(g′).
So we say that a network is eﬃcient if the unweighted sum of individual proﬁts
48One might consider to call a network “generically pairwise stable” if it is pairwise stable for a
continuum of cost levels. See e.g. Baetz (2015) who refers to a “generic equilibrium”.
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cannot be further increased by altering links in any way.49 Based on these fundamen-
tal concepts and considerations we are now able to establish our main results in the
following Section 3.3 as well as, subsequently, further interesting ﬁndings.
3.3 Characterization of Stable Networks
In the main part of this section we derive a complete characterization of non-singularly
pairwise stable networks for the case that players are inﬁnitely patient. Further,
we examine the implications for possible bargaining outcomes resulting thereof (see
Subsection 3.3.1) as well as the possibility of networks to be singularly pairwise stable
(see Subsection 3.3.2).
We consider period t = 0 and suppose that players, who anticipate the inﬁnite
horizon network bargaining game they will be involved in, individually intend to
maximize their expected proﬁts. Given the framework with δ → 1, we aim for a
characterization of stable network structures in the sense that no player has incentives
to add or delete links. As a ﬁrst step, we identify pairwise stable structures for
all levels of linking costs c > 0. Afterwards, we gradually rule out the possibility
to be pairwise stable for a broad range of networks until we arrive at a complete
characterization of non-singularly pairwise stable networks. It turns out that these
structures are even pairwise Nash stable.
Note ﬁrst that there exist some general results about existence, uniqueness and
the structure of pairwise stable networks in the literature which we should take into
account. One might suppose that the works of Hellmann (2013) and Hellmann and
Landwehr (2014), which are perhaps closest within this strand of literature, could
simplify the analysis of our model. In Appendix 3.B, however, we demonstrate that
crucial conditions are not satisﬁed here which implies that their results are in general
not applicable.
As already mentioned, we ﬁrst focus on one link deviations which is captured by
the notion of pairwise stability (see Deﬁnition 3.2). To get a ﬁrst impression of the
problem let us have a look at the situation for three players, i.e. for N = {1, 2, 3}.
It turns out that this case already covers many important aspects of the network
formation game. Figure 3.1 illustrates the four types of networks which might ap-
pear including the induced proﬁts u∗i for each player i ∈ N . To comprehend these
proﬁts, consider the algorithm introduced in Deﬁnition 3.1 and the subsequent payoﬀ
49This deﬁnition also goes back to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) who call such a network “strongly
eﬃcient”. However, in the literature this property is usually simply referred to as eﬃciency (see e.g.
Jackson, 2008b, p. 157).
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computation rule. Besides, note that all other possible networks can be derived by
permuting players which would not provide additional insights as players are assumed
to be ex ante homogeneous.
0
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2
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2
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2
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2
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3
− 2c
gI gII gIII gIV
Figure 3.1: A sketch of the four network structures which can arise in the case n = 3
with induced proﬁts
Let us consider these networks in detail. We see immediately that the network
gI is pairwise stable if and only if the linking costs c are greater than or equal to
1
2
. Otherwise any two players could increase their proﬁt from zero to 1
2
− c > 0 by
creating a mutual link. However, for c = 1
2
also no player wants to delete this link and
indeed, the cost range c ∈ (1
6
, 1
2
] is the one for which gII is pairwise stable. Here, link
deletion is obviously not beneﬁcial and if one of the two connected players creates a
link to the third player, then she would end up with a proﬁt of 2
3
−2c which is strictly
smaller than 1
2
− c for this cost range. These latter two terms are equal for c = 1
6
but
the third player would improve from zero to 1
6
in this case. Therefore, at this or an
even smaller cost level, gII cannot be pairwise stable. But so is gIII for c =
1
6
. This
is because here no player has incentives to delete a link and the two players who are
not connected are indiﬀerent between creating a mutual link and not creating it as
for this cost level we have 1
3
− c = 1
6
= 1
2
− 2c. However, if linking costs are even
smaller, then both would proﬁt from this link. Thus, gIII is pairwise stable if and
only if c = 1
6
. Finally, the network gIV is pairwise stable for c ∈ (0, 16 ] but obviously
not at higher cost levels.
It turns out that the observed mechanisms being crucial in the three-player case
hold similarly also in general. Our ﬁrst theorem reveals suﬃcient conditions for
networks to be pairwise stable. More precisely, it identiﬁes, for all cost levels, concrete
network structures being pairwise stable.
Theorem 3.1 (Suﬃcient Conditions for Networks to Be Pairwise Stable). In the
framework as introduced in Section 3.2 with δ → 1 and player set N the following
holds:
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(i) The empty network is pairwise stable if c ≥ 1
2
.
(ii) A network which is a union of separated pairs and at most one isolated player
is pairwise stable if c ∈ (1
6
, 1
2
].50 Additionally, if c = 1
2
, then several isolated
players can coexist in a pairwise stable network.
(iii) A network which is a union of odd circles with at most 1
2c
players and either
separated pairs or at most one isolated player is pairwise stable if c ∈ (0, 1
6
].51
Additionally, if c = 1
6
and given that there is no isolated player, then there can
also exist lines of length three in a pairwise stable network.52
The formal proof of this theorem is, like all other more complex or lengthy proofs,
provided in Appendix 3.A. It is important to note that, when considering the above
mentioned unions of subnetworks, we do not mean that the respective network neces-
sarily has to be composed of all of the stated subnetworks to be pairwise stable. For
instance, if we consider costs c ∈ (0, 1
6
], then a network consisting only of separated
pairs or only of (some of the permissible) odd circles is pairwise stable as well. Fur-
thermore, note that all of these subnetworks are component-induced which implies
that unions are disjoint with respect to contained links and players.
A byproduct of Theorem 3.1 is that it guarantees existence of a pairwise stable
network at each level of linking costs. Furthermore, we have given a characterization
of at least some pairwise stable networks for each level of costs. However, it is not
clear at all that the types of networks mentioned in the theorem are in each case
the only pairwise stable ones. Anyway, we can already state some consequences from
our observations in the three-player case considered in Figure 3.1 and the proof of
Theorem 3.1. This is done in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. In the model with δ → 1 a network cannot be pairwise stable if it
contains
(i) more than one isolated player while c < 1
2
,
(ii) a separated pair while c > 1
2
,
(iii) a line of length three while c 6= 1
6
,
50A separated pair denotes a subnetwork induced by a two-player component.
51A circle denotes a component-induced subnetwork which is regular of degree two. A circle with
m players or a m-player circle is induced by a component with cardinality m ≥ 3 and it is called
odd if this cardinality is an odd number.
52A line of length m ≥ 3 denotes a subnetwork induced by a m-player component which can be
transformed to a m-player circle by adding one link.
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(iv) an odd circle with more than 1
2c
members,53
(v) an isolated player combined with a separated pair or a line of length three while
c ≤ 1
6
.
Statements (i)–(iv) as well as the ﬁrst part of Statement (v) of Corollary 3.1 follow
immediately from what we learned in the three-player case and the proof of Theorem
3.1. To see that an isolated player and a line of length three cannot coexist in a
network being pairwise stable for some c ≤ 1
6
is, however, also quite obvious. An
isolated player’s proﬁt is always zero while each of the two players in a line of length
three having one link receives 1
3
− c as we know from the three-player case. If one
of these players links to an isolated player, then the algorithm A(·) yields that all
players in the new component receive a payoﬀ of 1
2
. Thus, it is beneﬁcial for both
players to build this mutual link as for c ≤ 1
6
we have 1
2
−2c ≥ 1
3
−c and 1
2
−c > 0. One
should perhaps mention that according to (iii) it is clear anyway that we cannot have
a line of length three in a pairwise stable network if c < 1
6
. So the above additional
consideration is actually only relevant for c = 1
6
.
The results we establish in the further course of this section together with the
above corollary reveal that the conditions stated in Theorem 3.1 are not only suﬃcient
but also necessary for a network to be non-singularly pairwise stable. Note however
that a network which is composed of several isolated players and at least one separated
pair is only singularly pairwise stable (at c = 1
2
, see Theorem 3.1(ii)). Similarly,
networks containing a line of length three can at most be singularly pairwise stable
(at c = 1
6
, see Theorem 3.1(iii)).
In general, it is clear that a network can only be pairwise stable if any link is
proﬁtable for both players involved or linking costs c > 0 are at least covered by
the additional payoﬀ. Therefore, the intuition says that pairwise stable networks
cannot have so called disagreement links, that is links which are not contained in the
corresponding limit equilibrium agreement network. One might argue that such a link
leads to higher costs for both players connected through it whereas it seems to be
irrelevant regarding payoﬀs. If it is selected by nature at some point in time, the two
players will not ﬁnd an agreement in the network bargaining game. So why should
they connect? From another perspective, however, things seem to be a bit more
complicated. With regard to the mechanism of the algorithm A(g) which determines
the payoﬀ of each player in a given network, a disagreement link could have a rather
global eﬀect. It might be conceivable that deleting such a link can change the whole
53In particular, this means that there can be no odd circles at all in pairwise stable networks as
long as c > 16 .
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payoﬀ structure induced by the network, which then might also aﬀect the two edge
players. For instance, the presence of a link, though giving rise to a disagreement,
might prevent one of the players it connects and who receives a payoﬀ of at least 1
2
from being deleted during the algorithm as part of a g-independent set, which would
induce a lower payoﬀ for this player. However, the following proposition establishes
that our ﬁrst intuition is indeed correct.
Proposition 3.1 (Disagreement Links). Consider the framework with δ → 1. If a
network g is pairwise stable for some cost level c > 0, then we must have that the
network itself and the corresponding limit equilibrium agreement network coincide,
i.e. g = g∗, meaning that g does not contain disagreement links. In particular, this
implies that we have v∗i (g) + v
∗
j (g) = 1 for all ij ∈ g.
This is a valuable insight which we repeatedly make use of in what follows. The
proof of the proposition can be found in the appendix. Basically, we adapt the proof
of Manea (2011, Theorem 4) in such a way as to show that for any pairwise stable
network g and any disagreement link ij ∈ g it would have to be v∗k(g) = v∗k(g − ij)
for all k ∈ N . Thus, players i and j would obviously want to delete their mutual link
which contradicts pairwise stability.
We now ﬁrst consider networks inducing a homogeneous payoﬀ structure. In line
with Manea (2011) we call a network equitable if every player receives a payoﬀ of
1
2
. For a given network g with player set N we deﬁne the subset N˜(g) := {i ∈
N | v∗i (g) = 12}. We utilize this notation in the following theorem. In combination
with Proposition 3.1, it reveals that a network can only be pairwise stable if any
player receiving a payoﬀ of 1
2
is contained in a component which either induces a
separated pair or an odd circle.
Theorem 3.2 (Equitability and Pairwise Stability). Consider the model with δ → 1.
If a network g is pairwise stable for some cost level c > 0, then g|N˜(g) must be a union
of separated pairs and odd circles.54
The proof, which is again given in Appendix 3.A, is by contradiction. The idea is
to assume that g is pairwise stable but g|N˜(g) is not a union of separated pairs and odd
circles. Note that by Proposition 3.1 a link from a player in N˜(g) to a player outside
this set cannot exist which implies that we have v∗i (g) = v
∗
i (g|N˜(g)) for all i ∈ N˜(g)
as payoﬀs are component-decomposable. Further, we make use of both directions of
Manea (2011, Theorem 5) who establishes that a network is equitable if and only if
54As usual, g|N˜(g) here is considered as being deﬁned on the player set N˜(g) instead of N .
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it has a so called “edge cover” g′ composed of separated pairs and odd circles. A
network g′ is said to be an edge cover of g|N˜(g) if it fulﬁlls g′ ⊆ g|N˜(g) and no player
in N˜(g) is isolated in g′. This implies that any player in N˜(g) has an incentive to
delete each of her links not contained in g′.
Though statements diﬀer, notice that Theorem 3.2 is in line with Manea (2011,
Theorem 1(ii) of the Online Appendix). The latter establishes that for zero linking
costs a network is pairwise stable if and only if it is equitable. Of course, in this
case no player can gain anything from deleting redundant links from an equitable
network. This then gives rise to a larger class of pairwise stable (equitable) networks.
For instance, any even circle or line of even length is equitable and therefore pair-
wise stable as long as there are no linking costs whereas Theorem 3.2 rules out this
possibility for c > 0. On the contrary, as we have seen in Figure 3.1 and Theorem
3.1, for positive linking costs there additionally exist non-equitable structures such
as networks composed of an isolated player combined with separated pairs or odd
circles which can be pairwise stable. Another example for this is the line of length
three though such a component-induced subnetwork can only occur in a singularly
pairwise stable network. In what follows, this kind of singularity is central to our
investigation.
Summing up our results so far, for all levels of positive linking costs, we achieved
a complete characterization of networks which are pairwise stable and induce homo-
geneous payoﬀs within each of its components. In these networks, all payoﬀs must be
equal to either 1
2
or zero by Proposition 3.1. According to Theorem 3.1, Corollary 3.1
and Theorem 3.2 certain unions of separated pairs, odd circles and isolated players
constitute this class of networks.
Thus, it remains to consider structures which induce heterogeneous payoﬀs within
a component. Most of the rest of the section is devoted to the examination of such
networks and the question whether and in which cases they can potentially be pairwise
stable. To begin with, let us make sure to be aware of the following property of
pairwise stable non-equitable networks. Taking into account the payoﬀ computation
rule it is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.1.
Corollary 3.2. Consider the framework with δ → 1. Let g 6= ∅ be a non-equitable
network having only one component and assume that it is pairwise stable for some
cost level c > 0. Then there exists a unique partition M ∪˙L = N with |M | > |L| and
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g|M = g|L = ∅, meaning that g is bipartite.55 Payoffs are then given by
v∗i (g) = x for all i ∈M and
v∗j (g) = 1− x for all j ∈ L,
where x = |L|
|M |+|L|
.
Note here that according to Manea (2011, Proposition 3) the sequence of minimal
shortage ratios provided by the algorithm in Deﬁnition 3.1 is strictly increasing for
any network. Thus, Corollary 3.2 implies that for any non-equitable pairwise stable
network g consisting of only one component the algorithm A(g) has to stop after
removing all players during the ﬁrst step. This then leads to the heterogeneous
payoﬀ distribution with two diﬀerent payoﬀs, one below and one above 1
2
.
Based on Corollary 3.2 the following theorem concludes the complete characteri-
zation of non-singularly pairwise stable networks. It establishes that any network in
which players belonging to one component receive diﬀerent payoﬀs can at most be
singularly pairwise stable.
Theorem 3.3 (Payoﬀ Heterogeneity and Pairwise Stability). Consider the framework
with δ → 1. If a network is pairwise stable for some cost level c > 0 and there is a
component in which players receive heterogeneous payoffs, then in any such component
there must occur exactly two different payoffs x ∈ (0, 1
2
) and 1− x ∈ (1
2
, 1) with
x+ c =
1
2
. (3.4)
The proof rests on two lemmas which are of some independent interest. We shall
now state these lemmas, one after the other, and then show how they combine to
establish the theorem.
We ﬁrst show that if any two players, whose payoﬀs in a pairwise stable network
are strictly smaller than 1
2
, link to each other, then both receive a payoﬀ of 1
2
in the
resulting network.
Lemma 3.1. In the framework with δ → 1 consider a pairwise stable network g
for which the algorithm A(g) provides (r1, x1,M1, L1, N1, g1), i.e. s¯ = 1, such that
r1 ∈ (0, 1). Then for all i, j ∈M1 it is
v∗i (g + ij) = v
∗
j (g + ij) =
1
2
.
55If we write M ∪˙ L, this simply denotes the union of two sets M and L being disjoint. We use
this notation whenever disjointness is of importance.
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Further, if the player set N = {1, ..., n} is extended by a player n+1 while the network
g remains unchanged, it similarly is v∗i (g + i(n+ 1)) = v
∗
n+1(g + i(n+ 1)) =
1
2
.
The second lemma, in contrast, considers link deletion and players who receive a
payoﬀ being strictly greater than 1
2
in a pairwise stable network. It establishes that
one link deletion cannot eﬀect these players’ payoﬀs to fall below 1
2
.
Lemma 3.2. In the framework with δ → 1 consider a pairwise stable network g
for which the algorithm A(g) provides (r1, x1,M1, L1, N1, g1), i.e. s¯ = 1, such that
r1 ∈ (0, 1). Then for all j ∈ L1, i ∈M1 and kl ∈ g it is
v∗j (g − kl) ≥
1
2
≥ v∗i (g − kl).
The proofs of these lemmas are somewhat lengthy and as usual provided in the
appendix. In both cases we show that if the respective statement were not true,
then this would imply that the player set is inﬁnite. To arrive at this contradiction
we make use of an additional, rather technical lemma which we also provide in the
appendix (see Lemma 3.3). Based on these lemmas, the proof of the theorem is
straightforward.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let g be a pairwise stable network inducing heterogeneous
payoﬀs within a component C ⊆ N . Let g′ := g|C . According to Corollary 3.2, the
algorithm A(g′) (with N1 = C) has to stop after the ﬁrst step, i.e. s¯′ = 1.56 Let
(r′1, x,M
′
1, L
′
1, N
′
1, g
′
1) be the outcome of A(g′) and i ∈ M ′1, j ∈ L′1. Then any player
in C must either receive a payoﬀ of x =
|L′1|
|M ′1|+|L
′
1|
∈ (0, 1
2
) or 1−x = |M ′1|
|M ′1|+|L
′
1|
∈ (1
2
, 1).
Then Lemma 3.1 provides the stability condition
x− ηi(g′)c ≥ 1
2
− (ηi(g′) + 1)c ⇔ x+ c ≥ 1
2
.
Similarly, according to Lemma 3.2 we must have
(1− x)− ηj(g′)c ≥ 1
2
− (ηj(g′)− 1)c ⇔ x+ c ≤ 1
2
.
So payoﬀs must be x = 1
2
− c and 1 − x = 1
2
+ c. Obviously, this has to hold for all
components of g in which players receive heterogeneous payoﬀs.
Notice by considering the limit case c→ 0 that Theorem 3.3 is in line with Manea’s
(2011, Online Appendix) result that for zero linking costs any pairwise stable network
56Disregarding isolated players here by considering the restricted player set is w.l.o.g. as the proﬁle
of payoﬀs respectively proﬁts is component-decomposable.
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must be equitable. As an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.3 and the previous
ﬁndings we arrive at the main result of this chapter which we write down as a corollary.
Corollary 3.3 (Complete Characterization). In the framework with δ → 1 the class
of non-singularly pairwise stable networks is completely characterized by Theorem
3.1 for each level of linking costs c > 0.57 Thus, specific unions of isolated players,
separated pairs and odd circles constitute this class.
To see this, recall ﬁrst that according to Theorem 3.2 any network g not mentioned
in Theorem 3.1 can only be pairwise stable if it induces heterogeneous payoﬀs within
at least one component. Each player contained in such a component must either
receive a payoﬀ of x = 1
2
− c or 1− x = 1
2
+ c by Theorem 3.3.58 Be aware that these
equations do not represent calculation rules determining payoﬀs in g but necessary
conditions for a network to (possibly) be pairwise stable. Recall that x is in fact
determined by the algorithm A(g), meaning that it solely depends on the structure
of g and that c > 0 is an independent parameter of the model. Therefore, such a
network g can only be pairwise stable at the single cost level c = 1
2
− x. Together
with Corollary 3.1 this establishes Corollary 3.3.
Besides, given this cost level, it is of course not at all clear that a network in which
each player either receives a payoﬀ of x ∈ (0, 1
2
) or 1 − x is actually pairwise stable.
However, even if this is the case, i.e. if such a network is singularly pairwise stable,
then any two players with a payoﬀ of x are indiﬀerent between leaving the network
unchanged and adding a mutual link (see Lemma 3.1). Also, any player receiving
a payoﬀ of 1 − x must be indiﬀerent between keeping all of her links and deleting
any of them (see Lemma 3.2). In this sense, the case that a network which induces
heterogeneous payoﬀs within a component is pairwise stable and does indeed form
is really special and insofar a singularity. We are able, however, to specify one such
network (and variations respectively generalizations of it as a component-induced
subnetwork), namely the line of length three with payoﬀs x = 1
3
and 1−x = 2
3
which
is pairwise stable if and only if c = 1
6
.59 As opposed to this, we even rule out the
possibility to be singularly pairwise stable for a broad range of network structures in
the further course of this section (see Subsection 3.3.2).
A ﬁrst step in this direction can be stated as a further corollary to our results so
far, in particular to Theorem 3.3.
57Of course, singularly pairwise stable networks mentioned in Theorem 3.1 are to be ignored here.
58By the way, recalling Corollary 3.2, the induced subnetwork must be bipartite.
59In Section 3.5, we additionally reveal that the stability of this particular network is not robust
in another respect either.
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Corollary 3.4. In the framework with δ → 1 a network cannot be pairwise stable
(i) at any cost level c > 1
4
if it is not mentioned in Theorem 3.1,
(ii) at any cost level c > 0 if it has a component which induces a bipartite subnetwork
with m ∈ N players on one side and less than m
3
on the other.
Let us comprehend this. According to Corollary 3.3 any network not mentioned
in Theorem 3.1 can at most be singularly pairwise stable. Moreover, there must be a
player i ∈ N who receives a payoﬀ of x = 1
2
− c. This player can save costs of c when
deleting a link while falling back to a payoﬀ of zero in the worst case. This leads to
the stability condition
x− ηi(g)c ≥ 0− (ηi(g)− 1)c ⇔ x ≥ c ⇔ 1
2
− c ≥ c ⇔ c ≤ 1
4
.
Beyond that, note that a component-induced subnetwork g as mentioned in Part (ii)
can only be contained in a pairwise stable network if the algorithm A(g) stops after
the ﬁrst step.60 Let (r1, x,M1, L1, N1, g1) denote its outcome. By assumption we
obviously have |M1| = m and |L1| < m3 but on the contrary we get
1
4
≥ c = 1
2
− x = 1
2
− |L1||M1|+ |L1| =
1
2
|M1| − |L1|
|M1|+ |L1| ⇔ 3|L1| ≥ |M1|.
Arriving at a contradiction this gives Part (ii). Recall that, with regard to networks
inducing heterogeneous payoﬀs within a component, the assumption of bipartiteness
is not an additional restriction here according to Corollary 3.2. However, the main
insight we gain from Corollary 3.4 is that Theorem 3.1 does not solely give a com-
plete characterization of non-singularly pairwise stable networks for all c > 0 (recall
Corollary 3.3) but also a complete characterization of pairwise stable networks for all
c > 1
4
.
So far we considered pure one link deviations and the concept of pairwise stability.
To conclude the main part of this section, we now relax this assumption to some
extent and allow for multiple link deletion as it is captured by the notion of pairwise
Nash stability (see Section 3.2). It is clear that every pairwise Nash stable network
is also pairwise stable whereas the reverse is in general not true. This gives rise to
the question whether in our model there exist pairwise stable networks which are not
pairwise Nash stable. However, it is quite obvious that, at least for networks being
non-singularly pairwise stable, this is not the case.
60See again Footnote 56.
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Corollary 3.5 (Pairwise Nash Stability). In the framework with δ → 1 consider a
non-singularly pairwise stable network g. Then g is pairwise Nash stable at each cost
level for which it is pairwise stable.
Note that, according to our previous results, in a non-singularly pairwise stable
network, a player can only have more than one link if she is contained in an odd
circle. Obviously, the deﬁnitions of pairwise Nash stability and pairwise stability
diﬀer only for such players. Recall that odd circles can only occur in networks being
pairwise stable at linking costs c ≤ 1
6
and that each player contained in such a circle
component receives a payoﬀ of 1
2
. Hence, any such player must receive a proﬁt of at
least 1
6
. On the contrary, multiple link deletion would lead to a proﬁt of zero since
the player would be isolated afterwards.
Combining Corollaries 3.4 and 3.5 then gives that we even have a general equiv-
alence between pairwise stability and pairwise Nash stability for linking costs c > 1
4
.
Finally, observe that the line of length three is also even pairwise Nash stable at
c = 1
6
. This is because the central player who receives a proﬁt of 1
3
would get isolated
when deleting both of her links. This then would again induce a lower proﬁt of zero.
3.3.1 Stability and Bargaining Outcomes
After characterizing (non-singularly) pairwise stable networks we now turn to see
what our ﬁndings imply for outcomes of the inﬁnite horizon network bargaining game.
As a second main result we show that payoﬀs and proﬁts induced by (non-singularly)
pairwise stable networks are in general highly but not completely homogeneous. How-
ever, given our previous results of this section this can be stated as a corollary.
Corollary 3.6 (Limited Outcome Diversity). In the framework with δ → 1 consider
a network g which is pairwise stable at a given level of linking costs c > 0. Then
players’ payoffs must be such that either v∗i (g) ∈ {12 − c, 12 , 12 + c} with c ∈ (0, 14 ] or
v∗i (g) ∈ {0, 12} for all i ∈ N . Moreover, if g is non-singularly pairwise stable, then only
the latter of these two cases can occur and there exists a set P (g) ⊂ {0, 1
2
− 2c, 1
2
− c}
with |P (g)| ≤ 2 such that for players’ profits it holds that u∗i (g) ∈ P (g) for all i ∈ N .
This result is basically an immediate consequence of Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, Corol-
laries 3.1 and 3.4, and Lemma 3.1. To see this, recall that in pairwise stable networks,
in terms of payoﬀs, there can only occur four kinds of players. Namely, these are iso-
lated players receiving zero, players belonging to a separated pair or an odd circle
with a payoﬀ of 1
2
and, for c ∈ (0, 1
4
], players contained in a component with hetero-
geneous payoﬀs who receive 1
2
+ c or 1
2
− c. However, the second part of Lemma 3.1
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implies that the former and the latter player type cannot coexist in a pairwise stable
network. Further, as every non-singularly pairwise stable network is a union of iso-
lated players, odd circles and separated pairs, the only possible proﬁts are zero, 1
2
−2c
and 1
2
− c in this case. However, for any cost level c > 0, only two of these three
kinds of component-induced subnetworks can coexist in a pairwise stable network
according to Corollary 3.1(iv) and (v).
Taken together, we have that the diversity of possible bargaining outcomes gets
narrowed down substantially compared to the work of Manea (2011) if one considers a
preceding stage of strategic network formation. To this end observe that in Manea’s
(2011) basic framework with δ → 1 one can obtain any rational number from the
interval [0, 1) as a payoﬀ induced by an appropriate network on a suﬃciently large
player set.61
3.3.2 Singular Pairwise Stability
As already announced, we conclude this section by ruling out the possibility to be
pairwise stable at all for certain network structures not considered yet. According
to our previous results any remaining network can at most be singularly pairwise
stable and there must be a component in which players receive heterogeneous payoﬀs
(recall Theorem 3.3). In the following propositions, similarly as in Corollary 3.4, we
consider speciﬁc classes of networks of that kind. The main idea of the proofs, which
are rather lengthy and therefore again given in the appendix, is to identify generic
network positions in which the respective player receives a payoﬀ strictly greater than
1
2
and still does so after deleting a certain link. Applying the notation of Theorem 3.3
we then must have x+ c < 1
2
for the corresponding stability condition to be fulﬁlled.
Thus, arriving at a contradiction, such a network cannot be pairwise stable. Another
approach we use focuses on players who are in a weak bargaining position but whose
loss in payoﬀ from dropping a certain own link is too small to be compatible with
the condition x+ c = 1
2
.
We show ﬁrst that all networks not considered in Theorem 3.1 which contain a
tree cannot even be singularly pairwise stable.62
Proposition 3.2 (Trees). Consider the framework with δ → 1. If a network g is
pairwise stable, then it cannot have a component of more than three players which
61For the rational number n
′
n′′
∈ [0, 1) with n′, n′′ ∈ N, consider the player set N with n = n′′ and
the complete bipartite network with n′ players on one side and n′′ − n′ players on the other side.
Then the algorithm A(·) yields payoﬀs n′′−n′
n′′
and n
′
n′′
.
62A tree denotes a component-induced subnetwork which is minimally connected.
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induces a tree.
Proposition 3.2 further reduces the class of potentially pairwise stable networks.
It implies that any component of a pairwise stable network either contains at most
three players or induces a subnetwork which has a cycle.63 The former case has been
analyzed exhaustively in Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1. Thus, the only structures
which are not captured by our analysis yet are networks which have a cycle and in
which players receive heterogeneous payoﬀs. A subclass of such networks is considered
in the following proposition. To state it we require an additional piece of notation. For
a given network g, a player k ∈ N is called cut-player if g|N\{k} has more components
than g.64
Proposition 3.3 (Cycles and Cut-Players). Consider the framework with δ → 1. If
a network g is pairwise stable, then there cannot be a cut-player who is part of a cycle
and receives a payoff strictly greater than 1
2
.
This statement might seem somewhat artiﬁcial but it rules out the possibility to
be pairwise stable for several generic kinds of networks. For instance, many networks
containing a component-induced subnetwork which has a cycle and a loose-end player,
i.e. there is a player who has one link, are excluded. See Figure 3.2 for an illustration
of exemplary subnetworks which cannot even be contained in singularly pairwise
stable networks according to Proposition 3.3.
gV gVI
Figure 3.2: A sketch of networks which cannot be pairwise stable according to Propo-
sition 3.3
However, there exist other networks not captured by our (explicitly stated) results
which could potentially still be singularly pairwise stable at some cost level c ∈ (0, 1
4
].
Two examples for this are given in Figure 3.3.
63A network g is said to have a cycle if there exist distinct players i1, i2, ..., im¯ ∈ N , m¯ ≥ 3, such
that i1im¯ ∈ g and imim+1 ∈ g for m = 1, 2, ..., m¯ − 1. For instance, this implies that any network
containing a circle has a cycle.
64This notation comes from graph theory where vertices of that kind are typically called “cut-
vertices” (see e.g. West, 2001). For instance, each player contained in a component which induces a
tree and having more than one link is a cut-player.
3.4 Eﬃciency • 81
gVII gVIII
Figure 3.3: A sketch of networks which, based on our general results in Section 3.3,
might still be singularly pairwise stable
Though a further generalization is not reached here, it is easy to check that the
concrete networks illustrated in the ﬁgure cannot be pairwise stable. In gVII one can
obviously delete any link without changing payoﬀs and, for instance as an immediate
consequence of Manea (2011, Theorem 6), a network like gVIII is not pairwise stable
at any cost level either. It remains as a conjecture that, in our framework with δ → 1,
the only singularly pairwise stable networks inducing heterogeneous payoﬀs within a
component are the ones containing a line of length three at cost level c = 1
6
.
3.4 Efficiency
Beside the issue of stability, it is of interest to analyze our model of network forma-
tion with regard to eﬃciency. From the perspective of a social planner it is important
to understand the connection between pairwise stable network structures on the one
hand and eﬃcient ones on the other. In this light, Polanski and Vega-Redondo (2013)
argue that the discrepancy between pairwise stability and eﬃciency in their model is
due to the ex-ante heterogeneity between players. Throughout this section we estab-
lish that, in general, the two classes of pairwise stable and eﬃcient networks do not
coincide either in our model though players are assumed to be ex ante homogeneous.
Our analysis is based on the concept of utilitarian welfare which postulates that a so-
ciety’s (or player set’s) welfare is simply given by the sum of players’ individual proﬁts
(recall Deﬁnition 3.4).65 The following theorem gives a complete characterization of
eﬃcient networks for all levels of positive linking costs.
Theorem 3.4 (Eﬃciency). Consider the framework with δ → 1 and player set N .
For linking costs c > 1
2
, the empty network is the only efficient one. For c = 1
2
, a
65Note that we solely consider proﬁts of the initial players here. One might argue that this is
somewhat short-sighted but it is these players who are present today, i.e. at time t = 0 which we
focus on throughout this work. Also, these are the players who are in charge of forming the network
and who are therefore in a crucial position. Moreover, recall that it is in general uncertain whether
or when players will get replaced during the subsequent network bargaining game. For these reasons,
a social planner might also restrict attention to the initial period.
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network is efficient if and only if it is a union of isolated players and separated pairs.
And for c ∈ (0, 1
2
), a network is efficient if and only if it is a union of separated pairs,
in case that n is odd supplemented by
• an isolated player if c ∈ [1
6
, 1
2
),
• a line of length three if c ∈ [ 1
12
, 1
6
], or
• a three-player circle if c ∈ (0, 1
12
].
The key insight of this theorem is that the empty network is the only eﬃcient
one while costs are high whereas for low costs any eﬃcient network is (essentially)
composed of separated pairs. In what follows, we therefore direct attention to the
situation in which we have an even number of players in the player set. Nevertheless,
a proof for the case n odd is as usual provided in the appendix. For both cases
we require an additional piece of notation. Given a network g, we deﬁne the set
N¯(g) := {i ∈ N | ηi(g) ≥ 1}, that is the set of players who are not isolated in g.
Moreover, for a set of players N ′ ⊆ N with |N ′| even, let gSPN ′ denote a network
composed of |N
′|
2
separated pairs and |N | − |N ′| isolated players.66
Proof of Theorem 3.4 (for n even). Consider a network g and furthermore let
(rs, xs,Ms, Ls, Ns, gs)s=1,...,s¯ be the outcome of the algorithm A(g) with N1 = N¯(g).
This means that we consider N¯(g) instead of N as player set here (thus, again disre-
garding isolated players which is w.l.o.g. as their proﬁt is zero anyway).67 Moreover,
note that for any y, z ∈ R we have y · z ≤ 1
4
(y + z)2 and that this holds strictly as
long as y 6= z. Using this we calculate
U∗(g) =
∑
i∈N¯(g)
(v∗i (g)− ηi(g)c) =
∑
i∈N¯(g)
v∗i (g)− 2d#(g)c
=
s¯−1∑
s=1
(xs|Ms|+ (1− xs)|Ls|) + 1
2
|Ns¯| − 2d#(g)c
= 2
s¯−1∑
s=1
|Ms||Ls|
|Ms|+ |Ls| +
1
2
|Ns¯| − 2d#(g)c
≤ 1
2
s¯−1∑
s=1
(|Ms|+ |Ls|) + 1
2
|Ns¯| − 2d#(g)c
=
1
2
|N¯(g)| − 2d#(g)c. (3.5)
66Strictly speaking, there exist of course many networks of this kind. However, since any two of
these can be converted into each other by permuting the ex ante homogeneous players, they are all
payoﬀ respectively welfare equivalent.
67Alternatively, one might think of this as considering the network g|N¯(g) with the usual restriction
on the player set.
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Since it is ηi(g) ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N¯(g), we have that d#(g) ≥ 12 |N¯(g)|. Moreover, if
d#(g) = 1
2
|N¯(g)|, then this obviously implies that |N¯(g)| is even and we must have
g = gSP
N¯(g)
. Hence, according to (3.5), for a network g 6= gSP
N¯(g)
it holds that
U∗(g) <
1
2
|N¯(g)| − |N¯(g)|c = |N¯(g)|
(1
2
− c
)
≤

 0 = U
∗(gSP∅ ) = U
∗(∅) if c ≥ 1
2
n(1
2
− c) = U∗(gSPN ) if c ≤ 12
.
This means that only networks which are unions of separated pairs and isolated
players can be eﬃcient. Among these candidates, it remains to identify the networks
which induce maximal utilitarian welfare. Obviously, for c > 1
2
this is solely the
network g with minimal |N¯(g)|, namely the empty network, whereas for c ∈ (0, 1
2
) we
have to choose the one with maximal |N¯(g)|, namely gSPN . For c = 12 all candidates
yield the same welfare of zero.
A comparison of Theorem 3.4 with the results established in Section 3.3 reveals
some interesting insights concerning the relationship between eﬃcient and pairwise
stable networks. We summarize these in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.7 (Eﬃciency vs. Pairwise Stability). In the model with δ → 1 it applies
(i) for c > 1
4
that a network is efficient if and only if it is pairwise stable,
(ii) for c ∈ (1
6
, 1
4
] that a network is efficient if and only if it is non-singularly pairwise
stable,
(iii) for c ∈ [ 1
12
, 1
6
] that there exists both efficient networks being not pairwise stable
and pairwise stable networks being not efficient and
(iv) for c ∈ (0, 1
12
) that every efficient network is also pairwise stable but there exist
pairwise stable networks being not efficient.
We can constitute that as long as linking costs are high enough, eﬃcient and
pairwise stable networks coincide. However, there is an intermediate cost level for
which a statement is not possible at all whereas for low costs the eﬃcient networks
constitute a proper subset of the pairwise stable ones. This conﬁrms the intuition
that, as long as linking costs are relatively low, there might be incentives for players to
implement individually beneﬁcial but non-eﬃcient outside options. For an illustration
consider the exemplary networks sketched in Figure 3.4 which are eﬃcient for certain
cost ranges but not pairwise stable or vice versa.
Observe that for c = 1
6
the network gIX is eﬃcient according to Theorem 3.4 but
not pairwise stable (see Corollary 3.1(v) or Figure 3.1). The same is true for gX and
84 • 3 Strategic Formation of Homogeneous Bargaining Networks
gIX gX gXI gXII
Figure 3.4: A sketch of networks revealing that eﬃciency and pairwise stability are
in general not equivalent
the cost range c ∈ [ 1
12
, 1
6
). On the other hand, gXI is pairwise stable but not eﬃcient
for c ∈ ( 1
12
, 1
6
]. And ﬁnally, for c ∈ (0, 1
12
] the network gXII is pairwise stable but
circles containing more than three players are never eﬃcient.
In summary, we ﬁnd that eﬃciency does not in general coincide with pairwise
stability although we deal with a setting of ex ante homogeneous players. Note,
however, that the eﬃcient networks are a subset of the pairwise stable ones at each
level of linking costs c > 0 if we restrict our attention to player sets with an even
number of players.
3.5 Effects of Time Discount
Our analysis in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 focuses on the limit case δ → 1 where players are
assumed to be inﬁnitely patient. However, in many situations it might be reasonable
to consider players who are less than inﬁnitely patient, meaning that in the network
bargaining game they discount time at least to some degree. In the underlying model
this is captured by a parametrization with δ ∈ (0, 1). In this section we take the
limit case as a benchmark and reveal some important commonalities and diﬀerences
between both cases with regard to strategic network formation and stability.
In Proposition 3.1 we establish that there are no disagreement links in pairwise
stable networks if we have δ → 1. For two reasons it should be intuitively clear that
this must still hold if we consider δ ∈ (0, 1) instead. On the one hand, if ik ∈ g is a
disagreement link, then we have δv∗δi (g) > 1 − δv∗δk (g) by deﬁnition. Therefore, the
ith equation of the system (3.1) determining the equilibrium payoﬀs is equivalent to
vi =

1− ∑
j∈Ni(g−ik)
1
2d#(g)

 δvi + ∑
j∈Ni(g−ik)
1
2d#(g)
max{1− δvj, δvi}.
This means that from player i’s perspective it does not make a diﬀerence whether
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she can get selected to bargain with player k or not since they will either way not
ﬁnd an agreement. This is of course similarly true from player k’s and also any other
player’s point of view. On the other hand, an additional amplifying eﬀect comes into
play when players are less than inﬁnitely patient. In this case, players care about
the time they have to wait until a certain outcome of a bargain is achieved as they
discount these payments by δ when calculating their expected payoﬀs. The existence
of a disagreement link prolongs the expected time until any other link gets selected
in the bargaining game and, therefore, must have a negative impact on any player’s
payoﬀ.
Next, we demonstrate that there exist networks which are pairwise stable for a
certain level of linking costs if players are inﬁnitely patient while this possibility can
be ruled out if there is time discount. The converse turns out to be true as well.
Example 3.1. Consider a player set with three players. Then a line of length three
is pairwise stable if we have δ → 1 and c = 1
6
. In the framework with δ ∈ (0, 1),
however, it is not pairwise stable for any c > 0.
The ﬁrst part of Example 3.1 is established by Theorem 3.1(iii). So let us examine
why a line of length three cannot be pairwise stable if players are impatient to some
degree. So let N = {1, 2, 3} and let g be a line of length three. By applying the
equation system (3.1) to g we ﬁnd that the payoﬀ of player 1, who is assumed to be
the player having two links, is v∗δ1 (g) =
2
4−δ
. Further, the two loose-end players 2 and
3 receive v∗δ2 (g) = v
∗δ
3 (g) =
1
4−δ
. Similarly, for the networks g − 12 and g + 23 we
calculate v∗δ1 (g−12) = 12 , v∗δ2 (g−12) = 0 and v∗δ2 (g+23) = v∗δ3 (g+23) = 13−δ . Hence,
for g to be pairwise stable, the following three conditions would have to be satisﬁed
simultaneously.
u∗δ2 (g) ≥ u∗δ2 (g − 12) ⇔ v∗δ2 (g) ≥ c ⇔
1
4− δ ≥ c, (3.6a)
u∗δ1 (g) ≥ u∗δ1 (g − 12) ⇔ v∗δ1 (g)− v∗δ1 (g − 12) ≥ c ⇔
δ
2(4− δ) ≥ c, (3.6b)
u∗δ2 (g) ≥ u∗δ2 (g + 23) ⇔ v∗δ2 (g + 23)− v∗δ2 (g) ≤ c ⇔
1
(3− δ)(4− δ) ≤ c. (3.6c)
However, one can show by simple transformations that conditions (3.6b) and (3.6c)
cannot be fulﬁlled at the same time. Figure 3.5 illustrates this. According to condition
(3.6b) the level of costs must be below the blue line and (3.6c) requires that c is above
the red line, which is obviously not possible simultaneously for δ < 1.
Thus, either linking costs are so low that players 2 and 3 want to add a mutual
link or they are so high that player 1 has incentives to delete one of her links. To
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0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
δ
c
1
4−δ
1
(3−δ)(4−δ)
δ
2(4−δ)
Figure 3.5: An illustration of the stability conditions (3.6) which arise in Example
3.1
sum up, we ﬁnd that, in the framework with players being inﬁnitely patient, the
existence of lines of length three in pairwise stable networks is not robust in two
respects. We already know that networks containing these subnetworks can at most
be singularly pairwise stable. Additionally, we now have that a marginal decrease of
δ, meaning however that players can still be almost inﬁnitely patient, already causes
general instability for this kind of networks.
On the contrary, there exist networks which, given any δ ∈ (0, 1), are pairwise
stable at some level of linking costs whereas such a c > 0 does not exist if players are
inﬁnitely patient, that is if we consider δ → 1 instead.
Example 3.2. Consider a player set with at least four players. Then for all δ ∈ (0, 1)
there exists c¯ > 0 such that the complete network is pairwise stable for all c ∈ (0, c¯]. In
the framework with δ → 1, however, complete networks with more than three players
are not pairwise stable for any c > 0.
As usual, the proof is provided in the appendix. However, the second part should
be clear, for instance by Theorem 3.2. To establish the ﬁrst part we basically solve
the equation system (3.1) for gN and gN − ij and show that for suﬃciently small
costs it is proﬁtable for any two players i, j ∈ N to keep their mutual link.
In this context, note that the cost range for which the complete network of less
than inﬁnitely patient players is pairwise stable gets arbitrarily small and close to
zero as δ approaches one. In this sense, the limit case δ → 1 does not constitute a
discontinuity regarding our previous results as it might seem at ﬁrst sight in the light
of Example 3.2. Also, note that, in the framework of Manea (2011, Online Appendix)
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with inﬁnitely patient players and zero linking costs, complete networks are always
pairwise stable as they are equitable.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we develop a well-founded and analytically tractable model of strategic
network formation in the context of decentralized bilateral bargaining involving ex
ante homogeneous players and explicit linking costs. One reasonable application of
our model is constituted by the stylized example of project collaboration between
ﬁrms which we introduce at the beginning.
In the case that players are inﬁnitely patient, we derive a complete character-
ization of non-singularly pairwise (Nash) stable networks. Depending on the level
of linking costs, speciﬁc unions of separated pairs, odd circles and isolated players
constitute this class. For a suﬃciently high cost level our result even yields a com-
plete characterization of pairwise (Nash) stable networks. The induced bargaining
outcomes are mostly homogeneous but a certain level of diversity regarding players’
payoﬀs and proﬁts can still occur. Besides, we study the remaining networks which
could possibly be singularly pairwise stable and succeed in ruling out this possibility
for a broad range of structures. These results are complementary to Manea (2011,
Online Appendix). Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of networks
being eﬃcient in terms of a utilitarian welfare criterion and reveal that these coincide
only partially, that is only at some cost levels, with the (non-singularly) pairwise
stable ones. As a robustness check we also relax the assumption that players are
inﬁnitely patient and gain insights regarding commonalities and diﬀerences between
the two cases.
Altogether, our work contributes to a better understanding of the behavior of
players in a non-cooperative setting of decentralized bilateral bargaining when the
underlying network is not exogenously given but the outcome of preceding strategic
interaction. We gain insights concerning the structure of resulting networks, induced
bargaining outcomes and regarding the eﬀects which inﬂuence players when aiming
for an optimization of their bargaining position in the network.
Regarding future research, it would be a reasonable next step, in our framework
with inﬁnitely patient players, to approach a complete characterization of pairwise
stable networks in general, that is beyond the case of non-singular pairwise stability
and for all levels of linking costs. This would call for a further discussion of net-
works which, according to our results, might be singularly pairwise stable for small
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costs. For this purpose, it might be a promising approach to strive for a generaliza-
tion of Manea’s (2011) Theorem 6 to the case where the “buyer-seller ratio” is not
(necessarily) an integer. If such an extension or generalization of our results is not
possible, one could alternatively work towards a generalization of Example 3.1 as an
additional robustness check. Anyway, it could be enriching to thoroughly analyze the
class of stable and eﬃcient networks when allowing players to discount time to some
degree. A consideration of alternative stability concepts such as pairwise stability
with transfers, which seems quite natural in a bargaining context, could generate
further important insights. Beyond that, it would surely be interesting to set up
an analytically tractable model of network formation in a bargaining framework in
which players do not get replaced one-to-one after dropping out. Due to the resulting
stochastic change of the network structure over time, this would certainly constitute
a challenging research topic.
Appendix 3.A Proofs
3.A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Consider a component C ⊆ N of some network g which induces a circle or a separated
pair. Then in both cases it is impossible to ﬁnd a g-independent subset M ⊆ C such
that for the corresponding partner set we have |Lg(M)| < |M |. Hence, the algorithm
A(g) yields a payoﬀ of 1
2
for each player contained in C in both cases (recall Deﬁnition
3.1 and the subsequent payoﬀ computation rule). Now consider two players i, j ∈ N
with ij /∈ g where
(a) both are contained in the same component inducing an odd circle,
(b) they are contained in diﬀerent components each inducing an odd circle,
(c) they are contained in diﬀerent components each inducing a separated pair,
(d) one is contained in a component inducing an odd circle and the other one is
contained in a component inducing a separated pair, or
(e) one is contained in a component inducing an odd circle and the other one is an
isolated player.
Then in each of these cases the algorithm A(g + ij) again yields a payoﬀ of 1
2
for all
players contained in the new component Ci(g+ ij) = Cj(g+ ij). The best way to see
3.A Proofs • 89
this is again to consider Deﬁnition 3.1 and the subsequent payoﬀ computation rule.68
Therefore, at least one of the two players i and j (in Cases (a)–(d) even both) will
receive an unchanged payoﬀ after having established this link. Regarding proﬁts this
means, however, that this player is worse oﬀ as she has to bear additional linking
costs of c > 0. Thus, the respective link will never be formed.
Next, recall the three-player case. From this it is straightforward to see that Part
(i) of the theorem is indeed true. Also, we can deduce that a pairwise stable network
can contain both an isolated player and a separated pair if we have linking costs
c ∈ (1
6
, 1
2
]. Together with the above Case (c) this establishes Part (ii) of the theorem.
Consider again a network g and now two players i′, j′ ∈ N with i′j′ ∈ g. Moreover,
assume that these players are contained in a component C which induces an odd circle
with m ≥ 3 players. We already know that g induces a payoﬀ of 1
2
for both players.
Now consider the network g′ := g − i′j′ which is obviously a line of length m. Let
(r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s=1,...,s¯′ be the outcome of A(g′) (with N1 = C).69 As m is an
odd number, we have that s¯′ = 1 and i′, j′ ∈ M ′1. Further, it is |M ′1| = m+12 and
|L′1| = m−12 which implies that v∗i′(g′) = v∗j′(g′) = x′1 = m−12m . As a stability condition
this gives
u∗i′(g)− u∗i′(g′) =
1
2
− 2c−
(m− 1
2m
− c
)
≥ 0 ⇔ 1
2m
≥ c ⇔ m ≤ 1
2c
.
Of course, the same holds for player j′. Together with the above Cases (a) and (b)
this means that a network which is composed of odd circles is pairwise stable if and
only if each circle has at most 1
2c
members. Note that a pairwise stable network can
therefore contain odd circles only if we have c ≤ 1
6
since a circle must have at least
three members by deﬁnition.
Furthermore, observe that for the cost range c ∈ (0, 1
6
] we have 1
2
− c > 0 which
means that no player contained in a component inducing a separated pair has in-
centives to delete her link. This together with the above Cases (c)–(e) gives that,
potentially besides one or several odd circles with a permissible number of players, a
network being pairwise stable at c ∈ (0, 1
6
] can contain separated pairs or one isolated
player. As we know from the three-player case, however, an isolated player and a
separated pair cannot coexist in a pairwise stable network at these levels of linking
costs. This proves the ﬁrst statement in Part (iii).
68However, a shortcut would be to consider Manea (2011, Theorem 5) which we make use of when
proving our Theorem 3.2.
69Disregarding players in C∁ is w.l.o.g. as the proﬁle of payoﬀs respectively proﬁts is component-
decomposable.
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Finally, consider the transition point c = 1
6
. In what follows, let the network g be
composed of two lines of length three, an odd circle, and a separated pair as sketched
in Figure 3.6.
1
2 3
4 5
6
Figure 3.6: A sketch of a network g containing lines of length three
W.l.o.g. we focus on the labeled players 1, 2, ..., 6. At c = 1
6
the algorithm A(g)
yields the following proﬁts:
u∗1(g) =
2
3
− 2c = 1
3
, u∗2(g) = u
∗
3(g) =
1
3
− c = 1
6
, u∗6(g) =
1
2
− 2c = 1
6
Based on this, we are able to establish that link addition either leads to a worsening
for at least one of the two players or both are indiﬀerent. Speciﬁcally, applying the
respective algorithm gives
u∗2(g + 23) = u
∗
3(g + 23) =
1
2
− 2c = 1
6
= u∗2(g) = u
∗
3(g),
u∗1(g + 13) = u
∗
1(g + 14) = u
∗
1(g + 15) = u
∗
1(g + 16) =
2
3
− 3c = 1
6
<
1
3
= u∗1(g),
u∗2(g + 25) =
2
5
− 2c = 1
15
<
1
6
= u∗2(g),
u∗6(g + 26) =
1
2
− 3c = 0 < 1
6
= u∗6(g).
Since we know from the three-player case that within the component of a line of
length three there are no incentives to add or delete a link at this cost level, this
concludes the proof of Part (iii) and of the whole theorem.
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
For ease of notation consider a network g′ and assume that it is pairwise stable.
Moreover, assume that there is a disagreement link in the network, that is g′\g′∗ 6= ∅.
Let w.l.o.g. 12 ∈ g′\g′∗ be such a link and deﬁne g := g′ − 12. This implies g′∗ ⊆ g.
Furthermore, assume w.l.o.g. that every player has at least one link in g′ (otherwise
disregard isolated players which is permissible since the proﬁle of payoﬀs respectively
proﬁts is component-decomposable). According to Manea (2011, Lemma 1) every
player has at least one link in g′∗ and therefore also in g.
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Take the network g as a basis and let (rs, xs,Ms, Ls, Ns, gs)s=1,2,...,s¯ be the outcome
of A(g) (recall again Deﬁnition 3.1). Then by equations (3.3) the limit equilibrium
payoﬀ vector v∗(g) is given by
v∗i (g) = xs ∀ i ∈Ms ∀ s < s¯,
v∗j (g) = 1− xs ∀ j ∈ Ls ∀ s < s¯,
v∗k(g) =
1
2
∀ k ∈ Ns¯.
Now consider g′∗. The following ﬁndings being equivalent to Manea (2011, Proposi-
tion 2, Theorem 3) are important:
• FromManea (2011, Proposition 2) we have that if ij ∈ g, then v∗i (g′)+v∗j (g′) ≥ 1
and if ij ∈ g′∗, then v∗i (g′) + v∗j (g′) = 1.
• By Manea (2011, Theorem 3) for all M ∈ I(g′∗) the following bounds on limit
equilibrium payoﬀs hold:
min
i∈M
v∗i (g
′) ≤ |L
g′∗(M)|
|M |+ |Lg′∗(M)|
max
j∈Lg′∗(M)
v∗j (g
′) ≥ |M ||M |+ |Lg′∗(M)|
If in Manea’s (2011, Theorem 4) proof of the payoﬀ computation rule (3.3) one
replaces g∗ by g′∗, v∗i by v
∗
i (g
′), v∗j by v
∗
j (g
′), v∗k by v
∗
k(g
′), and Proposition 2, Lemma
1 and Theorem 3 (Manea, 2011) by the corresponding statements from above, then
this leads to the result that also
v∗i (g
′) = xs ∀ i ∈Ms ∀ s < s¯,
v∗j (g
′) = 1− xs ∀ j ∈ Ls ∀ s < s¯,
v∗k(g
′) = 1
2
∀ k ∈ Ns¯.
Thus, it is v∗(g′) = v∗(g) and hence
u∗1(g
′) = v∗1(g
′)− η1(g′)c = v∗1(g)− (η1(g) + 1)c < v∗1(g)− η1(g)c = u∗1(g′ − 12).
Arriving at a contradiction this proves that a pairwise stable network cannot contain
a disagreement link.
Finally, notice that for any network g we have from Manea (2011, Proposition
2) that v∗i (g) + v
∗
j (g) = 1 for all ij ∈ g∗. Thus, the above result implies that
v∗i (g) + v
∗
j (g) = 1 for all ij ∈ g if g is pairwise stable.
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3.A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Consider a pairwise stable network g and assume that g|N˜(g) is not a union of sep-
arated pairs and odd circles. Notice that due to Proposition 3.1 for any component
C ⊆ N of g it must either be C ⊆ N˜(g) or C ⊆ N˜(g)∁. Furthermore, recall that the
proﬁle of payoﬀs is component-decomposable, meaning that v∗i (g) = v
∗
i (g|N˜(g)) for all
i ∈ N˜(g). Thus, the network g|N˜(g) is equitable such that by Manea (2011, Theorem
5) respectively by Berge (1981) it has a so called edge cover composed of separated
pairs and odd circles. This means that there exists a union of separated pairs and
odd circles g′ ⊆ g|N˜(g) such that no player i ∈ N˜(g) is isolated in g′. By assumption
there must exist a link ij ∈ g|N˜(g)\g′. Obviously, the network g′ is also an edge cover
of the network g|N˜(g) − ij. Again from Manea (2011, Theorem 5) respectively from
Berge (1981) it then follows that g|N˜(g) − ij is still equitable. Hence, recalling the
implication of Proposition 3.1 mentioned above, this gives
u∗i (g) = v
∗
i (g|N˜(g))− ηi(g|N˜(g))c =
1
2
− ηi(g|N˜(g))c <
1
2
−
(
ηi(g|N˜(g))− 1
)
c
= v∗i
(
g|N˜(g) − ij
)
− ηi
(
g|N˜(g) − ij
)
c
= u∗i (g − ij).
Thus, arriving at a contradiction, this concludes the proof.
3.A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2
As announced in Section 3.3, the proofs of both lemmas rest on another rather tech-
nical lemma which be provide and prove ﬁrst.
Lemma 3.3. Let g˜ be a network with A(g˜) providing (r˜s, x˜s, M˜s, L˜s, N˜s, g˜s)s. For
any step s < s¯ and any set I ⊆ N the following implications must apply:
(i) 1 ≤ |M˜s ∩ I| ≤ |L˜s ∩ I| ⇒ |Lg˜s(L˜s ∩ I) ∩ M˜s ∩ I∁| ≥ 1,
(ii) 1 ≤ |M˜s ∩ I| < |L˜s ∩ I| ⇒ |Lg˜s(L˜s ∩ I) ∩ M˜s ∩ I∁| ≥ 2.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We prove the two parts of the lemma one after the other.
Part (i):
Assume that we have 1 ≤ |M˜s ∩ I| ≤ |L˜s ∩ I| and Lg˜s(L˜s ∩ I)∩ M˜s ∩ I∁ = ∅ for some
3.A Proofs • 93
step s < s¯ and some set I ⊆ N . Recalling Deﬁnition 3.1, this obviously implies
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
= r˜s < 1 ≤ |L˜s ∩ I||M˜s ∩ I|
.
Additionally, we have that M˜s = (M˜s ∩ I) ∪˙ (M˜s\I) and L˜s = (L˜s ∩ I) ∪˙ (L˜s\I). This
induces that M˜s\I 6= ∅ since it is |M˜s∩I| ≤ |L˜s∩I| ≤ |L˜s| but |M˜s| > |L˜s|. It follows
that
|L˜s\I|
|M˜s\I|
<
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
.
Moreover, it is Lg˜s(M˜s\I) ⊆ L˜s\I since by assumption Lg˜s(L˜s ∩ I) ∩ M˜s ⊆ I. Taken
together, this then gives
|Lg˜s(M˜s\I)|
|M˜s\I|
≤ |L˜s\I||M˜s\I|
<
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
= r˜s,
which contradicts the minimality of r˜s.
Part (ii):
It remains to show that having 1 ≤ |M˜s∩ I| < |L˜s∩ I| and |Lg˜s(L˜s∩ I)∩M˜s∩ I∁| = 1
in some step s < s¯ and for some set I ⊆ N leads to a contradiction as well. In such
a situation, slightly diﬀerent from Part (i), we have
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
= r˜s < 1 ≤ |L˜s ∩ I||M˜s ∩ I|+ 1
.
Again, it holds that M˜s = (M˜s ∩ I) ∪˙ (M˜s\I) and L˜s = (L˜s ∩ I) ∪˙ (L˜s\I), which in
this case even guarantees that |M˜s\I| ≥ 2 since it is |M˜s ∩ I| < |L˜s ∩ I| ≤ |L˜s|, but
|M˜s| > |L˜s|. This gives
|L˜s\I|
|M˜s\I| − 1
<
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
.
Moreover, we have that there exists exactly one player i˜ ∈ Lg˜s(L˜s ∩ I) ∩ M˜s ∩ I∁.
Similarly to Part (i) this implies that it is Lg˜s(M˜s\(I ∪˙ {˜i})) ⊆ L˜s\I, which combined
with the above leads to
|Lg˜s(M˜s\(I ∪˙ {˜i}))|
|M˜s\(I ∪˙ {˜i})|
≤ |L˜s\I||M˜s\I| − 1
<
|L˜s|
|M˜s|
= r˜s,
which again contradicts the minimality of r˜s.
Now, we can turn to the proof of the ﬁrst of the two lemmas which are stated in
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Section 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. For i, j ∈ M1 consider the network g′ := g + ij. Let
(r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s=1,...,s¯′ be the outcome of A(g′). Assume for contradiction that
there exists a step sˆ ∈ {1, ..., s¯′ − 1} such that L1 ∩ M ′s = M1 ∩ L′s = ∅ for all
s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ − 1} but M1 ∩ L′sˆ 6= ∅. Note that L1 ∩ M ′sˆ 6= ∅ would also entail
M1 ∩ L′sˆ 6= ∅. This is because any player contained in L1 ∩M ′sˆ must have a neighbor
k ∈ M1 in g due to the minimality of r1 < 1 and it can obviously neither be k ∈ L′s
nor k ∈ M ′s for any s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ − 1}. In what follows, we construct a sequence
of players (i0, i1, i2, ...) and show by induction that the underlying procedure which
sequentially adds players to it can never break up so that we get a contradiction to
the ﬁniteness of the player set N . For m ∈ N let Im := {i0, i1, ..., im} ⊆ N denote the
players of the sequence up to the mth one. We need to distinguish two cases.
Case 1: i ∈ L′sˆ
Set i0 = i. It then must be |Ni0(g′sˆ) ∩M ′sˆ| ≥ 2 since otherwise one could reduce r′sˆ
by not including i0 and possibly her one contact belonging to M
′
sˆ. This guarantees
that there exists i1 ∈ Ni0(g′sˆ) ∩M ′sˆ\{j}. So it is i0 ∈M1 ∩ L′sˆ and i1 ∈ L1 ∩M ′sˆ. Let
I1 = {i0, i1}. Now consider some odd numberm ∈ N. Assume that L1∩Im = M ′sˆ∩Im,
M1 ∩ Im = L′sˆ ∩ Im and that the cardinalities of these two sets are equal. We then
have:
• It is 1 ≤ |M1 ∩ Im| = |L1 ∩ Im| and therefore by Lemma 3.3(i) there exists
a player im+1 ∈ Lg(L1 ∩ Im) ∩ M1 ∩ I∁m. For this player it must hold that
im+1 ∈M1∩L′sˆ\Im since L1∩Im ⊆M ′sˆ andM1∩L′s = ∅ for all s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ−1}.
• It then is 1 ≤ |M ′sˆ ∩ Im+1| < |L′sˆ ∩ Im+1| and therefore by Lemma 3.3(ii) there
exists a player im+2 ∈ Lg′sˆ(L′sˆ ∩ Im+1) ∩M ′sˆ ∩ I∁m+1\{j}. For this player it must
hold that im+2 ∈ L1 ∩M ′sˆ\Im+1 since L′sˆ ∩ Im+1 ⊆M1 and im+2 6= j.
Thus, it is L1 ∩ Im+2 = M ′sˆ ∩ Im+2, M1 ∩ Im+2 = L′sˆ ∩ Im+2 and also the cardinalities
of these two sets are equal. Moreover, it is |Im+2| = |Im|+ 2. By induction it follows
that the player set N must be inﬁnitely large. Thus, we arrive at a contradiction.
Case 2: i /∈ L′sˆ
In this case we must have j /∈ M ′sˆ since by assumption M1 ∩ L′s = ∅ for all s ∈
{1, ..., sˆ− 1}. For the same reason, i ∈M ′sˆ would imply j ∈ L′sˆ which is equivalent to
Case 1. This is also true for i /∈ M ′sˆ and j ∈ L′sˆ. So it remains to consider the case
that i, j /∈ (M ′sˆ∪L′sˆ). However, by assumption there must be a player i0 ∈M1∩L′sˆ. As
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in the previous case, existence of another player i1 ∈ Ni0(g′sˆ)∩M ′sˆ is then guaranteed
and it must be i1 /∈ {i, j} since i, j /∈ M ′sˆ. Therefore it is i1 ∈ L1 ∩ M ′sˆ. Let
again I1 = {i0, i1} and assume for some odd number m ∈ N that L1 ∩ Im = M ′sˆ ∩ Im,
M1∩Im = L′sˆ∩Im and that the cardinalities of these two sets are equal. Furthermore,
assume that i, j /∈ Im. Similarly to the ﬁrst case we have:
• There exists im+1 ∈M1 ∩ L′sˆ\Im for the stated reasons.
• By Lemma 3.3(ii) there then exists a player im+2 ∈ Lg′sˆ(L′sˆ∩ Im+1)∩M ′sˆ∩ I∁m+1.
For this player it must hold that im+2 ∈ L1 ∩ M ′sˆ\Im+1 since L′sˆ ∩ Im+1 ⊆
M1\{i, j}.
Thus, it is again L1 ∩ Im+2 = M ′sˆ ∩ Im+2, M1 ∩ Im+2 = L′sˆ ∩ Im+2 and also the
cardinalities of these two sets are equal. Beyond that, we have i, j /∈ Im+2. By
induction this leads again to a contradiction to the ﬁniteness of the player set N .
Summing up, we have that L1 ∩M ′s = M1 ∩ L′s = ∅ for all s < s¯′. Therefore, it
must be v∗i (g
′), v∗j (g
′) ≤ 1
2
. On the contrary, we know by Manea (2011, Proposition
2) that v∗i (g
′) + v∗j (g
′) ≥ 1. Taken together, this implies v∗i (g′) = v∗j (g′) = 12 .
With regard to the second part of the lemma consider the network g′ := g+i(n+1)
and let (r′s, x
′
s,M
′
s, L
′
s, N
′
s, g
′
s)s=1,...,s¯′ be the outcome ofA(g′). It is clear that n+1 /∈ L′s
for all s < s¯′ since otherwise one could simply reduce r′s by deleting n + 1 from L
′
s
and possibly her one neighbor i from M ′s. The possibility that i ∈ L′s for some s < s¯′
can be ruled out by a line of argumentation which is equivalent to the proof of the
ﬁrst part if one substitutes n + 1 for j, M2 for M1 and L2 for L1 (while taking into
account that A(g) provides M1 = {n+ 1} and L1 = ∅ in this case).
And ﬁnally we establish the second of the two lemmas.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. W.l.o.g. assume that g has only one component.70 Beside g
consider the network g′ := g−kl and let (r′s, x′s,M ′s, L′s, N ′s, g′s)s=1,...,s¯′ be the outcome
of A(g′). Similarly to the proof of Lemma 3.1 assume for contradiction that there
exists a step sˆ ∈ {1, ..., s¯′−1} such that L1∩M ′s = M1∩L′s = ∅ for all s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ−1}
but L1 ∩M ′sˆ 6= ∅. Observe that M1 ∩L′sˆ 6= ∅ would also entail L1 ∩M ′sˆ 6= ∅ since due
to the minimality of r′sˆ any player in M1 ∩L′sˆ needs to have a g′-neighbor in M ′ˆˆs who
then must have been a neighbor in g as well. We again construct a sequence of players
(i0, i1, i2, ...) and show by induction that the underlying procedure which sequentially
adds players to it can never break up, meaning that we get a contradiction to the
70Again, this is w.l.o.g. as the proﬁle of payoﬀs respectively proﬁts is component-decomposable.
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ﬁniteness of the player set N . For m ∈ N let Im := {i0, i1, ..., im} ⊆ N denote the
players of the sequence up to the mth one.
Initially, select some player i0 ∈ L1 ∩M ′sˆ. i0 cannot be isolated or a loose-end
player, i.e. she must have more than one link in g, since otherwise one could reduce
r1 by not including i0 in L1 and possibly her one contact in M1. This guarantees that
there exists i1 ∈ Ni0(g′). It must be i1 ∈ M1 ∩ L′sˆ since by assumption M1 ∩ L′s = ∅
for all s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ − 1}. Let I1 = {i0, i1}. Now consider some odd number m ∈ N.
Assume that L1 ∩ Im = M ′sˆ ∩ Im, M1 ∩ Im = L′sˆ ∩ Im and that the cardinalities of
these two sets are equal. We then have:
• It is 1 ≤ |M ′sˆ ∩ Im| = |L′sˆ ∩ Im| and therefore by Lemma 3.3(i) there exists
a player im+1 ∈ Lg′sˆ(L′sˆ ∩ Im) ∩ M ′sˆ ∩ I∁m. For this player it must hold that
im+1 ∈ L1 ∩M ′sˆ\Im since it is L′sˆ ∩ Im ⊆M1.
• Then it is 1 ≤ |M1 ∩ Im+1| < |L1 ∩ Im+1| and therefore by Lemma 3.3(ii) there
exists a player im+2 ∈ Lg(L1 ∩ Im+1) ∩ M1 ∩ I∁m+1 ∩ Lg′sˆ(L1 ∩ Im+1) since g′
arose from g by a single link deletion and, additionally, M1 ∩ L′s = ∅ for all
s ∈ {1, ..., sˆ − 1} and L1 ∩ Im+1 ⊆ M ′sˆ. This reasoning then also implies that
im+2 ∈M1 ∩ L′sˆ\Im+1.
Thus it is L1∩ Im+2 = M ′sˆ∩ Im+2, M1∩ Im+2 = L′sˆ∩ Im+2 and also the cardinalities of
these two sets are equal. Moreover, it is |Im+2| = |Im| + 2. Again, by induction this
leads to a contradiction to the ﬁniteness of the player set N . Consequently, it must
be L1 ∩M ′s = M1 ∩ L′s = ∅ for all s < s¯′.
3.A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Consider a network g which is a tree with n > 3 players and assume that it is
pairwise stable.71 By Theorem 3.2 it cannot be the case that all players receive a
payoﬀ of 1
2
in g. According to Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2, the algorithm A(g)
therefore has to stop after the ﬁrst step providing an outcome (r1, x1,M1, L1, N1, g1)
with M1 ∪˙ L1 = N , |M1| > |L1| and g|M1 = g|L1 = ∅. So we have r1 ∈ (0, 1) and
v∗i (g) = 1− v∗j (g) = x1 ∈ (0, 12) for all i ∈M1, j ∈ L1. Theorem 3.3 then implies that
x1 + c =
1
2
. (3.7)
71Again, it is w.l.o.g. to assume that g consists of only one component as the proﬁle of payoﬀs
respectively proﬁts is component-decomposable.
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The class of tree networks we consider here can be divided into the following
subclasses:
(a) No player has more than two links in g, meaning that g is a line network.
(b) There is a player who has more than two links in g such that at least two of
her neighbors are loose-end players.72
(c) There is a player who has more than two links in g but no player has more than
one loose-end contact.
In the following, we distinguish between these three subclasses and show separately
that there arises a contradiction to pairwise stability.
Subclass (a):
W.l.o.g. let g := {12, 23, ..., (n − 1)n}. Here n must be odd since otherwise it would
obviously be |L
g(M)|
|M |
≥ 1 for all g-independent sets M ⊆ N inducing a payoﬀ of 1
2
for every player. So by assumption it must be n ≥ 5. Considering the algorithm
A(g), we ﬁnd that the shortage ratio is minimized by the g-independent set which
contains the players 1, 3, ..., n − 2, n. Therefore, it is r1 = n−1n+1 and x = n−12n . Hence,
here equation (3.7) is equivalent to
c =
1
2n
. (3.8)
Now, if player 3 deletes her link to player 2, then she becomes a loose-end player.
Moreover, in the network g−23 she is contained in a component with an odd number
of players which induces a line of length n − 2. Hence, it is v∗3(g − 23) = n−32(n−2) .
Taking into account equation (3.8), the corresponding stability condition yields
u∗3(g)− u∗3(g − 23) ≥ 0 ⇔ v∗3(g)− v∗3(g − 23)− c ≥ 0
⇔ n− 1
2n
− n− 3
2(n− 2) −
1
2n
≥ 0
⇔ 4− n
2n(n− 2) ≥ 0.
Obviously, this is never fulﬁlled for n ≥ 5, meaning that a line network cannot be
pairwise stable.
72Recall that some i ∈ N is said to be a loose-end player if it is ηi(g) = 1, that is if she has exactly
one link in g.
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Subclass (b):
Let k ∈ N be a player with at least three neighbors including two or more loose-end
players. Then Manea (2011, Theorem 3) implies that it is v∗k(g) ≥ 23 . So it must be
k ∈ L1. Select a player i ∈ Nk(g) such that ηi(g) ≥ ηi′(g) for all i′ ∈ Nk(g). Note that
in the network g−ki, player k still has at least two loose-end contacts such that again
according to Manea (2011, Theorem 3) we have v∗k(g − ki) ≥ 23 . The corresponding
stability condition then gives
u∗k(g) ≥ u∗k(g − ki) ⇔ v∗k(g)− c ≥ v∗k(g − ki) ⇒ 1− x1 − c ≥
2
3
⇔ x1 + c ≤ 1
3
.
This obviously contradicts equation (3.7). Thus, a network g belonging to Subclass
(b) cannot be pairwise stable.
Subclass (c):
First deliberate the following: For any tree network g˜ and any player k ∈ N there ex-
ists a unique partition
(
Brkν
)
ν∈Nk(g˜)
of N\{k} such that for all ν ∈ Nk(g˜) it is ν ∈ Brkν
and g˜|Brkν is connected, i.e. g˜|Brkν has only one component (if one restricts the player
set to Brkν). Based on this observation, we deﬁne the subnetworks
(
g˜|Brkν
)
ν∈Nk(g)
to
be the branches of player k in g˜ and ν ∈ Nk(g˜) is said to be the fork player of g˜|Brkν .
Note that if g belongs to Subclass (c), then there exists a player k ∈ N who has
more than two links such that for at least all but one of her branches, all players
contained in these have at most two links in g. If this would not be the case, the
following procedure would never stop, meaning that there would have to be inﬁnitely
many players in N : Initially, select a player k0 having more than two links and one
of her branches containing another player k1 with more than two links. Then by
assumption player k1 must have a branch in g which does not contain player k0 but
a player k2 who also has more than two links. For this player k2 there must again be
a branch in g not containing k0 and k1 but a player k3 having more than two links.
Continuing this way, for any m ∈ N there is a player km+1 ∈ N\{k0, ..., km}, which
then gives a contradiction by induction. Thus, a player k as mentioned above must
indeed exist.
In the following we distinguish two cases.
Case (c).1: k ∈ L1
If there are other players having more than two links, then let i ∈ N be the fork
player of player k’s branch which contains all of them. Otherwise, arbitrarily pick
some i ∈ Nk(g). In both cases consider the network g−ki and the component C ⊂ N
which player k is contained in. In the network g|C , there is only player k who might
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have more than two links. Furthermore, every branch of player k in g|C must be a
line of odd length as Manea (2011, Theorem 3) implies that any loose-end player in
g is contained in M1. In turn, this implies that for any g|C-independent set M with
|Lg|C (M)|
|M |
< 1 it is k ∈ Lg|C (M). One example for such a set is M1 ∩ C with partner
set L1 ∩ C. Hence, it must be v∗k(g − ki) > 12 . The corresponding stability condition
then gives
u∗k(g) ≥ u∗k(g − ki) ⇔ v∗k(g)− c ≥ v∗k(g − ki) ⇒ 1− x1 − c >
1
2
⇔ x1 + c < 1
2
.
This obviously again contradicts equation (3.7). Consequently, a network g belonging
to Subclass (c) with k ∈ L1 cannot be pairwise stable.
Case (c).2:
We need to introduce some additional notation here. Identify a branch of player k
which is a line network with minimal length among all of these line branches. We
denote the set of players in this branch by B1 ⊂ N . Note that any branch of player k
which is a line must be of even length. Let Mˆ1 := M1 ∩B1 and Lˆ1 := L1 ∩B1. Then
it is |Mˆ1| = |Lˆ1|. Let j denote the fork player of this branch. In addition, let B2 ⊂ N
denote the set of all players contained in the other line branch(es) of player k. Let
similarly Mˆ2 := M1 ∩ B2 and Lˆ2 := L1 ∩ B2. Then we have |Mˆ2| = |Lˆ2| ≥ |Mˆ1|.
Finally, let B3 := N\(B1 ∪˙ B2 ∪˙ {k}) and Mˆ3 := M1 ∩ B3, Lˆ3 := L1 ∩ B3. Then it
must be |Mˆ3| ≥ |Lˆ3| as we have |M1| > |L1|.
Note that we must have r1 =
|L1|
|M1|
≤ |Lˆ3|
|Mˆ3|
since r1 is the minimal shortage ratio
for g and obviously Lg(Mˆ3) = Lˆ3. Thus, applying the above notation gives
x1 =
|L1|
|M1|+ |L1| =
|Mˆ1|+ |Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
2|Mˆ1|+ 2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1 . (3.9)
Now consider the network g′ := g−kj and let (r′s, x′s,M ′s, L′s, N ′s, g′s)s=1,...,s¯′ be the
outcome of the algorithm A(g′). Notice ﬁrst that the set Mˆ2 ∪˙ Mˆ3 ∪˙ {k} ⊂ M1 is
g′-independent and Lˆ2 ∪˙ Lˆ3 is the corresponding partner set in g′. Furthermore, we
have
|Lˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1 =
|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1 < 1.
Assume for contradiction that there is another g′-independent set M ′ ⊆ N with
partner set L′ = Lg
′
(M ′) ⊆ N which is shortage ratio minimizing in step s = 1 of
A(g′). Since the set B1 is a component of g′ and it induces a line network of even
length where every player receives a payoﬀ of 1
2
, we must have (M ′ ∪ L′) ∩ B1 = ∅
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and s¯′ ≥ 2. Moreover, Lemma 3.2 yields that M1 ∩ L′s = L1 ∩M ′s = ∅ for all s < s¯′.
Hence, we must have M ′ ⊂ Mˆ2 ∪˙ Mˆ3 ∪˙ {k} and L′ ⊂ Lˆ2 ∪˙ Lˆ3 such that
|L′|
|M ′| <
|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1 < 1.
On the contrary,M ′ ∪˙Mˆ1 ⊂M1 is g-independent and we have Lg(M ′ ∪˙Mˆ1) = L′ ∪˙Lˆ1.
The minimality of r1 =
|L1|
|M1|
in A(g) then implies
r1 =
|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|+ |Mˆ1|
|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1 + |Mˆ1| ≤
|L′|+ |Mˆ1|
|M ′|+ |Mˆ1| < 1 ⇒
|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1 ≤
|L′|
|M ′| .
Thus, arriving at a contradiction, this implies that
v∗k(g
′) =
|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|
2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1 . (3.10)
Taking into account equation (3.8), the corresponding stability condition demands
u∗k(g) ≥ u∗k(g − kj) ⇔ v∗k(g)− ηk(g)c ≥ v∗k(g′)− ηk(g′)c
⇔ x1 ≥ v∗k(g′) +
1
2
− x1
⇔ 2x1 − v∗k(g′) ≥
1
2
(3.11)
However, we now establish that it must be 2x1 − v∗k(g′) < 12 . Recalling equations
(3.9) and (3.10), some calculation yields
2x1 − v∗k(g′) =
2|Mˆ1|+ 2(|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|)
2|Mˆ1|+ (2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1) −
(|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|)
(2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1)
=
2|Mˆ1|(|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ 1) + (|Mˆ2|+ |Lˆ3|)(2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1)
2|Mˆ1|(2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1) + (2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1)2
=
D −R
2D
,
where
D = 2|Mˆ1|(2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1) + (2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|+ |Lˆ3|+ 1)2 > 0
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and
R =− 2|Mˆ1||Mˆ3|+ 2|Mˆ1||Lˆ3| − 2|Mˆ1|+ 2|Mˆ2||Mˆ3| − 2|Mˆ2||Lˆ3|+ 2|Mˆ2|+ |Mˆ3|2
+ 2|Mˆ3| − |Lˆ3|2 + 1
= 2(|Mˆ2| − |Mˆ1|︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
) + 2(|Mˆ3| − |Lˆ3|︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
)(|Mˆ2| − |Mˆ1|︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
) + (|Mˆ3|2 − |Lˆ3|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
) + 2|Mˆ3|+ 1
≥ 2|Mˆ3|+ 1
> 0.
Hence, we indeed have
2x1 − v∗k(g − kj) =
D −R
2D
<
1
2
.
This concludes the proof for Subclass (c) and of the whole proposition.
3.A.6 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Consider a pairwise stable network g and assume that there is a cut-player k ∈ N
who is part of a cycle and receives a payoﬀ v∗k(g) >
1
2
. Assume w.l.o.g. that g has
only one component. According to Proposition 3.1 and Corollary 3.2, the algorithm
A(g) must stop after the ﬁrst step providing an outcome (r1, x1,M1, L1, N1, g1) with
M1 ∪˙L1 = N , |M1| > |L1| and g|M1 = g|L1 = ∅. So we have r1 = |L1||M1| ∈ (0, 1), k ∈ L1
and v∗k(g) = 1− x1. Further, by Theorem 3.3 it is x1 + c = 12 .
In what follows, we prove that player k can delete a certain link such that in the
resulting network she still receives a payoﬀ greater than 1
2
. To start with, note that
by assumption there must be a set K ⊂ N with k ∈ K such that
• Lg(K\{k}) ⊆ K,
• k is contained in a cycle in g|K∁∪{k} and
• g|K∁ has only one component (as usual, considering K∁ as player set).
As g has only one component, it must be k ∈ Lg(K\{k}), meaning thatNk(g)∩K 6= ∅.
Moreover, there exists i′ ∈ Nk(g)\K such that k and i′ belong to the same cycle in
g. Now consider the network g′ := g− ki′ and let (r′s, x′s,M ′s, L′s, N ′s, g′s)s=1,...,s¯′ be the
outcome of A(g′). Lemma 3.2 yields that v∗k(g′) ≥ 12 . Assume for contradiction that
we have v∗k(g
′) = 1
2
, meaning that k ∈ N ′s¯′ .
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Consider the set C ′k := Ck(g
′
s¯′ |K) = Ck(g|N ′
s¯′
∩K), that is the component of player
k in the network g restricted to the set N ′s¯′ ∩K. As a ﬁrst step, we establish that it
is
|L1 ∩ C ′k|
|M1 ∩ C ′k|
= 1. (3.12)
Note ﬁrst that we have Nk(g
′|K) 6= ∅. Furthermore, it must be Nk(g′) ⊆ M1 ∩ N ′s¯′
as Lemma 3.2 yields M1 ∩ L′s = ∅ for all s < s¯′. This guarantees that M1 ∩ C ′k 6= ∅.
Based on this, we can immediately rule out the possibility that the left-hand side
of (3.12) is strictly smaller than one since M1 ∩ C ′k is g′-independent and clearly
Lg
′
s¯′ (M1 ∩ C ′k) ⊆ L1 ∩ C ′k. So assume that the left-hand side of (3.12) is strictly
greater than one. We make use of the following implication which we verify at the
end of the proof:
|Lˆ| = |Mˆ | ≥ 1 for Lˆ ⊆ L1 ∩ C ′k\{k}, Nk(g) ∩K ⊆ Mˆ ⊆ M1 ∩ C ′k
⇒ Lg′s¯′ (Lˆ)\Mˆ 6= ∅ (3.13)
We know that it is ∅ 6= Nk(g) ∩K ⊆ Nk(g′) ⊆ N ′s¯′ . Let Mˆ0 := Nk(g) ∩K such that
Mˆ0 ⊆ M1 ∩ C ′k. Hence, it must be |L1 ∩ C ′k\{k}| ≥ |Mˆ0| since otherwise we would
get
|L1 ∩ C ′k|
|M1 ∩ C ′k|
≤ |L1 ∩ C
′
k|
|Mˆ0| ≤ 1,
that is a contradiction to our assumption. So select a set of players Lˆ0 ⊆ L1∩C ′k\{k}
with |Lˆ0| = |Mˆ0|. Note that Mˆ0 and Lˆ0 satisfy the conditions of implication (3.13).
Based on this, we can construct a sequence of players (j1, j2, j3, ...) in a certain
way such that according to the previous considerations, the underlying procedure
which sequentially adds players to the sequence can never break up. As in the proofs
of Lemma 3.1 and 3.2, this leads to a contradiction to the ﬁniteness of the player
set N . Given such a sequence, let Mˆm := {jl | 1 ≤ l ≤ m, l odd} ∪ Mˆ0 and
Lˆm := {jl | 1 ≤ l ≤ m, l even} ∪ Lˆ0 for m ∈ N. Now consider some even number
m ∈ N ∪ {0}. Assume that Lˆm ⊆ L1 ∩ C ′k\{k}, Nk(g) ∩ K ⊆ Mˆm ⊆ M1 ∩ C ′k and
|Lˆm| = |Mˆm| ≥ 1. We then have:
• By implication (3.13) there exists jm+1 ∈ Lg′s¯′ (Lˆm)\Mˆm. For this player it must
hold that jm+1 ∈M1 ∩ C ′k\Mˆm since Lˆm ⊆ L1 ∩ C ′k\{k}.
• Then there must exist jm+2 ∈ L1 ∩ C ′k\(Lˆm+1 ∪˙ {k}) since otherwise we would
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have
1 <
|L1 ∩ C ′k|
|M1 ∩ C ′k|
≤ |Lˆ
m+1 ∪˙ {k}|
|Mˆm+1| = 1.
Thus it is Lˆm+2 ⊆ L1 ∩ C ′k\{k}, Nk(g) ∩ K ⊆ Mˆm+2 ⊆ M1 ∩ C ′k and |Lˆm+2| =
|Mˆm+2| = |Lˆm| + 1 ≥ 1. By induction this leads to a contradiction to the ﬁniteness
of the player set N . This establishes equation (3.12), however, under the assumption
of having v∗k(g
′) = 1
2
.
During the second step we now use this to construct a concluding contradiction
of similar kind arising from the assumption that v∗k(g
′) = 1
2
. Here, we make use of
the following implication:
|L˜| = |M˜ | ≥ 1 for L˜ ⊆ L1 ∩N ′s¯′\K, M˜ ⊆M1 ∩N ′s¯′\K ⇒ Lg
′
s¯′ (L˜)\(M˜ ∪˙K) 6= ∅
(3.14)
Its veriﬁcation is postponed to the end of this proof as well. Note that by deﬁnition
it is |L
g
s¯′ (M¯)|
|M¯ |
≥ 1 for all g′-independent sets M¯ ⊆ N ′s¯′ . Based on this, we can again
construct a sequence of players (i1, i2, i3, ...) such that, according to the previous
considerations, the sequential adding of new players can never break up. Thus, we
again get a contradiction to the ﬁniteness of the player set N . For this purpose, we
deﬁne the sets M˜m := {il | 1 ≤ l ≤ m, l odd} and L˜m := {il | 1 ≤ l ≤ m, l even} for
m ∈ N.
Initially, select a player i1 ∈M1∩N ′s¯′\K. Such a player must exist as k ∈ L1∩N ′s¯′
is part of a cycle in g|N\K∪{k} and, according to Lemma 3.2, we have M1 ∩L′s = ∅ for
all s < s¯′. Now consider some odd number m ∈ N. Assume that M˜m ⊆M1 ∩N ′s¯′\K,
L˜m ⊆ L1 ∩N ′s¯′\K and that |M˜m| = m+12 > m−12 = |L˜m|. We then have:
• M˜m ∪˙ (M1 ∩ C ′k) ⊆ N ′s¯′ is g′-independent and
|L˜m ∪˙ (L1 ∩ C ′k)|
|M˜m ∪˙ (M1 ∩ C ′k)|
< 1
since it is |L1 ∩ C ′k| = |M1 ∩ C ′k| as we know from equation (3.12). As we
have k ∈ Lg′s¯′ (M1 ∩ C ′k) ⊆ L1 ∩ C ′k, this implies that there must exist a player
im+1 ∈ Lg′s¯′ (M˜m)\(L˜m ∪˙K). It is im+1 ∈ L1 ∩N ′s¯′\(L˜m ∪˙K) since M˜m ⊆M1.
• We then have |L˜m+1| = |M˜m+1| = m+1
2
≥ 1 and L˜m+1 ⊆ L1 ∩N ′s¯′\K, M˜m+1 ⊆
M1 ∩ N ′s¯′\K. Hence, by implication (3.14) there exists im+2 ∈
Lg
′
s¯′ (L˜m+1)\(M˜m+1 ∪˙K). It is im+2 ∈M1 ∩N ′s¯′\(M˜m+1 ∪˙K) since L˜m+1 ⊆ L1.
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Thus, we have M˜m+2 ⊆ M1 ∩N ′s¯′\K, L˜m+2 ⊆ L1 ∩N ′s¯′\K and |M˜m+2| = (m+2)+12 >
(m+2)−1
2
= |L˜m+2|. Again, by induction this leads to a contradiction to the ﬁniteness
of the player set N . This proves that player k’s payoﬀ must indeed be strictly greater
than 1
2
. The corresponding stability condition then yields
u∗k(g) ≥ u∗k(g − ki′) ⇔ v∗k(g)− c ≥ v∗k(g′) ⇒ 1− x1 − c >
1
2
⇔ x1 + c < 1
2
,
which is a contradiction to Theorem 3.3. Hence, such a network g cannot be pairwise
stable.
It remains to prove implications (3.13) and (3.14). We start with the ﬁrst one.
Given the two sets Lˆ ⊆ L1 ∩ C ′k\{k} and Mˆ ⊆ M1 ∩ C ′k with Nk(g) ∩ K ⊆ Mˆ
and |Lˆ| = |Mˆ | ≥ 1 assume for contradiction that Lg′s¯′ (Lˆ) ⊆ Mˆ . Note that we
have Nj(g
′
s¯′) = Nj(g) for all j ∈ Lˆ since it is Lˆ ⊆ L1 ∩ N ′s¯′\{k} and, according to
Lemma 3.2, M1 ∩ L′s = ∅ for all s < s¯′. Together with the assumption this implies
that Lg(M1 ∩ K\Mˆ) ⊆ L1 ∩ K\Lˆ. Moreover, since Nk(g) ∩ K ⊆ Mˆ , it even is
Lg(M1 ∩K\Mˆ) ⊆ L1 ∩K\(Lˆ ∪˙ {k}).
Additionally, we need the following inequalities:
|L1 ∩K| − 1
|M1 ∩K| ≤ r1 ≤
|L1 ∩K|
|M1 ∩K| ≤ 1 (3.15)
To see that these are correct, note ﬁrst that it is Lg(M1 ∩K) ⊆ L1 ∩K and similarly
Lg(M1\K) ⊆ L1\K ∪˙{k}. So we must have r1 ≤ |L1∩K||M1∩K| and r1 ≤
|L1\K|+1
|M1\K|
as r1 is the
minimal shortage ratio. Moreover, it is r1 =
|L1|
|M1|
< 1, M1 = (M1 ∩K) ∪˙ (M1\K) and
L1 = (L1∩K)∪˙(L1\K). Together this implies that |L1∩K|−1|M1∩K| =
|L1|−(|L1\K|+1)
|M1|−|M1\K|
≤ r1. In
particular, this means that |L1∩K|−1 < |M1∩K| which in turn implies |L1∩K||M1∩K| ≤ 1.
According to the third inequality in (3.15) we must have M1 ∩ K\Mˆ 6= ∅ since
otherwise it would be |L1 ∩ K| ≤ |M1 ∩ K| = |Mˆ | = |Lˆ| < |Lˆ ∪˙ {k}| ≤ |L1 ∩ K|.
Taken together, this leads to the following contradiction:
r1 ≤ |L
g(M1 ∩K\Mˆ)|
|M1 ∩K\Mˆ |
≤ |L1 ∩K\(Lˆ ∪˙ {k})||M1 ∩K\Mˆ |
=
|L1 ∩K| − |Lˆ| − 1
|M1 ∩K| − |Mˆ |
=
|L1 ∩K| − 1− |Lˆ|
|M1 ∩K| − |Lˆ|
<
|L1 ∩K| − 1
|M1 ∩K| ≤ r1,
where the last two inequalities are due to (3.15) and the fact that r1 < 1.
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Similarly, to prove implication (3.14), we consider the two sets L˜ ⊆ L1 ∩ N ′s¯′\K
and M˜ ⊆ M1 ∩ N ′s¯′\K with |L˜| = |M˜ | ≥ 1 and assume for contradiction that we
have Lg
′
s¯′ (L˜) ⊆ M˜ . Again according to Lemma 3.2, it must be Nj(g′s¯′) = Nj(g) for
all j ∈ L˜. Hence, we have that Lg(M1\M˜) ⊆ L1\L˜. Also, it is clear that M1\M˜ 6= ∅
since otherwise we would have |L1| < |M1| = |M˜ | = |L˜| ≤ |L1|. Summing up, this
implies
r1 ≤ |L
g(M1\M˜)|
|M1\M˜ |
≤ |L1\L˜||M1\M˜ |
=
|L1| − |L˜|
|M1| − |M˜ |
=
|L1| − |L˜|
|M1| − |L˜|
<
|L1|
|M1| = r1,
which is obviously again a contradiction. So we have that Lg
′
s¯′ (L˜)\(M˜ ∪˙K) 6= ∅ since
it is Lg
′
s¯′ (L˜) ⊆ K∁. This concludes the proof.
3.A.7 Proof of Theorem 3.4 (for n odd)
Consider a network g and let n = |N | be odd (as only this case is remaining).
Considering again N¯(g) instead of N as player set, let gSPL
N¯(g)
denote a representative
of the networks consisting of |N¯(g)|−3
2
separated pairs and one line of length three.
Similarly, let gSPC
N¯(g)
be a network consisting of |N¯(g)|−3
2
separated pairs and one three-
player circle. Since we did not utilize that n was even to derive inequality (3.5), we
again have
U∗(g) ≤ 1
2
|N¯(g)| − 2d#(g)c.
Again, since ηi(g) ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N¯(g), we must have d#(g) ≥ 12 |N¯(g)|. We now
distinguish two cases.
Case 1: |N¯(g)| even
If we have d#(g) = 1
2
|N¯(g)| here, then this implies again that g = gSP
N¯(g)
. So conversely,
for a network g 6= gSP
N¯(g)
this means that we have d#(g) > 1
2
|N¯(g)| and therefore,
according to (3.5),
U∗(g) <
1
2
|N¯(g)| − |N¯(g)|c = ∑
i∈N¯(g)
(1
2
− c
)
= U∗(gSPN¯(g)).
Case 2: |N¯(g)| odd
Note ﬁrst that it must be d#(g) ≥ 1
2
(|N¯(g)|+1) as the interval
[
1
2
|N¯(g)|, 1
2
(|N¯(g)|+1)
)
does not contain an integer here. Consider the following subcases.
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Subcase 2(a): d#(g) = 1
2
(|N¯(g)|+ 1)
This subcase implies that g = gSPL
N¯(g)
. This is because otherwise we would either have
ηj(g) ≥ 3 for at least one player j ∈ N¯(g) or ηk(g), ηl(g) ≥ 2 for k, l ∈ N¯(g), k 6= l,
which both would give d#(g) ≥ 1
2
(4 + (|N¯(g)| − 2)) = 1
2
(|N¯(g)|+ 2) > 1
2
(|N¯(g)|+ 1).
Subcase 2(b): d#(g) = 1
2
(|N¯(g)|+ 3)
Here, g must either be
(i) a network with three players having two links each and |N¯(g)| − 3 players with
one link,
(ii) a network consisting of one player with three links, one player with two links
and |N¯(g)| − 2 players with one link or
(iii) a network with one player having four links and |N¯(g)| − 1 players with one
link.
Note that the network gSPC
N¯(g)
is included here in Class (i). On closer examination, one
ﬁnds that, for any other g 6= gSPC
N¯(g)
belonging to Class (i), (ii) or (iii), the algorithm
A(g) (with N1 = N¯(g)) yields |M1| > |L1|. This implies a strict inequality in (3.5).
Hence, for g 6= gSPC
N¯(g)
with d#(g) = 1
2
(|N¯(g)|+ 3) it is
U∗(g) <
1
2
|N¯(g)|−2d#(g)c = 1
2
|N¯(g)|−(|N¯(g)|+3)c = |N¯(g)|
(1
2
−c
)
−3c = U∗(gSPCN¯(g)).
Subcase 2(c): d#(g) > 1
2
(|N¯(g)|+ 3)
In this subcase, again according to (3.5), we have
U∗(g) ≤ 1
2
|N¯(g)|−2d#(g)c < 1
2
|N¯(g)|−(|N¯(g)|+3)c = |N¯(g)|
(1
2
−c
)
−3c = U∗(gSPCN¯(g)).
Summarizing this, we have shown that a network g /∈
{
gSP
N¯(g)
, gSPL
N¯(g)
, gSPC
N¯(g)
}
cannot
be eﬃcient. To conclude the proof, we have to examine which of the remaining
candidates is eﬃcient depending on the level of linking costs. Note that for the set
N¯(g) it must hold that 0 ≤ |N¯(g)| ≤ n and |N¯(g)| 6= 1. Moreover, recall that gSP
N¯(g)
is only well-deﬁned for |N¯(g)| even while gSPL
N¯(g)
and gSPC
N¯(g)
only are so for |N¯(g)| odd.
Thus, we have
max
N¯(g) feasible
U∗(gSPN¯(g)) = max
N¯(g) feasible
|N¯(g)|
(1
2
− c
)
=

 0, for c ≥
1
2
(n− 1)
(
1
2
− c
)
, for c ∈
(
0, 1
2
) ,
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max
N¯(g) feasible
U∗(gSPLN¯(g)) = max
N¯(g) feasible
|N¯(g)|
(1
2
− c
)
−
(
c+
1
6
)
=


4
3
− 4c, for c ≥ 1
2
n
(
1
2
− c
)
−
(
c+ 1
6
)
, for c ∈
(
0, 1
2
) ,
max
N¯(g) feasible
U∗(gSPCN¯(g)) = max
N¯(g) feasible
|N¯(g)|
(1
2
− c
)
− 3c
=


3
2
− 6c, for c ≥ 1
2
n
(
1
2
− c
)
− 3c, for c ∈
(
0, 1
2
) .
Hence, for c ≥ 1
2
it is
max
N¯(g) feasible
U∗(gSPLN¯(g)), max
N¯(g) feasible
U∗(gSPCN¯(g)) < 0 = max
N¯(g) feasible
U∗(gSPN¯(g)).
So in this case, a network g ∈
{
gSPL
N¯(g)
, gSPC
N¯(g)
}
cannot be eﬃcient. For c > 1
2
, g with
N¯(g) = ∅ is the unique maximizer of U∗(gSP
N¯(g)
), meaning that the empty network
is uniquely eﬃcient. On the contrary, for c = 1
2
, any network g = gSP
N¯(g)
maximizes
U∗(gSP
N¯(g)
), meaning that a network is eﬃcient if and only if it is a union of separated
pairs and isolated players.
Concerning linking costs c ∈ (0, 1
2
) we calculate
max
{
−
(1
2
− c
)
,−
(
c+
1
6
)
,−3c
}
=


−
(
1
2
− c
)
, for c ≥ 1
6
−
(
c+ 1
6
)
, for c ∈
[
1
12
, 1
6
]
−3c, for c ≤ 1
12
.
This means that a network is eﬃcient for linking costs
• c ∈ [1
6
, 1
2
] if and only if it is a union of n−1
2
separated pairs and one isolated
player,
• c ∈ [ 1
12
, 1
6
] if and only if it is a union of n−3
2
separated pairs and a line of length
three,
• c ∈ (0, 1
12
] if and only if it is a union of n−3
2
separated pairs and a three-player
circle.
This concludes the proof.
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3.A.8 Proof of Example 3.2
The second part of the example is an immediate consequence of Theorem 3.2. So
consider the case δ ∈ (0, 1). To start with, we solve the equation
v1 =
(
1− n− 1
n(n− 1)
)
δv1 +
n− 1
n(n− 1)(1− δv1)
which gives v1 =
1
(1−δ)n+2δ
. Obviously, it is v1 ∈ (0, 12) which implies 1 − δv1 > δv1.
Moreover, we have d#(gN) = n(n−1)
2
and all players are in symmetric positions. This
shortcut avoiding extensive calculations establishes that the n-tuple (v1, v1, ..., v1)
solves the equation system (3.1) for the network gN . Therefore, we have
v∗δi (g
N) =
1
(1− δ)n+ 2δ (3.16)
for all i ∈ N . Next, consider the network gN − ij for some i, j ∈ N . For this purpose,
let v˜ = (v˜1, v˜2, ..., v˜n) be given by
v˜i = v˜j =
(1− δ)n2 + (2δ − 1)n− (δ + 2)
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2) ,
v˜k =
(1− δ)n2 + δn− (2δ + 1)
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2) ,
(3.17)
where k ∈ N\{i, j}. By showing that the denominator of the terms in (3.17) is in
both cases greater than the numerator and that both numerators are greater than
zero, we establish ﬁrst that v˜ ∈ (0, 1)n. For δ ∈ (0, 1) and n ≥ 4 we have
(
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
)
−
(
(1− δ)n2 + (2δ − 1)n− (δ + 2)
)
= (1− δ)2n3 + (1− δ)(3δ − 1)n2 + (2δ2 + δ − 2)n− δ(2δ + 1)
= (1− δ)n
[
(1− δ)n2 + (3δ − 1)n− (2δ + 3)
]
+ n− δ(2δ + 1)
> (1− δ)n[2n− (2δ + 3)] + n− δ(2δ + 1)
> (1− δ)n[2n− 5] + (n− 3)
> 0
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and
(
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
)
−
(
(1− δ)n2 + δn− (2δ + 1)
)
= (1− δ)2n3 + (1− δ)(3δ − 1)n2 + (2δ2 + 2δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 1)
= (1− δ)n
[
(1− δ)n2 + (3δ − 1)n− (2δ + 4)
]
+ n− (2δ2 + 1)
> (1− δ)n[2n− (2δ + 4)] + n− (2δ2 + 1)
> (1− δ)n[2n− 6] + (n− 3)
> 0,
and, moreover,
(1− δ)n2 + (2δ − 1)n− (δ + 2) > n− (δ + 2) > n− 3 > 0,
(1− δ)n2 + δn− (2δ + 1) > n− (2δ + 1) > n− 3 > 0.
Next, we show that it is 1 − δv˜i − δv˜k > 0 and 1 − 2δv˜k > 0, which implies that
max{1 − δv˜i, δv˜k} = 1 − δv˜i, max{1 − δv˜k, δv˜i} = 1 − δv˜k and max{1 − δv˜k, δv˜k} =
1− δv˜k. We calculate
1− δv˜i − δv˜k = (δ
2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−δ2 + δ)n2 + (−δ2 + 4δ − 3)n+ (δ2 + δ − 2)
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
=
(1− δ)
[
(1− δ)n3 + δn2 + (δ − 3)n− (δ + 2)
]
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
>
(1− δ)[n2 + (δ − 3)n− (δ + 2)]
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
>
(1− δ)[
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
n2 − 3n− 3]
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
> 0
and
1− 2δv˜k = (δ
2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−δ2 + δ)n2 + (3δ − 3)n+ (2δ2 − 2)
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
=
(1− δ)
[
(1− δ)n3 + δn2 − 3n− 2(δ + 1)
]
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
>
(1− δ)[n2 − 3n− 2(δ + 1)]
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
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>
(1− δ)[
≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
n2 − 3n− 4]
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
≥ 0.
Furthermore, note that d#(gN − ij) = n(n−1)−2
2
and, hence, for the network gN − ij
equation system (3.1) is equivalent to
vl =
(
1− n− 2
n(n− 1)− 2
)
δvl +
n− 2
n(n− 1)− 2 max{1− δvk, δvl},
vk =
(
1− n− 1
n(n− 1)− 2
)
δvk +
2
n(n− 1)− 2 max{1− δvl, δvk} (3.18)
+
n− 3
n(n− 1)− 2 max{1− δvk, δvk},
for all l ∈ {i, j}, k ∈ N\{i, j}. Using our preparatory work, one can show by
straightforward calculations that v˜ as given in (3.17) is a solution to the system
(3.18). Hence, as we know from Manea (2011, Theorem 1) that this solution is
unique, the equilibrium payoﬀ vector is v∗δ(gN − ij) = v˜.
After deriving the payoﬀs in both networks gN and gN − ij, it remains to show
that for all δ ∈ (0, 1) and n ≥ 4 there exists c¯ > 0 such that for all c ∈ (0, c¯] and
i, j ∈ N it is
v∗δi (g
N)− v∗δi (gN − ij) ≥ c. (3.19)
For this purpose let
c¯ :=
2(1− δ)(n− 1)(
(1− δ)n+ 2δ)((δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)) .
Note that the denominator is positive as it is the product of the denominators of the
terms in (3.16) and (3.17). Hence, we have c¯ > 0 and calculate
v∗δi (g
N )− v∗δi (gN − ij)
=
1
(1− δ)n+ 2δ −
(1− δ)n2 + (2δ − 1)n− (δ + 2)
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2)
=
(δ2 − 2δ + 1)n2 + (−3δ2 + 4δ − 1)n+ (2δ − 2)(
(1− δ)n+ 2δ)((δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2))
=
(1− δ)[(1− δ)n2 + (3δ − 1)n− 2](
(1− δ)n+ 2δ)((δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2))
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>
(1− δ)[2n− 2](
(1− δ)n+ 2δ)((δ2 − 2δ + 1)n3 + (−3δ2 + 3δ)n2 + (2δ2 + 3δ − 3)n− (2δ2 + 2δ + 2))
= c¯.
This concludes the proof of the example and Appendix 3.A.
Appendix 3.B Relation to the Works of
Hellmann (2013) and Hellmann
and Landwehr (2014)
As mentioned in Sections 3.1 and 3.3, there is a strand of literature which provides
some general results about existence, uniqueness and the structure of (pairwise) sta-
ble networks. Prima facie, at least some ﬁndings of Hellmann (2013) and Hellmann
and Landwehr (2014) are most likely in line for an application to our framework. Ac-
cording to Hellmann (2013) the existence of a pairwise stable network is, for instance,
guaranteed if the proﬁle of utility or proﬁt functions is ordinal convex in own links
and satisﬁes ordinal strategic complements. Other ﬁndings of Hellmann (2013) and
Hellmann and Landwehr (2014) concerning these issues are further and among other
properties based on concavity, anonymous convexity, the strategic substitutes prop-
erty or strong preference for centrality. In this appendix, we ﬁrst provide explanations
and deﬁnitions of these concepts. Second, we provide appropriate counterexamples
which demonstrate that, among these properties, the proﬁt function considered in
our model with δ → 1 does not satisfy some crucial ones at least for a broad range
of cost levels. In this light, this conﬁrms that our analysis is not a special case of
questions which have already been answered before but of some independent interest.
The ﬁndings of Hellmann (2013) and Hellmann and Landwehr (2014) are mainly
based on marginal eﬀects of link creation. To be able to summarize certain properties
in this context and to make use of the subsequent counterexamples we require some
additional notation. For a given network g and ij /∈ g let ∆ui(g+ij, ij) := ui(g+ij)−
ui(g) denote the marginal utility of the link ij for player i ∈ N . Further, let the set of
all own links of a player i ∈ N in a network g be denoted by Li(g) := {ij ∈ g | j ∈ N}
whereas L−i(g) := g − Li(g) denotes all other links.
At least one of the following properties is part of the conditions of each relevant
theorem, proposition or corollary of Hellmann (2013) and Hellmann and Landwehr
(2014).
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Definition 3.5 (Marginal Eﬀects). A profile of utility functions (ui)i∈N
• is concave in own links if for all g ⊆ gN , i ∈ N, li ⊆ Li(gN − g), ij /∈ g + li
we have
∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ ∆ui(g + li + ij, ij),
• is ordinal convex in own links if for all g ⊆ gN , i ∈ N, li ⊆ Li(gN − g), ij /∈
g + li we have
(i) ∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + li + ij, ij) ≥ 0 and
(ii) ∆ui(g + ij, ij) > 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + li + ij, ij) > 0,
• satisfies anonymous convexity if for all g ⊆ gN , i, j, k ∈ N with ηi(g) ≤ ηj(g),
ik ∈ g and jk /∈ g we have
∆ui(g, ik) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆uj(g + jk, jk) ≥ 0,
• satisfies strong preference for centrality if for all g ⊆ gN , i, j, k ∈ N with
ηj(g) ≤ ηk(g), ij ∈ g and ik /∈ g we have
∆ui(g, ij) ≥ 0 ⇒ ∆ui(g + ik, ik) > 0,
• satisfies ordinal strategic complements (substitutes) if for all g ⊆ gN , i ∈
N, l−i ⊆ L−i(gN − g), ij /∈ g we have
(i) ∆ui(g + ij, ij) ≥ 0 ⇒ (⇐) ∆ui(g + l−i + ij, ij) ≥ 0 and
(ii) ∆ui(g + ij, ij) > 0 ⇒ (⇐) ∆ui(g + l−i + ij, ij) > 0, and
• satisfies positive (negative) externalities if for all g ⊆ gN , jk /∈ g, i ∈ N\{j, k}
we have
ui(g + jk) ≥ (≤)ui(g).
We now provide counterexamples which establish that, at least for some cost
levels, the proﬁle of proﬁt functions (u∗i )i∈N is neither concave or ordinal convex nor
does it satisfy anonymous convexity, strong preference for centrality, ordinal strategic
complements/substitutes or positive/negative externalities.
Counterexample 3.1 (Concavity). Consider the player set N with n = 7 and the
network g := {14, 45, 56, 67}. Further let l1 := {13}.
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Note ﬁrst that it is l1 ⊆ L1(gN − g) as required. Applying the algorithm A(·) to
the diﬀerent networks gives
∆u∗1(g + 12, 12) = u
∗
1(g + 12)− u∗1(g) =
1
2
− 2c−
(2
5
− c
)
=
1
10
− c, and
∆u∗1(g + l1 + 12, 12) = u
∗
1(g + l1 + 12)− u∗1(g + l1) =
2
3
− 3c−
(1
2
− 2c
)
=
1
6
− c.
This yields ∆u∗1(g+ l1+12, 12) > ∆u
∗
1(g+12, 12) for all c > 0 which means that our
proﬁt function is not concave.
Counterexample 3.2 (Ordinal Convexity). Consider the player set N with n = 4
and the network g := {24}. Further let l1 := {13, 14}.
Note again ﬁrst that we have l1 ⊆ L1(gN − g) in this counterexample as well. For
c ∈
(
0, 1
3
]
we calculate by using the algorithm A(·) that
∆u∗1(g + 12, 12) = u
∗
1(g + 12)− u∗1(g) =
1
3
− c− 0 ≥ 0, but
∆u∗1(g + l1 + 12, 12) = u
∗
1(g + l1 + 12)− u∗1(g + l1) =
1
2
− 3c−
(1
2
− 2c
)
= −c < 0.
Thus, our proﬁt function is in general not convex either, even not in ordinal notion.
Counterexample 3.3 (Anonymous Convexity and Strong Preference for Central-
ity). Consider the player set N with n = 4 and the network g := {13, 24}.
Note that it is ηi(g) = 1 for all i ∈ N . For c ∈
(
0, 1
2
]
we have according to the
outcome of A(·) that
∆u∗1(g, 13) = u
∗
1(g)− u∗1(g − 13) =
1
2
− c− 0 ≥ 0, but both
∆u∗2(g + 23, 23) = u
∗
2(g + 23)− u∗2(g) =
1
2
− 2c−
(1
2
− c
)
= −c < 0 and
∆u∗1(g + 12, 12) = u
∗
1(g + 12)− u∗1(g) =
1
2
− 2c−
(1
2
− c
)
= −c < 0.
Thus, our proﬁt function does neither in general satisfy anonymous convexity nor
strong preference for centrality.
Counterexample 3.4 (Ordinal Strategic Substitutes). Consider the player set N
with n = 5 and the network g := {14, 23}. Further let l−1 := {45}.
Note that, as required, we have l−1 ⊆ L−1(gN − g) in this case. For c ∈
(
0, 1
15
]
we
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get again from A(·) that
∆u∗1(g + l−1 + 12, 12) = u
∗
1(g + l−1 + 12)− u∗1(g + l−1) =
2
5
− 2c−
(1
3
− c
)
=
1
15
− c ≥ 0, but
∆u∗1(g + 12, 12) = u
∗
1(g + 12)− u∗1(g) =
1
2
− 2c−
(1
2
− c
)
= −c < 0.
Hence, our proﬁt function does not in general satisfy ordinal strategic substitutes.
Counterexample 3.5 (Ordinal Strategic Complements). Consider the player set N
with n = 4 and the network g := {14}. Further let l−1 := {23}.
Note ﬁrst, that it is again l−1 ⊆ L−1(gN − g). Calculating payoﬀs in the usual
way gives for c ∈
(
0, 1
6
]
that
∆u∗1(g + 12, 12) = u
∗
1(g + 12)− u∗1(g) =
2
3
− 2c−
(1
2
− c
)
=
1
6
− c ≥ 0, but
∆u∗1(g + l−1 + 12, 12) = u
∗
1(g + l−1 + 12)− u∗1(g + l−1) =
1
2
− 2c−
(1
2
− c
)
< 0.
Hence, our proﬁt function does not in general satisfy ordinal strategic complements
either.
Counterexample 3.6 (Positive/Negative Externalities). Consider the player set N
with n = 4 and the network g := {12, 23}.
For this counterexample we calculate
u∗1(g + 34) =
1
2
− c > 1
3
− c = u∗1(g) and
u∗2(g + 34) =
1
2
− 2c < 2
3
− 2c = u∗2(g).
Consequently, our proﬁt function does neither satisfy positive nor negative external-
ities for all c > 0.
Thus, the question of existence and structure of stable networks cannot be an-
swered by applying the results of Hellmann (2013) and Hellmann and Landwehr
(2014). In this sense, our problem seems to be independent and indeed requires a
detailed analysis as conducted in Section 3.3.
3.C Relation to the Work of O’Donnell (2011) • 115
Appendix 3.C Relation to the Work of
O’Donnell (2011)
In this appendix we discuss the closely related “honours thesis” of O’Donnell (2011).
First, we give a brief overview of his work which reveals major commonalities and
diﬀerences to our setting. In doing so, we point out some rather general issues con-
cerning his approach. Second, we go more into detail and focus on the proofs of
crucial results presented and applied in O’Donnell (2011, Chapter 4). Mainly by
providing straightforward counterexamples we argue that there are several shortcom-
ings in his line of argument. This unveils that his key result must be considered as
being unproven which means that, contrary to what is suggested, O’Donnell does not
provide a complete characterization of pairwise stable networks by far.73
Though entitled “Preliminary Results” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 41), Chapter 4 is
rather fundamental for his work. The ﬁndings in this chapter are supposed to rule
out the possibility to be pairwise stable for a broad range of networks. Though the
line of argument is very diﬀerent, regarding the underlying idea and signiﬁcance for
his work the chapter’s results are comparable to Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.3 in
our work. O’Donnell states several lemmas whose proofs shall build on one another
and which shall ﬁnally combine to the following main result.
“Theorem 4.1: When c > 0, any link stable network G must be of degree two or less,
meaning it is made up of circle segments, line segments, and disconnected agents.”
(O’Donnell, 2011, p. 44)
As we establish in Section 3.3, this is true for non-singularly pairwise stable net-
works. Though we do not prove this, our further results suggest that this is indeed
even true for pairwise stable networks. However, there are various shortcomings
within O’Donnell’s proofs of the lemmas as we point out in the second part of this
appendix. Thus, the theorem might be true, however, based on the work of O’Donnell,
it can at most be considered as a conjecture.
This is followed by a rather descriptive chapter characterizing pairwise stable
networks (see O’Donnell, 2011, pp. 59–67). However, some questions remain open.
For instance, it is not clariﬁed why line networks of length greater than three are never
pairwise stable. Also, the examination of odd circles is rather short and seems to be
incomplete as only the special cases of three and ﬁve player circles are considered
explicitly. Regarding its content and purpose, this chapter is comparable to our
73O’Donnell uses the expression “link stable” synonymously for “pairwise stable”.
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Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 where we establish suﬃcient conditions for networks
to be pairwise stable.74 There are no contradictions between both works here.
Next, O’Donnell (2011, pp. 69–78) focuses on “Nash stability” and “Pareto opti-
mality”, however, while redeﬁning these notions. Usually, a network is called Nash
stable if it is supported by a Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative network for-
mation game à la Myerson (1991, p. 448).75 This seems to be equivalent to what he
calls “strong Nash stability” while his notion of Nash stability does not seem to be
well-founded. Furthermore, in economics the notion of Pareto optimality or Pareto
eﬃciency is commonly associated with a status quo where no player can improve
without another one being worse oﬀ (see e.g. Pareto, 1964; Jackson, 2008b, p. 157).
However, O’Donnell uses it as follows: “[...] examining the set of networks that is
Pareto optimal, that is the set of networks that maximise the sum of the payoﬀs” (p.
69). This is rather a description of eﬃciency based on a utilitarian welfare notion that
we consider in Section 3.4. However, diﬀerent from O’Donnell we give a complete
characterization of this class of networks.76 Moreover, we consider the concept of
pairwise Nash stability (see Corollary 3.5) which, diﬀerent than one might suppose,
does not coincide with any of his alternative notions of stability. Finally, note that,
while examining the model for δ → 1, O’Donnell does not provide results for the case
δ ∈ (0, 1) which we consider in Section 3.5.
In the following second part of this appendix, we state most of O’Donnell’s lemmas
which are supposed to combine to establish the key result in his Theorem 4.1. How-
ever, as already announced, we reveal substantial shortcomings in the corresponding
proofs by providing appropriate counterexamples.
3.C.1 Lemma 4.1 of O’Donnell (2011)
“Lemma 4.1: Let r′s and r
′′
s be the minimum shortage ratios in the networks G
′ and
G′′ respectively where G′ ⊂ G′′. It must be that r′s ≤ r′′s .” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 45)
Note that O’Donnell uses capital letters when referring to networks. In what
follows we adopt this notation. The following two counterexamples demonstrate that
this statement is in general not true.
74 Note that, among other parts of the work at hand, I accomplished this (as well as the elaboration
of the model) before I became aware of O’Donnell’s thesis on March 06, 2014 and he kindly send it
to me by e-mail on April 08, 2014 (as it is not publicly available).
75Here, a Nash equilibrium denotes a strategy proﬁle (s1, s2, ..., sn) where no player i ∈ N wants
to deviate from her strategy si ∈ {0, 1}n−1 which, together with the other players’ strategies,
determines a network g with jk ∈ g if and only if sjk = skj = 1 (see also Bloch and Jackson, 2006).
76See Footnote 74.
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Counterexample 3.7. Consider the player set N with n = 3 and the networks
G′ := {12} and G′′ := {12, 13}.
Note that, as required, we have G′ ⊂ G′′. However, the algorithms A(G′) and
A(G′′) yield r′1 = 0 < 12 = r′′1 but r′2 = 1 while r′′2 does not exist.
In the second counterexample, both algorithms stop after the same step but
Lemma 4.1 is still violated.
Counterexample 3.8. Consider the player set N with n = 8 and the networks
G′ := {12, 23, 34, 45, 56, 67} and G′′ := G′+68 = {12, 23, 34, 45, 56, 67, 68} as sketched
in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: A sketch of the network G′ considered in Counterexample 3.8
Again, we obviously have G′ ⊂ G′′. Now, the algorithms A(G′) and A(G′′) yield
r′1 = 0 <
1
2
= r′′1 but r
′
2 =
3
4
> 2
3
= r′′2 .
However, following O’Donnell’s reasoning one can show that at least it holds that
r′1 ≤ r′′1 for G′ ⊂ G′′.
3.C.2 Lemma 4.2 of O’Donnell (2011)
Next, we consider Lemma 4.2. First, one notices that the statements in the preceding
explanation and in the lemma itself diﬀer.
“Lemma 4.2: Let G be a network such that ij ∈ G and jk /∈ G. Then let G′ =
{ij|ij ∈ G} ∪ {ik}. Then vi(G) ≥ vi(G′).” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 46)
Here, vi(·) is equal to v∗i (·) if one applies our notation. To avoid confusion, how-
ever, we again adopt O’Donnell’s notation in what follows. The statement is in
general not true as the next counterexample shows.
Counterexample 3.9. Consider the player set N with n = 3 and the network G :=
{12}.
Observe that for i = 1, j = 2 and k = 3 the network considered in the coun-
terexample satisﬁes the conditions of Lemma 4.2. We then have G′ = {12, 13} and
vi(G) =
1
2
< 2
3
= vi(G
′) which contradicts the above statement.
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If on the contrary we follow the explanation given as an introduction to the lemma,
it should read as follows.
Lemma 4.2’: Let G be a network such that ij ∈ G and jk /∈ G. Then let G′ =
{ij|ij ∈ G} ∪ {jk}. Then vi(G) ≥ vi(G′).
This statement might be correct but there is a mistake in the proof. The author
argues that in the ﬁrst case, where it is vi(G) <
1
2
, “player i’s payoﬀ does not change”
(O’Donnell, 2011, p. 47) if G′ = G+ jk is considered instead. This is not true as the
following counterexample reveals.
Counterexample 3.10. Consider the player set N with n = 4 and the network
G := {12, 24}.
Note that for i = 1, j = 2 and k = 3 the algorithm A(G) gives vi(G) = 13 < 12 .
Further we have G′ = G+ jk = {12, 23, 24} and in this network the payoﬀ of player
i is changed to vi(G
′) = 1
4
.
3.C.3 Lemma 4.3 of O’Donnell (2011)
To prepare for the following considerations, the set Li(G) ⊂ N “of players to whom
player i is connected to in G plus himself” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 45) is deﬁned. Thus,
we have Li(G) = Ni(G) ∪˙ {i} here, which implies |Li(G)| = ηi(G) + 1.
“Lemma 4.3: In any link stable network there exists a maximum number of links any
single player can have depending on c. This number is determined by the following
inequality. It is possible for a player to have Li links in a link stable network only if
1
(Li + 1)Li
− c ≥ 0.”
(O’Donnell, 2011, p. 48)
Possibly, he refers to a (link stable) network G and a player i here and has |Li(G)|
in mind when writing Li. The corresponding proof, however, is not convincing. The
author argues that Lemma 4.2 proves that it is suﬃcient to conﬁne oneself to star
networks “in which the potential partners of i under consideration have no other
connections in the network” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 48). Even if one assumes that this
is justiﬁed and neglects the fact that Lemma 4.2 or Lemma 4.2’ have to be considered
as unproven (see Appendix 3.C.2), a reasonable explanation is still missing here.
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3.C.4 Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6 of O’Donnell (2011)
“Lemma 4.5: It is not possible to have a link stable network where 0 < rs <
1
2
,
regardless of c > 0.” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 51)
“Lemma 4.6: It is not possible to have a link stable network where 1
2
< rs < 1,
regardless of c > 0.” (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 53)
At ﬁrst notice that it is not clear, which step s of the algorithm is considered here.
As we know from Corollary 3.2, the algorithm A(G) has to break oﬀ after the ﬁrst
step s = 1 if G is pairwise stable and consisting of only one component. Therefore,
let us assume that O’Donnell refers to r1 in both lemmas. Under this assumption
the statements in both lemmas might indeed be true. However, they are again not
proven properly. Given partner set L, G-independent set M and players j, k ∈ M ,
the author argues within the proof of Lemma 4.5 that “if j and k were to link, then
j would receive:
L+1
M−1
1 + L+1
M−1
− Ljc ”
(O’Donnell, 2011, p. 51). Assuming that he means |L|, |M | and |Lj(G)| here, the
following counterexample shows that this is not true.
Counterexample 3.11. Consider the player set N with n = 5 and the star network
G := {12, 13, 14, 15}.
Note that for j = 2 and k = 3 it is j, k ∈ M here. Now consider G′ := G + jk.
Then the algorithm A(G′) gives
vj(G+ jk) =
1
2
>
2
5
=
|L|+1
|M |−1
1 + |L|+1
|M |−1
which contradicts the above statement. Moreover, we know from Lemma 3.1 that for
a pairwise stable network G with r1 < 1 and j, k ∈M we always have vj(G+jk) = 12 .
O’Donnell uses this in the proof of Lemma 4.6, however, without a proof, when stating
that “if j and k were to link, then j would receive: 1
2
− Ljc” (p. 54). Beyond that,
in the proof of Lemma 4.5 he infers that “0 < rs <
1
2
implies L+1
M−1
< 1” (p. 51). As
it can again easily be seen from the following counterexample this is not true.
Counterexample 3.12. Consider the player set N with n = 4 and the star network
G := {12, 13, 14}.
For this network the algorithm A(G) yields r1 = 13 < 12 but we have |L1|+1|M1|−1 = 1.
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3.C.5 Lemma 4.7 of O’Donnell (2011)
“Lemma 4.7: If G is a link stable network where rs =
1
2
, then c = 1
6
.” (O’Donnell,
2011, p. 55)
If we assume as before that the author refers to step s = 1 here, then according
to our Theorem 3.3 this statement is true. However, even if we assume that all
statements in the previous lemmas were true (and proven properly), the proof of
Lemma 4.7 is again not exhaustive. To be more precise, the reasoning that “1
2
= rs
implies one or more disjoint line segments of three players” (O’Donnell, 2011, p.
55) is not correct. For instance, this becomes clear from examining the following
counterexample.
Counterexample 3.13. Consider the player set N with n = 6 and the network
G := {12, 13, 24, 34, 45, 46} as sketched in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8: A sketch of the network G considered in Counterexample 3.13
For the considered network the algorithm A(G) yields r1 = 12 though it does not
contain a (disjoint) line of length three.
3.C.6 Lemma 4.9 of O’Donnell (2011)
In his Lemma 4.9, O’Donnell (2011, p. 57) considers components of pairwise stable
networks which are neither isolated players nor lines. For such a component G′
O’Donnell states the following.
“Lemma 4.9: The network G′ is of degree two.”77 (O’Donnell, 2011, p. 57)
Though we suppose that this is indeed true, the following crucial inference in the
proof of Lemma 4.9 is not correct. O’Donnell argues that “a player i in the smallest
circle segment, [...] having more than two links” (pp. 57–58) and receiving, just as
every other player, a payoﬀ of 1
2
is “strictly worse oﬀ than if she were just to have the
77A network is said to be of degree two if every player in this network has exactly two links.
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two links that keep him in the circle” (p. 58).78 This does not need to be the case as
the following counterexample reveals.
Counterexample 3.14. Consider the player set N with n = 9 and the network
G′ := {12, 17, 19, 23, 34, 45, 47, 56, 67, 78, 89} as sketched in Figure 3.9. Further let
c ∈ (0, 1
18
].
1
2
Figure 3.9: A sketch of the network G′ considered in Counterexample 3.14
Note that player 1 has more than two links and is contained in the smallest circle
segment, that is in one of the two smallest subnetworks of G′ which are a circle.
Evaluating the algorithm A(G′) gives that, as required, every player receives a payoﬀ
of 1
2
in G′. Further, if player 1 deletes her link to player 2, she would still be contained
in the smallest circle (segment). However, if we consider the network G′ − 12 and
apply the algorithm A(G′ − 12), we get
v1(G
′ − 12)− 2c = 4
9
− 2c ≤ 1
2
− 3c = v1(G′)− 3c.
Thus, player 1 is not worse oﬀ in G′ compared to G′ − 12.
In summary, one can state that, concerning the characterization of pairwise stable
networks, O’Donnell’s work is roughly comparable with the ﬁndings we derive in
Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1 if one only considers the results he established properly
and correctly. In this context, notice again Footnote 74.
78A “circle (segment)” here is meant to be a (not necessarily component-induced) subnetwork
which is a circle.
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Chapter 4
Continuous Homophily and
Clustering in Random Networks
4.1 Introduction
Suppose you own a ﬁrm and want to ﬁll an open vacancy through the social contacts
of one of your current employees. Whom would you ask to recommend someone?
Most probably you would address the worker who would himself perform best in the
position in question. While this seems to be intuitively reasonable, why do we expect
it to be optimal? One important reason is that people tend to connect to similar
others. This phenomenon is known as homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1954).
In this chapter, we introduce a continuous notion of homophily based on incor-
porating heterogeneity of agents into the Bernoulli Random Graph (BRG) model as
examined by Erdős and Rényi (1959). To this end, we propose a two-stage random
process which we call Homophilous Random Network model. First, agents are as-
signed characteristics independently drawn from a continuous interval and second a
network realizes, linking probabilities being contingent on a homophily parameter
and the pairwise distance between agents’ characteristics. This enables us to account
for homophily in terms of similarity rather than equality of agents, capturing the
original sociological deﬁnition instead of the stylized version up to now commonly
used in the economic literature.
As a ﬁrst result, we determine the expected linking probabilities between agents
(Proposition 4.1) as well as the expected number of links (Corollary 4.2). We then
calculate the expected probability that an agent has a certain number of links (Propo-
sition 4.2), showing that the according binomial distribution of the original BRG
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model is preserved to some degree. Further, we establish a threshold theorem for any
given agent to be connected (Proposition 4.3). For all these (and further) results we
demonstrate that the BRG model is comprised as the limit case of no homophily and
we thus provide a generalization thereof. As a main result, we show that in our model
homophily induces clustering (Theorem 4.1), two stylized facts frequently observed
in real-world networks which are not captured by the BRG model.79 Furthermore,
clustering proves to be strictly increasing in homophily. As a second important fea-
ture of our model, two simulations indicate that even at high homophily levels the
well-known small-world phenomenon is preserved.80 We ﬁnally provide an application
of the Homophilous Random Network model within a stylized labor market setting
to answer the introductory questions.
In the literature the presence of homophily has been established in a wide range of
sociological and economic settings. Empirical studies on social networks discovered
strong evidence for the similarity of connected individuals with respect to age (see
e.g. Verbrugge, 1977; Marsden, 1988; Burt, 1991), education (see e.g. Marsden, 1987;
Kalmijn, 2006), income (see e.g. Laumann, 1966, 1973), ethnicity (see e.g. Baerveldt
et al., 2004; Ibarra, 1995) or geographical distance (see e.g. Campbell, 1990; Well-
man, 1996). For an extensive survey see McPherson et al. (2001). In recent years,
economists have developed an understanding of the relevance of network eﬀects in
a range of economic contexts. Thus, bearing in mind the presence of homophily in
real-world networks can be of great importance for creating meaningful economic
models.
There already exists a strand of economic literature examining homophily eﬀects
in diﬀerent settings (see e.g. Currarini et al., 2009). Most of the models assume a
ﬁnite type space and binary homophily in the sense that an agent prefers to connect
to others that are of the same type while not distinguishing between other types.81
Thus, these models rather capture the idea of equality than of similarity. However,
in reality people are in many respects neither “equal” nor “diﬀerent”. We therefore
believe that a notion that provides an ordering of the “degree of similarity” with
respect to which an agent orders his preference for connections can capture real-
world eﬀects more accurately. This gives rise to a continuous notion of homophily in
networks.
79A network exhibits clustering if two individuals with a common neighbor have an increased
probability of being connected.
80The small-world phenomenon describes the observation that even in large networks on average
there exist relatively short paths between two individuals.
81For several homophily measures of this kind see Currarini et al. (2009).
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This approach is followed by Gilles and Johnson (2000) and Iijima and Kamada
(2014) who examine strategic, deterministic models of network formation. In both
models individual utility is shaped directly by homophily such that individuals con-
nect if (and only if) they are suﬃciently similar. Iijima and Kamada (2014) consider
the extreme case of purely homophilous utility functions, entailing that a high level
of homophily is directly identiﬁed with eﬃciency. As opposed to this, in our random
graph model, a novel continuous homophily measure is incorporated as a parameter
that may be freely chosen to reﬂect a broad range of possible situations. In their
multi-dimensional framework, Iijima and Kamada (2014) examine clustering and the
average path length as functions of the number of characteristics agents take into
account when evaluating their social distance to others. In contrast, we investigate
the direct relation between homophily and these network statistics. The diﬀerences
in methodology especially lead to opposing results concerning the small-world phe-
nomenon. While in Iijima and Kamada (2014) small worlds only arise if agents
disregard a subset of characteristics, we show that this phenomenon is well present
in our one-dimensional setting.
Besides the presence of homophily, stylized facts such as the small-world phe-
nomenon and high levels of clustering have indeed been empirically identiﬁed in real-
world networks (see e.g. Milgram, 1967; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). As in many cases
these networks are very large and remain unknown for an analysis, typically random
networks are used as an approximation. This constitutes a challenge to design the
random network formation process in a way to ensure it complies with the observed
stylized facts.
Since the seminal work of Erdős and Rényi (1959), who developed and analyzed
a random graph model where a ﬁxed number out of all possible bilateral connections
is randomly chosen, a lot of diﬀerent models have been proposed (see e.g. Wasserman
and Pattison, 1996; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Barabási and Albert, 1999). The most
commonly used until today is the BRG model where connections between any two
agents are established with the same constant probability. It has been shown that for
large networks this model is almost equal to the original model of Erdős and Rényi
(1959) (for details see Jackson, 2006; Bollobás, 2001).82 It is well understood that
this model reproduces the small-world phenomenon but does not exhibit clustering.
Also, a notion of homophily is not present as the described random process does
not rely on individual characteristics. The latter is also true for the small-world
model proposed by Watts and Strogatz (1998). Starting from a network built on a
82In fact, the BRG model rather than their original one is nowadays also known as the Erdős-Rényi
model.
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low-dimensional regular lattice, they reallocate randomly chosen links and obtain a
random network showing a small-world phenomenon. According to their notion this
encompasses an increased level of clustering. However, the socio-economic causality
of this occurrence remains uncertain. In this regard our model can to some extend
serve as a socio-economic foundation of the work of Watts and Strogatz (1998). An
approach to generate random graphs more similar to ours is proposed by the recently
emerging graph-theoretic literature on random intersection graphs (see e.g. Karonski
et al., 1999). Here, each node is randomly assigned a set of features. Connections are
then established between any two nodes sharing a given number of features. It has
been shown that the resulting graphs also exhibit clustering (Bloznelis, 2013).
In general, not much work has yet been dedicated to the incorporation of ho-
mophily into random networks. However, some papers exist that include similar ideas.
Jackson (2008a) analyzes the impact of increasing homophily on network statistics
such as clustering and the average distance of nodes. A ﬁnite number of types as
well as linking probabilities between them are exogenously given. Though linking
probabilities may vary among types, which allows for cases where similar types are
preferred, his notion of homophily remains binary. Golub and Jackson (2012) also
assume a ﬁnite number of types as well as the linking probabilities between them
to be exogenously given. Based on this they analyze the implications of homophily
in the framework of dynamic belief formation on networks. Bramoullé et al. (2012)
combine random link formation and local search in a sequentially growing society
of heterogeneous agents and establish a version of binary homophily along with a
degree distribution. Besides the continuous notion of homophily, a major distinc-
tion of our approach is the sequential combination of two random processes where
agents’ characteristics are considered as random variables that inﬂuence the random
network formation. We thus account for the fact that in many applications, in which
the network remains unobserved, it seems unnatural to assume that individual char-
acteristics, which in fact may depict attitudes, beliefs or abilities, are perfectly known.
We conclude this chapter by providing an application of our model for the labor
market, proposing an analysis of the introductory question: When is it optimal for
a ﬁrm to search for a new employee via the contacts of a current employee? We
assume the characteristic of each worker to be her individual ability to ﬁll the open
vacancy and use our Homophilous Random Network model as an approximation of
the workers’ network. Given an agent and her characteristic, we determine the ex-
pected characteristic of a random contact (Proposition 4.4). This gives rise to a
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simple decision rule stating in which constellations ﬁrms should hire via the social
network. In particular, given suﬃciently high levels of homophily and the current
employee’s ability, it proves to be optimal to always hire via the social network.
Within the job search literature, Horváth (2013) and Zaharieva (2013) incorpo-
rate homophily among contacts into job search models. However, these models are
again based on a binary concept of homophily and do not include an explicit notion
of networks. This research strand traces back to the work of Montgomery (1991) who
was the ﬁrst to address this issue. Finally, our application to some extent captures
an idea proposed by Ioannides and Loury (2004) to combine this class of models with
a random network setting à la Erdős-Rényi.83
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we set up the model.
Section 4.3 reveals basic properties of homophilous random networks while results on
clustering can be found in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5 we simulate the model focusing
on the small-world phenomenon. Section 4.6 contains the labor market application
and Section 4.7 concludes. Proofs of most results are provided in the appendix.
4.2 The Model
We set up a model of random network formation where ﬁrst each agent is randomly
assigned a continuous characteristic which then inﬂuences the respective linking prob-
abilities. We refer to this as the Homophilous Random Network model. Consider a
set of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n}. A connection or (undirected) link between two agents
i, j ∈ N is denoted by ij = ji := {i, j}. By gN := {ij | i, j ∈ N} we denote the
complete network, that is the network where any two agents are connected. Then,
we let G := {g | g ⊆ gN} be the set of all possible non-directed graphs or networks.
Further, we deﬁne Ni(g) := {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g} to be the set of neighbors of agent i in
network g, and let ηi(g) := |Ni(g)| denote the number of her neighbors. This is some-
times also referred to as the degree of agent i. Each agent is assigned a characteristic
pi where the vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) denotes a certain realization of the random
variable P = (P1, P2, ..., Pn). The underlying distribution of each Pi is assumed to be
standard uniform. Hence, all Pi are identically and independently distributed.
83Ioannides and Loury (2004, p. 1068) state “It would be interesting to generalize the model of
social structure employed by Montgomery, by assuming groups of diﬀerent sizes. For example, one
may invoke a random graphs setting (Paul Erdős and Alfred Rényi 1960; Ioannides 1997), where a
fraction of the entire economy may be in groups whose sizes are denumerable but possibly large.”
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Subsequent to the assignment of characteristics a random network forms. Here,
based on the Bernoulli Random Graph (BRG) model as introduced by Erdős and
Rényi (1959), we assume the following variation. The linking probability of two agents
i, j ∈ N is given by
q(pi, pj) := λa
|pi−pj |, (4.1)
where the scaling parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] and the homophily parameter a ∈ [0, 1] are
exogenously given and independent of agents i and j. Note that, in situations where
the vector of characteristics is unknown, q(Pi, Pj) is a random variable such that the
linking probability q(pi, pj) is in fact a conditional probability. Figure 4.1 depicts the
linking probabilities q(pi, pj) for diﬀerent homophily parameters a, ﬁrst as a function
of the distance of characteristics and second as a function of pj for given pi = 0.25.
As in our model λ simply serves as a scaling parameter corresponding to the linking
probability in the BRG model, in Figure 4.1 it is ﬁxed to one for simplicity.
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Figure 4.1: (a) Linking probability for all distances of characteristics for several
homophily parameters a; (b) Linking probabilities for an agent with characteristic
pi = 0.25 for several homophily parameters a
Let us shortly elaborate on the role of the homophily parameter a. Observe
that the linking probability q is decreasing in |pi − pj| as a takes values only in
[0, 1]. In particular, for a = 1 the model is equal to the BRG model as all linking
probabilities are equal to λ and hence independent of the agents’ characteristics.
On the contrary, if we have a = 0, then solely agents with identical characteristics
pi = pj get connected with probability λ while all other linking probabilities are zero.
Insofar, the parameter a serves as a measure of homophily in the model. Here, lower
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parameter values correspond to a higher homophily level in the network. The notion
at hand measures homophily in a continuous instead of a binary manner since the
distance function | · | is continuous. Note, however, that an increase in homophily
which leads to a decreased linking probability then also implies a decreased expected
degree of agents. Whenever suitable, one may therefore choose the scaling parameter
λ dependent on a such that the expected degree is kept constant for any level of
homophily.84 We make use of this possibility in Section 4.5 (see Simulation 4.1).
4.3 Basic Properties of Homophilous Random
Networks
This section constitutes a foundation for the upcoming main results. To this end,
we ﬁrst need to collect several important properties of the Homophilous Random
Network model, such as the expected linking probabilities and the number of links
of agents. Moreover, we discuss a threshold theorem for an agent to be isolated.
This is of particular importance for the labor market application provided in Section
4.6. Throughout this section we explore, on the one hand, situations in which the
realization of one considered agent i ∈ N is known while all others are not and, on
the other hand, situations in which the whole vector of characteristics is unknown.
In any case we demonstrate that the BRG model is recuperated as the limit case of
no homophily and we thus provide a generalization thereof.
We start by determining the expected linking probabilities for two given agents
i, j ∈ N in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Given agent i’s realized characteristic Pi = pi while all other
characteristics p−i are unknown, the expected probability that a certain link ij forms
is
E
P
[
P
G (ij ∈ G | P )
∣∣∣ Pi = pi] = λ
ln(a)
(
api + a1−pi − 2
)
=: ϕ(λ, a, pi). (4.2)
If the vector p is unknown, the expected probability that the link ij forms is
E
P
[
P
G (ij ∈ G | P )
]
=
2λ
ln(a)2
(
a− 1− ln(a)
)
=: Φ(λ, a). (4.3)
84According to Corollary 4.2, choosing λ = η
exp ln(a)2
2(n−1)(a−1−ln(a)) yields a ﬁxed expected degree of η
exp
(if compatible).
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The proof of Proposition 4.1 as well as all subsequent proofs can be found in
the appendix. It is straightforward to understand that the function ϕ indeed has to
depend on characteristic pi as it makes a diﬀerence whether pi tends to the center
or to the boundaries of the interval [0, 1]. The closer pi is to 0.5 the smaller is the
expected distance to other agents’ characteristics, hence, the higher is the expected
linking probability ϕ. In particular, it is argmaxpi ϕ = 0.5 and argminpi ϕ = {0, 1}
for all a ∈ (0, 1). To this respect, it is obvious that ϕ(λ, a, 0) ≤ Φ(λ, a) ≤ ϕ(λ, a, 0.5)
for all λ, a ∈ [0, 1]. Also, it is important to note that the expected linking probability
is decreasing in homophily, that is for all a ∈ (0, 1] we have
∂
∂a
Φ(λ, a) =
∂
∂a
[
2λ
a− 1− ln(a)
ln(a)2
]
= 2λ
2(1− a) + ln(a)(1 + a)
a ln(a)3
> 0.85
To verify intuition that our model reproduces the BRG model as a limit case and to
gain insights on the behavior in boundary cases, the following corollary is concerned
with the limits of the expected linking probabilities with respect to the homophily
parameter a.
Corollary 4.1. For maximal homophily, i.e. for a → 0, the expected linking proba-
bility is
lim
a→0
ϕ(λ, a, pi) = lim
a→0
Φ(λ, a) = 0. (4.4)
In case of no homophily, i.e. for a→ 1, the expected linking probability is
lim
a→1
ϕ(λ, a, pi) = lim
a→1
Φ(λ, a) = λ. (4.5)
As usual, a proof is provided in the appendix. Maximal homophily in this model
means that only agents with identical characteristics would have a strictly positive
linking probability. However, since the standard uniform distribution has no mass
point, such two agents do not exist with positive probability. Therefore, both accord-
ing expected linking probabilities ϕ and Φ tend to zero. In case of no homophily, as
mentioned before, the model indeed reproduces the BRG model such that all linking
probabilities are alike, independent of individual characteristics p.
Based on Proposition 4.1, we also immediately get the expected number of links
of an agent.
85We indeed can include the value a = 1 here as it happens to be a removable discontinuity of the
derivative. On the contrary, at a = 0 the right-handed derivative is inﬁnity as the expected number
of links is zero with probability one.
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Corollary 4.2. The expected number of links of an agent i with given characteristic
Pi = pi is
E
P
[
E
G [ηi(G) | P ]
∣∣∣ Pi = pi] = (n− 1)ϕ(λ, a, pi). (4.6)
Similarly, if p is unknown, we have
E
P
[
E
G [ηi(G) | P ]
]
= (n− 1)Φ(λ, a). (4.7)
A proof of this corollary is omitted as it is clear that all expected linking prob-
abilities are independent and, hence, the result follows directly from the proof of
Proposition 4.1. Observe that from this result, we can also calculate the expected
number of links in a network to be
n(n− 1)
2
Φ(λ, a).
Together with Corollary 4.1 this gives that the expected number of links is zero for
maximal homophily while in case of no homophily, again as in the BRG model, one
gets λn(n− 1)/2 links in expectation.
In what follows, we calculate the expected probability for an agent with given
characteristic to have a certain number of links. This entails that the model inherits
a version of the binomial distribution known from the BRG model.
Proposition 4.2. The expected probability that an agent i with given characteristic
Pi = pi has k ∈ {0, 1, ..., n− 1} links is given by
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) = k | P )
∣∣∣Pi = pi] =
(
n− 1
k
)
· ϕ(λ, a, pi)k · (1− ϕ(λ, a, pi))n−k−1.
(4.8)
Observe that this form can be interpreted as a binomial distribution with param-
eters ϕ(λ, a, pi) and n − 1. Further, it is worth noting that the extreme cases meet
the expected outcome as we have
lim
a→0
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) = k | P )
∣∣∣Pi = pi] (4.4)=
(
n− 1
k
)
· 0k · 1n−k−1 =


1, if k = 0
0, else
,
lim
a→1
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) = k | P )
∣∣∣Pi = pi] (4.5)=
(
n− 1
k
)
· λk · (1− λ)n−k−1 ,
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where the latter term, unsurprisingly, is equal to the probability for any agent to have
k links in the BRG model with independent linking probability λ. Unfortunately, the
calculation in case that the whole vector of characteristics p is unknown is analytically
not tractable.
One major reason why random network models are used frequently is to match
qualitative characteristics of real world networks. The Law of Large Numbers in
this case yields that large networks indeed meet these characteristics with a high
probability (see e.g. Jackson, 2008b, Chapter 4). A seminal contribution of Erdős
and Rényi (1959) was to provide so called threshold theorems for the case of the
BRG model. These results state that, if the network size n goes to inﬁnity while
the linking probability λ(n) goes to zero slower than some threshold t(n), then the
limit network has a certain property with probability one. On the contrary, if λ(n)
goes to zero faster than t(n), then the limit network has the same property only
with probability zero.86 It is clear that this kind of results can only be found for
monotone properties, that is for those which yield that, if any network g has the
property, then also any network g′ ⊇ g has it. One example is the property that
a given agent has at least one link which we establish in the next proposition. For
instance, regarding our application of the labor market (Section 4.6) this feature is of
great importance. In that context, we assume this as a prerequisite as determining
the expected characteristic of a given agent’s contact is meaningful only if this agent
is not isolated.
Proposition 4.3. Assume a minimal level of homophily to be guaranteed as the
network size becomes large. Then the function t(n) = 1/(n − 1) is a threshold for a
given agent to be non-isolated in the following sense:
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) ≥ 1 | P )
∣∣∣Pi = pi] → 1 ∀ pi ∈ [0, 1] if −λ(n)/ ln(a(n))
t(n)
→ ∞,
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) ≥ 1 | P )
∣∣∣Pi = pi] → 0 ∀ pi ∈ [0, 1] if −λ(n)/ ln(a(n))
t(n)
→ 0.
First, note that in Proposition 4.3 the right-hand side conditions are equivalent
to ϕ(λ(n), a(n), pˆ)/t(n) converging to inﬁnity or zero, respectively, for any arbitrary
pˆ ∈ [0, 1]. For details refer to the proof in the appendix. What is surprising about
this (as well as about other threshold theorems), is the sharp distinction made by the
threshold t(n), in the sense that if the growth of probability ϕ passes the threshold
t(n), then the probability of any agent to be isolated changes “directly” from zero to
86For a more elaborate characterization of thresholds as well as several results see Bollobás (1998).
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one. What is more, notice that the threshold t(n) = 1/(n−1) is actually the same as
in the BRG model. However, it has to hold for ϕ rather than just for λ since in this
model both λ and a may vary with respect to the size of the network. Indeed, it does
not seem farfetched to assume that homophily increases with the network size as the
assortment of similar agents gets larger. Having understood this, one can directly
deduce the cases where only one of the two parameters varies with n.
Corollary 4.3. If a ≡ a(n) depends on n but λ does not, one gets that if a(n) goes
toward zero faster than exp(−n), then any given agent is isolated with probability one
in the limit while if a(n) does not go toward zero or at least slower than exp(−n),
then any given agent has at least one link with probability one in the limit.
If λ ≡ λ(n) depends on n but a does not, the condition collapses to the threshold of
t(n) for λ(n) as in the BRG model where any given agent has at least one link if
λ(n) grows faster than t(n) while if λ(n) grows slower than t(n), any given agent is
isolated with probability one.
Both parts of the corollary follow directly from Proposition 4.3 such that a proof
can be omitted.
4.4 Clustering
As mentioned in the introduction, a main criticism of the Bernoulli Random Graph
(BRG) model is that the resulting networks do not exhibit clustering while most
examples of real-world networks do so (see e.g. Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Newman,
2003, 2006). In this section, we show that our Homophilous Random Network model
indeed exhibits clustering and one can use the homophily parameter a to calibrate it
to a broad range of degrees of clustering.
The notion of clustering in general captures the extent to which connections in
networks are transitive, that is the frequency with which two agents are linked to
each other given that they have a common neighbor. Watts and Strogatz (1998), who
introduced this concept, measure the transitivity of a network by a global clustering
coeﬃcient which denotes the average probability that two neighbors of a given agent
are directly linked as well. A random graph model is said to exhibit clustering if the
coeﬃcient is larger than the general, unconditional linking probability of two agents
(see Newman, 2006). Considering the set of networks that contain some link ij ∈ gN ,
that is Gij := {g ⊆ gN | ij ∈ g} ⊂ G, this can be transferred to our model in the
following way:
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Definition 4.1 (Clustering). For the Homophilous Random Network model with λ ∈
[0, 1] and a ∈ (0, 1) the clustering coeﬃcient is defined as
C(λ, a) := EP
[
P
G (G ∈ Gjk | P )
∣∣∣ G ∈ Gij ∩Gik]
where i, j, k ∈ N . The model is said to exhibit clustering if we have C(λ, a) > Φ(λ, a).
The choice of the agents i, j and k obviously cannot have an inﬂuence in this
context since ex ante, i.e. before characteristics realize, all agents are assumed to be
equal. Further, recall that Φ gives the probability of two agents to be connected,
characteristics being unknown. The function C captures this probability as well,
however, conditional on the existence of a common neighbor. It should be clear that
the original BRG model does not exhibit clustering since every link is formed with
the same independent probability. As a main result of this chapter, we discover next
that, apart from the limit case of no homophily, our Homophilous Random Network
model has this feature and is insofar more realistic.
Theorem 4.1 (Clustering in Homophilous Random Networks). In the Homophilous
Random Network model the clustering coefficient is given by
C(λ, a) = λ
3
(
ln(a)a2 + ln(a)− a2 + 1
)
2
(
2 ln(a)a+ 4 ln(a) + a2 − 8a+ 7
) .
Given a non-extreme homophily parameter, the model exhibits clustering, that is we
have
C(λ, a) > Φ(λ, a)
for all λ ∈ (0, 1], a ∈ (0, 1).
The intuition for the proof of this theorem (which is again presented in the ap-
pendix) is the following: If there is homophily to some degree and two agents have a
common neighbor, then this fact contains additional information. The expected dis-
tance between these two agents is smaller than if there is no assumption about a com-
mon neighbor. Again due to homophily, it is therefore more likely that a link between
these two agents forms. Also, Figure 4.2 might contribute to a better understanding
of the situation. Note here that C(λ, a)/λ ≡ C(1, a) and Φ(λ, a)/λ ≡ Φ(1, a). One
can additionally perceive that the diﬀerence C(λ, a) − Φ(λ, a) is strictly decreasing
in a ∈ (0, 1) for all λ ∈ (0, 1], that is clustering is strictly increasing in the degree of
homophily.
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Figure 4.2: Clustering coeﬃcient C(1, a) and unconditional linking probability Φ(1, a)
for all homophily parameters a ∈ (0, 1)
Again, it is of interest to consider the limit cases of maximal and no homophily
which we do in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. For maximal homophily, i.e. for a→ 0, we have
lim
a→0
C(λ, a) = lim
a→0
[C(λ, a)− Φ(λ, a)] = 3
8
λ.
In case of no homophily, i.e. for a→ 1, we get
lim
a→1
C(λ, a) = lim
a→1
Φ(λ, a) = λ.
If there is no homophily, we are again back in the BRG model which we already
know not to exhibit clustering. Insofar, the second part of the corollary is consis-
tent. However, the more interesting case is the one of maximal homophily. Though
in the limit no link forms with positive probability, one can deduce properties re-
garding the case of homophily being high, yet not maximal, due to continuity of the
functional forms. Let us clarify the intuition why the clustering coeﬃcient takes a
value strictly between zero and λ if homophily is maximal. Recall ﬁrst that we have
lima→0Φ(λ, a) = 0 since for maximal homophily only agents with identical character-
istics are linked with positive probability and such two agents exist with probability
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zero. However, the clustering coeﬃcient is a probability conditioned on the existence
of links to a common neighbor. This additional information implies that either char-
acteristics are equal or links have formed despite diﬀering characteristics. Though
both events occur only with probability zero, this does not preclude them per se.
Having understood this, it should be clear that in the former case the probability of
the third link would indeed be λ while in the latter case it would still be zero. Taken
together, this yields lima→0C(λ, a) ∈ (0, λ). It remains surprising, however, that the
clustering coeﬃcient takes the speciﬁc value 3
8
λ.
4.5 The Small-World Phenomenon
Besides the presence of homophily and clustering, another stylized fact is frequently
observed in real-world networks which is widely known as the small-world phe-
nomenon. It captures the ﬁnding that, even in large networks, there typically exist
remarkably short paths between two individuals. The original BRG model is known
to reproduce this characteristic (see e.g. Bollobás, 2001; Chung and Lu, 2002).
Thus, in this section, we aim to establish the small-world phenomenon to be pre-
served in our Homophilous Random Network (HRN) model even in case of homophily
being high. For this purpose, we present and analyze simulations of homophilous ran-
dom networks as this issue seems to be no longer analytically tractable. Our simula-
tions provide a strong indication that also in cases of high homophily the small-world
phenomenon remains present. Additionally, we apply two alternative statistical no-
tions of clustering. It turns out that their values are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
the analytical measure given in Deﬁnition 4.1. In the following, Figure 4.3 may al-
ready provide a ﬁrst intuition regarding the diﬀerences between cases of high and low
homophily. In particular, while the total number of links is almost the same in both
simulated 100-agent networks, one observes clustering merely in the ﬁrst case.
The notion of the small-world phenomenon usually grounds on the average short-
est path length between all pairs of agents belonging to a network and having a
connecting path. With regard to real-world networks the small-world phenomenon is
a rather vague concept since it is typically based on subjective assessments of path
lengths rather than on veriﬁable, deﬁnite criteria. However, most people will agree
that the values for several real-world networks as for instance compiled by Watts and
Strogatz (1998) and Newman (2003) are surprisingly low. Insofar, it could be said
that most of these networks exhibit the small-world phenomenon. A formal deﬁni-
tion of the small-world phenomenon applicable to most random network models is
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Figure 4.3: (a) HRN with λ = 0.5, a = 10−8; #links = 484
(b) BRG with linking probability Φ(0.5, 10−8) = 0.0513; #links = 496
(created with MATLAB, 2014)
formulated by Newman (2003) and reads as follows:
Definition 4.2 (Small-World Phenomenon). A random network is said to exhibit the
small-world phenomenon if the average shortest path length d¯ between pairs of agents
having a connecting path scales logarithmically or slower with network size n while
keeping agents’ expected degree constant, that is if d¯/ ln(n) is non-increasing in n.
As already mentioned, it has been established that the original BRG model ex-
hibits the small-world phenomenon according to Deﬁnition 4.2 (see e.g. Bollobás,
2001; Chung and Lu, 2002). It is not clear, however, whether this still holds for our
generalization, given a considerably high level of homophily, but the results of the
following simulations provide some indication.
Prior to this, let us additionally introduce two statistical notions of clustering
which are frequently used in the literature and closely related to the one given in
Deﬁnition 4.1. The simulations allow to compare these for our model. Here, clustering
is associated with an increased number of triangles in the network. More precisely,
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both alternative clustering measures are deﬁned based on the ratio of the number
of triangles and the number of connected triples. A triangle is a subnetwork of
three agents all of whom being connected to each other while a connected triple is a
subnetwork of three agents such that at least one of them is linked to the other two.
Formally, this amounts to the following deﬁnition.
Definition 4.3 (Statistical Clustering). For a given network with set of agents N =
{1, ..., n}, the (statistical) clustering coeﬃcients C(1) and C(2) are determined by
C(1) :=
3× number of triangles in the network
number of connected triples in the network
and
C(2) :=
1
n
∑
i∈N
number of triangles containing agent i
number of connected triples centered on agent i
.
The coeﬃcient C(1) counts the overall number of triangles and relates it to the
overall number of connected triples in the network. The factor of three accounts for
the fact that each triangle contributes to three connected triples. The second one,
C(2), which goes back to Watts and Strogatz (1998), ﬁrst calculates an individual
clustering coeﬃcient for each agent and then averages these. Compared to the ﬁrst
one, C(2) gives more weight to low-degree agents.87 Additionally, note that C(2) is
only well-deﬁned if there are no isolated or loose-end agents in the network.
To capture both the heuristic and the formal approach to the small-world phe-
nomenon, we present the outcomes of two diﬀerent simulations. In the ﬁrst one, we
ﬁx the number of agents n = 500 and the ex-ante expected degree of any agent i,
here denoted by ηexp, to ηexp := E[ηi] = 15. Furthermore, we select several homophily
levels ranging from no homophily, i.e. the limit case of the BRG model, to very high
homophily, represented by a = 10−8. For each parameter value of a, we then simu-
late a homophilous random network R = 1000 times and assess the averaged network
statistics. The parameters and network statistics of the simulation are stated in Table
4.1. We ﬁx the expected degree by choosing λ = 15 ln(a)
2
2(n−1)(a−1−ln(a))
(recall Corollary 4.2)
which enables us to compare the results for diﬀerent homophily levels as this leads to
identical values for Φ(λ, a) in all cases. Recall that Φ captures the expected probabil-
ity of two agents to be connected, characteristics being unknown (recall Proposition
4.1).
Regarding the results of the simulation, we ﬁnd that the average path length
increases in homophily. This is in line with intuition since agents with distant char-
87Referring to C(2), Newman (2003, p. 184) states “This deﬁnition eﬀectively reverses the order
of the operations of taking the ratio of triangles to triples and of averaging over vertices – one here
calculates the mean of the ratio, rather than the ratio of the means.”
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Parameter / Statistics a = 1 a = 10−2 a = 10−4 a = 10−6 a = 10−8
n 500
R 1000
Exp. Degree ηexp 15
Exp. Linking Prob. Φ 0.0301
λ 0.0301 0.0882 0.1553 0.2239 0.2928
Avg. Degree η¯ 14.9990 15.0074 15.0098 14.9899 15.0037
(0.2475) (0.3064) (0.2986) (0.2925) (0.2839)
Avg. Shortest Path d¯ 2.5944 2.6288 2.8086 3.0806 3.3939
(0.0113) (0.0164) (0.0277) (0.0429) (0.0611)
d¯/ ln(n) 0.4175 0.4230 0.4519 0.4957 0.5461
(0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0069) (0.0098)
Clustering Coeﬀ. C 0.0301 0.0411 0.0641 0.0892 0.1147
Clustering Coeﬀ. C(1) 0.0301 0.0411 0.0642 0.0891 0.1147
(0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0035)
Clustering Coeﬀ. C(2) 0.0301 0.0411 0.0642 0.0892 0.1148
(0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0039)
Table 4.1: Results of Simulation 4.1 comparing network statistics for diﬀerent ho-
mophily levels ranging from no homophily (BRG) to extreme homophily; Standard
errors stated in parentheses (carried out with MATLAB, 2014)
acteristics are increasingly likely to be distant in the network. However, it increases
by less than one link from no to highest homophily. Also, an average distance of less
than 3.4 between two agents can still be considered relatively small in a network of
500 agents with about 15 links on average. Thus, regarding the heuristic approach,
it seems reasonable to accept the small-world phenomenon to be exhibited for all
homophily levels.88
Furthermore, we observe an increasing level of clustering for the simulated ho-
mophilous random networks. This is in line with the ﬁndings in Section 4.4. If
homophily is highest, the probability that two agents are linked, given they have a
common neighbor, is about four times as high as in the case of the Bernoulli Random
Graphs where this probability coincides with the unconditional linking probability
Φ(λ, a). Another expectable, yet important observation is that there are no signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences between the expected clustering coeﬃcient C (recall Deﬁnition 4.1)
and the values we determined for the statistical coeﬃcients C(1) and C(2) (recall Def-
inition 4.3).89 To sum up, Simulation 4.1 indicates that the Homophilous Random
88To calculate average shortest paths, one commonly restricts to agents having a connecting path
if the network has more than one component. However, such a network realized extremely rarely in
this simulation, namely only in 0.06% of all cases.
89Note that isolated and loose-end agents never appeared in the simulation guaranteeing that C(2)
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Network model exhibits the small-world phenomenon and clustering at the same time
for all a ∈ (0, 1). In what follows, we consider the most interesting case of highest
homophily captured by a = 10−8 in more detail.
The second simulation focuses on the formal Deﬁnition 4.2 of the small-world
phenomenon. For this purpose, we simulate a collection of R = 100 networks for each
size n = 150, 200, 250, ..., 1000 and compute the respective averages of the relevant
network statistics. To this end, we consider the parameter of highest homophily that
is regarded in Simulation 4.1. The precise data is stated in Table 4.2. Note that the
simulation for each network size is structurally the same as in the ﬁrst simulation,
merely a smaller number of iterations is chosen due to computational restrictions.
However, as can be seen in Table 4.1, all standard errors and especially the one of
the ratio d¯/ ln(n) are very low. Thus, 100 iterations should be suﬃcient to generate
a precise estimate.
In Figure 4.4, we plot the ratio of the average shortest path length and the log-
arithm of the network size d¯/ ln(n) for the diﬀerent network sizes n. This ratio is
decreasing in n as the illustration reveals. From this, we deduce that the average
path length d¯ increases slower in n than ln(n) does. Thus, the homophilous random
networks exhibit the small-world phenomenon according to Deﬁnition 4.2.
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Figure 4.4: Small World of HRN with n from 150 to 1000 and constant expected
degree 15 (created with MATLAB, 2014)
was steadily well-deﬁned.
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Parameter / Statistics n = 150 200 250 300 350 400
R 100
a 10−8
Expected Degree ηexp 15
Average Degree η¯ 14, 99 15, 02 14, 98 15, 02 14, 97 15, 00
Average Shortest Path d¯ 3, 05 3, 14 3, 19 3, 25 3, 29 3, 33
d¯/ ln(n) 0, 609 0, 593 0, 577 0, 569 0, 562 0, 556
Parameter / Statistics n = 450 500 550 600 650 700
R 100
a 10−8
Expected Degree ηexp 15
Average Degree η¯ 15, 01 15, 03 15, 02 15, 01 15, 00 15, 01
Average Shortest Path d¯ 3, 35 3, 39 3, 42 3, 44 3, 47 3, 50
d¯/ ln(n) 0, 549 0, 545 0, 543 0, 538 0, 536 0, 534
Parameter / Statistics n = 750 800 850 900 950 1000
R 100
a 10−8
Expected Degree ηexp 15
Average Degree η¯ 14, 99 14, 98 15, 03 15, 04 14, 97 15, 01
Average Shortest Path d¯ 3, 52 3, 54 3, 55 3, 57 3, 59 3, 61
d¯/ ln(n) 0, 532 0, 529 0, 526 0, 524 0, 524 0, 522
Table 4.2: Results of Simulation 4.2 computing average degrees, shortest paths and
small world ratios of the HRN model for a growing network size (carried out with
MATLAB, 2014)
4.6 An Example of the Labor Market
While in the previous sections, a theoretical analysis of the suggested Homophilous
Random Network model is presented, we now provide one possible economic appli-
cation. In recent years, more and more research in the ﬁeld of labor economics has
been dedicated to understanding the mechanisms of diﬀerent hiring channels. One
of these channels which is commonly used in reality relies on the contacts of current
employees. Starting with the seminal contribution of Montgomery (1991), a lot of
researchers decided to model connections between workers as a social network (see
e.g. Calvó-Armengol, 2004; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2007; Dawid and Gemkow,
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2014).90 As known from the extensive sociological literature (see Section 4.1), in these
social networks, one should expect to observe homophily with respect to skills or com-
petence, performance, education, level of income, and geographical distance. While
there are lots of empirical studies conﬁrming the existence of homophily in workers’
social contacts and analyzing the implications thereof (see e.g. Mayer and Puller,
2008; Rees, 1966), only few work has yet been dedicated to developing theoretical
models capturing this eﬀect.91
In our application, we consider a risk-neutral ﬁrm that plans to ﬁll an open va-
cancy. Two possible hiring channels are available. On the one hand, there is the
formal job market and, on the other hand, the possibility to hire a contact of its cur-
rent employee. Based on the model introduced in Section 4.2, we consider n workers
and a vector of characteristics p capturing the ability of each worker to do the vacant
job. W.l.o.g. we assume that agent 1 is the current employee of the ﬁrm while all
other agents 2, ..., n are supposed to be available on the job market. While we ﬁx p1 as
a parameter of the model, meaning that the ﬁrm knows the ability of its current em-
ployee, p−1 = (p2, .., pn) is again considered as a realization of the (n−1)-dimensional
random variable P−1. Given this situation and based on individual linking probabili-
ties (4.1) for parameters λ, a ∈ (0, 1), we assume that a homophilous random network
forms.
Knowing the distribution function of the random variable P−1 and the conditional
linking probabilities but not the realization, the ﬁrm has to decide on one hiring
channel. For this purpose, the expected characteristic of a contact of agent 1 is the
crucial statistic. It can be calculated as follows.92
Proposition 4.4. Given some homophily parameter a ∈ (0, 1), the expected char-
acteristic of a neighbor j ∈ {2, ..., n} of agent 1 with given characteristic p1 ∈ [0, 1]
is
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = 1
2
+
(ap1 − a1−p1)(1
2
− 1
ln(a)
) + 2p1 − 1
2− ap1 − a1−p1 . (4.9)
A plot of function (4.9) is given in Figure 4.5. However, investigating the expected
characteristic analytically, reveals some intuitive properties, at least for some special
90For an extensive survey including both empirical and theoretic literature from sociology and
economics see Ioannides and Loury (2004).
91Exceptions are Horváth (2013), van der Leij and Buhai (2008) and Zaharieva (2013), however,
all using binary notions of homophily.
92Note that this probability is meaningful only if agent 1 has at least one link. For large networks,
however, this is guaranteed whenever the corresponding condition of the threshold theorem (recall
Proposition 4.3) is fulﬁlled.
4.6 An Example of the Labor Market • 143
cases. These might contribute to a better understanding of the rather complicated
functional form and its appearance. We collect these properties in the following
corollary. Note that all of them can be detected in Figure 4.5.
a p1
E
P
[P
j
|G
∈
G
1
j
]
Figure 4.5: Expected characteristic of a contact of agent 1 (carried out and created
with MATLAB, 2014)
Corollary 4.5. Function (4.9) in Proposition 4.4 yields:
(i) EP [Pj | G ∈ G1j]
∣∣∣
p1=
1
2
= 1
2
∀a ∈ (0, 1),
(ii) lima→0 E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = p1 ∀p1 ∈ [0, 1], and
(iii) lima→1 E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = 12 ∀p1 ∈ [0, 1].
Finally assume, for simplicity, that the expected characteristic or rather ability of
a worker hired via the formal job market is some value p¯ ∈ (0, 1) which is independent
of the homophily parameter a and the ability of the current employee p1. Given this
situation, the ﬁrm faces a simple decision rule when to hire via the social network.
We have that, for suﬃciently high p1 and low a, respectively, the expected ability of
the current employee’s contact exceeds any ability level p¯. More precisely, for any
parameter value a ∈ (0, 1), solving the equation EP [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = p¯ yields a min-
imum ability level p1 (if existing at this homophily level) that has to be reached for
the expected ability of the current employee’s contact to exceed p¯. Similarly, given
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p1 ∈ [0, 1], we obtain a maximum level of a, that is a minimum level of homophily.
Thus, the decision rule is that the ﬁrm should hire a randomly chosen contact in-
stead of recruiting via the formal job market if and only if the respective calculated
minimum level is exceeded (or at least reached).
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we set up a novel Homophilous Random Network model incorporating
heterogeneity of agents. In a two-stage random process, ﬁrst each agent (or vertex)
is assigned a one-dimensional characteristic. Second, based on these realized charac-
teristics, the links of a random network form whilst taking into account a continuous
notion of homophily. This captures the frequently observed propensity of individuals
to connect with similar others. Exploiting this continuous formalization of homophily,
our approach allows for a broad range of homophily levels ranging from the extreme
case of maximal homophily where only equal agents get linked with positive proba-
bility up to the case where there is no homophily at all. The latter case corresponds
to the Bernoulli Random Graph (BRG) model, often referred to as the Erdős-Rényi
model. Insofar, our model can also be regarded as a generalization thereof. Most
importantly, unlike the vast majority of related economic models, we indeed capture
homophily as it is deﬁned and used in the sociological literature, namely in terms of
similarity rather than equality.
In our work, we ﬁrst reveal some basic properties and network statistics of the
Homophilous Random Network model and establish a threshold theorem. The com-
parison with the BRG model provides additional insight. To derive one of our main
results, we focus on another stylized fact of real-world networks, namely the occur-
rence of clustering. Although homophily and clustering are frequently observed in
reality, both phenomena are not captured by the original BRG model. While re-
vealing by simulations that the small-world phenomenon is apparently preserved, we
are able to show analytically that homophily induces clustering in our model. This
gives rise to the conjecture that also in reality there might be a considerable causality
between the two. It might be worthwhile for future research to pursue this question.
Finally, we provide an easily accessible application of our model for labor economics.
Assuming homophily with respect to abilities to do a certain job, we consider workers
being connected through a homophilous random network. We determine the expected
ability of a given worker’s random contact depending on the level of homophily and
the given worker’s own ability. This yields a simple decision rule for a ﬁrm which
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intends to ﬁll an open vacancy and needs to decide whether to hire through a current
employee’s contacts or the formal job market.
Furthermore, our Homophilous Random Network model is now available as a tool
which can be used to understand and predict diﬀusion processes in social networks.
As it complies with those important stylized facts which we frequently observe in
social networks, it might yield meaningful results, for instance, regarding the spread
of information or a disease. Beyond that, there are certainly several further ques-
tions which remain open for future research. Although our simulation results yield a
strong indication in this direction, one task would be to show analytically that the
small-world phenomenon is generally preserved in our model. As a second point, it
could be of interest to expand our considerations about threshold theorems and to
establish those for diﬀerent properties such as connectedness in our model. Further,
it would be a natural, yet analytically challenging extension to check the qualitative
robustness of the ﬁndings for diﬀerent distributions of characteristics. For many ap-
plications, a distribution that puts more weight on intermediate characteristics might
capture reality more accurately. Also, an extension of the model to multi-dimensional
characteristics would be valuable, in particular if one would succeed to combine char-
acteristics of both continuous and binary nature. Finally, a calibration of the model
to real-world data is yet to be done. Performing this in a meaningful way is most
certainly a challenge, especially as the level of homophily in a given network is not
clearly observable. However, one way to deal with this could be to calibrate the model
to the observable degree of clustering which we showed to be directly connected to
homophily in our model.
Appendix 4.A Proofs
4.A.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
We calculate the expected probability:
E
P
[
P
G (ij ∈ G | P ) | Pi = pi
]
= EP
[
λa|Pi−Pj | | Pi = pi
]
= λ
( ∫ 1
0
fPj(pj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
a|pi−pj |dpj
)
= λ
(∫ pi
0
api−pjdpj +
∫ 1
pi
apj−pidpj
)
= λ
(
api
∫ pi
0
a−pjdpj + a
−pi
∫ 1
pi
apjdpj
)
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= λ
(
api
1− a−pi
ln(a)
+ a−pi
a− api
ln(a)
)
=
λ
ln(a)
(
api + a1−pi − 2
)
. (4.10)
Moreover, by integrating equation (4.10) with respect to pi, we get the expected
probability if p is unknown:
E
P
[
P
G [ij ∈ G | P ]
]
= EP
[
λa|Pi−Pj |
]
= λ
(∫
[0,1]2
fPi,Pj(pi, pj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=fPi (pi)fPj (pj)=1
a|pi−pj |d(pi, pj)
)
(4.10)
= λ
( ∫ 1
0
(api + a1−pi − 2)
ln(a)
dpi
)
=
λ
ln(a)
[
api − a1−pi − 2pi ln(a)
ln(a)
] ∣∣∣∣∣
pi=1
pi=0
=
λ
ln(a)2
[a− 1− 2 ln(a)− 1 + a]
=
2λ
ln(a)2
[a− 1− ln(a)] .
4.A.2 Proof of Corollary 4.1
Using l’Hôpital’s rule, we calculate the limit of ϕ as
lim
a→0
ϕ(λ, a, pi) = lim
a→0
λ(api + a1−pi − 2)
ln(a)
= lim
a→0
λ(pia
pi−1 + (1− pi)a−pi)
1/a
= lim
a→0
λ(pia
pi + (1− pi)a1−pi) = 0.
Similarly, we get
lim
a→1
ϕ(λ, a, pi) = lim
a→1
λ(api + a1−pi − 2)
ln(a)
= lim
a→1
λ(pia
pi−1 + (1− pi)a−pi)
1/a
= lim
a→1
λ(pia
pi + (1− pi)a1−pi) = λ.
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For the case of Φ, by now using l’Hôpital’s rule twice, we get
lim
a→0
Φ(λ, a) = lim
a→0
2λ
a− 1− ln(a)
ln(a)2
= lim
a→0
2λ
1− 1/a
2 ln(a)/a
= lim
a→0
λ
a− 1
ln(a)
= 0,
as well as
lim
a→1
Φ(λ, a) = lim
a→1
2λ
a− 1− ln(a)
ln(a)2
= lim
a→1
2λ
a− 1
2 ln(a)
= lim
a→1
λ
1
1/a
= λ.
4.A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Taking into account equation (4.2), we calculate
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) = k | P ) | Pi = pi
]
= EP

 ∑
K⊆N\{i}:|K|=k

∏
j∈K
(q(Pi, Pj)) ·
∏
l∈N\K\{i}
(1− q(Pi, Pl))

 | Pi = pi


=
∑
K⊆N\{i}:|K|=k

EP

∏
j∈K
(q(Pi, Pj)) ·
∏
l∈N\K\{i}
(1− q(Pi, Pl)) | Pi = pi




=
∑
K⊆N\{i}:|K|=k

∫
[0,1]n−1
(
fP−i(p−i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
· ∏
j∈K
(q(pi, pj)) ·
∏
l∈N\K\{i}
(1− q(pi, pl))
)
dp−i


=
∑
K⊆N\{i}:|K|=k

∏
j∈K
(∫ 1
0
(q(pi, pj)) dpj
)
· ∏
l∈N\K\{i}
(∫ 1
0
(1− q(pi, pl)) dpl
)
(4.2)
=
∑
K⊆N\{i}:|K|=k

( λ
ln(a)
(
api + a1−pi − 2
))k
·
(
1− λ
ln(a)
(
api + a1−pi − 2
))n−k−1
(4.2)
=
(
n− 1
k
)
· (ϕ(λ, a, pi))k · (1− ϕ(λ, a, pi))n−k−1 .
4.A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.3
The probability that an agent i with given characteristic pi is isolated is
E
P
[
P
G (ηi(G) = 0 | P ) | Pi = pi
] (4.8)
= (1− ϕ(λ(n), a(n), pi))n−1.
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If we assume that there is at least some homophily as the size of the network becomes
large, that is formally
∃ ǫ˜ > 0, n¯ ∈ N : a(n) ≤ 1− ǫ˜ ∀ n ≥ n¯,
then we have that
∃ ǫ > 0 : 2− a(n)pˆ − a(n)1−pˆ ∈ [ǫ, 2] ∀ n ≥ n¯.
Now it holds that if limn→∞[−λ(n)/(ln(a(n))t(n))] =∞, then we have
lim
n→∞
(1− ϕ(λ(n), a(n), pi))n−1
= lim
n→∞
(
1− ϕ(λ(n), a(n), pi)/t(n)
n− 1
)n−1
(4.2)
= lim
n→∞

1− λ(n)(n−1)ln(a(n)) (a(n)pi + a(n)1−pi − 2)
n− 1

n−1
= lim
n→∞
exp
(
−λ(n)(n− 1)
ln(a(n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
→∞
(a(n)pi + a(n)1−pi − 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈[−2,−ǫ]
)
= 0,
On the contrary, if limn→∞[−λ(n)/(ln(a(n))t(n))] = 0, then we get
lim
n→∞
(1− ϕ(λ(n), a(n), pi))n−1
= lim
n→∞
exp
(
−λ(n)(n− 1)
ln(a(n))︸ ︷︷ ︸
→0
(a(n)pi + a(n)1−pi − 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈[−2,−ǫ]
)
= 1.
4.A.5 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We calculate the clustering coeﬃcient
C(λ, a)
= EP
[
λa|Pj−Pk|
∣∣∣ G ∈ Gij ∩Gik]
= λ
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|fP (p | G ∈ Gij ∩Gik)dp
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= λ
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|
fP,G(p,Gij ∩Gik)
fG(Gij ∩Gik) dp
=
λ
fG(Gij ∩Gik)
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|fP,G(p,Gij ∩Gik)dp
=
λ
fG(Gij ∩Gik)
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|fG(Gij ∩Gik | P = p)
=1︷ ︸︸ ︷
fP (p) dp
=
λ∫
[0,1]n fP (x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
fG(Gij ∩Gik | P = x)dx
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|fG(Gij ∩Gik | P = p)dp
=
λ∫
[0,1]n P
G(G ∈ Gij ∩Gik | P = x)dx
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|PG(G ∈ Gij ∩Gik | P = p)dp
=
λ∫
[0,1]n λa
|xi−xj |λa|xi−xk|dx
∫
[0,1]n
a|pj−pk|λa|pi−pj |λa|pi−pk|dp
= λ
∫
[0,1]n a
|pj−pk|+|pi−pj |+|pi−pk|dp∫
[0,1]n a
|xi−xj |+|xi−xk|dx
= λ
∫
[0,1]3 a
|pj−pk|+|pi−pj |+|pi−pk|d(pi, pj, pk)∫
[0,1]3 a
|xi−xj |+|xi−xk|d(xi, xj, xk)
.
(4.11)
Let us solve the integral in the denominator ﬁrst. For the sake of readability denote
x = (xi, xj, xk). We have
∫
[0,1]3
a|xi−xj |+|xi−xk|dx =
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xj ,xk≤xi
a2xi−xj−xkdx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xi≤xj ,xk
axj+xk−2xidx
+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xj≤xi≤xk
axk−xjdx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xk≤xi≤xj
axj−xkdx
=
2 ln(a)− 4a+ a2 + 3
2(ln(a))3
+
2 ln(a)− 4a+ a2 + 3
2(ln(a))3
+
2 ln(a)− 4a+ 2a ln(a) + 4
2(ln(a))3
+
2 ln(a)− 4a+ 2a ln(a) + 4
2(ln(a))3
=
1
2(ln(a))3
[
8 ln(a)− 16a+ 2a2 + 4 ln(a)a+ 14
]
.
Next, we solve the integral in the numerator of (4.11), substituting x for p in order
to use the same notation as above. This yields
∫
[0,1]3
a|xj−xk|+|xi−xj |+|xi−xk|dx
=
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xi≤xj≤xk
a2xk−2xidx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xi≤xk≤xj
a2xj−2xidx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xj≤xi≤xk
a2xk−2xjdx
+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xj≤xk≤xi
a2xi−2xjdx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xk≤xi≤xj
a2xj−2xkdx+
∫
x∈[0,1]3:
xk≤xj≤xi
a2xi−2xkdx
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= 6
ln(a)− a2 + a2 ln(a) + 1
4(ln(a))3
=
1
2(ln(a))3
[
3 ln(a)− 3a2 + 3a2 ln(a) + 3
]
.
Taken together, this gives
C(λ, a) = λ
3 ln(a)− 3a2 + 3a2 ln(a) + 3
8 ln(a)− 16a+ 2a2 + 4 ln(a)a+ 14 .
By using this, we can now start with the actual proof. We have
C(λ, a)− Φ(λ, a)
= λ

 3
(
ln(a)a2 + ln(a)− a2 + 1
)
2
(
2 ln(a)a+ 4 ln(a) + a2 − 8a+ 7
) + 2
(
ln(a)− a+ 1
)
ln(a)2


= λ3 ln(a)
3(a2+1)+ln(a)2(−3a2+8a+19)+ln(a)(−4a2−40a+44)+(−4a3+36a2−60a+28)
2 ln(a)2(2 ln(a)a+4 ln(a)+a2−8a+7)
(4.12)
In what follows, we use that for a ∈ (0, 1) we have
ln(a) = −
∞∑
m=0
(1− a)m+1
m+ 1
which implies that ln(a) < −∑Mm=0 (1−a)m+1m+1 < 0 for all M ∈ N. The ﬁrst and easier
part is to show that the denominator of the term on the right-hand side of equation
(4.12) is negative for all a ∈ (0, 1). We calculate
2 ln(a)a+ 4 ln(a) + a2 − 8a+ 7
= 2(a+ 2) ln(a) + a2 − 8a+ 7
< − 2(a+ 2)
(
1− a+ 1
2
(1− a)2 + 1
3
(1− a)3
)
+ a2 − 8a+ 7
=
1
3
(a+ 2)
(
2a3 − 9a2 + 18a− 11
)
+ a2 − 8a+ 7
=
1
3
(
2a4 − 5a3 + 3a2 + a− 1
)
= −1
3
(1− a)3(2a+ 1) < 0
Further, we deﬁne
g(a) := 3 ln(a)3(a2 + 1) + ln(a)2(−3a2 + 8a+ 19) + ln(a)(−4a2 − 40a+ 44)
+ (−4a3 + 36a2 − 60a+ 28).
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Then λg(a) is the numerator of the term on the right-hand side of equation (4.12).
We calculate the derivatives
dg
da(a) =
1
a
[
6 ln(a)3a2 + ln(a)2(3a2 + 8a+ 9) + 2 ln(a)(−7a2 − 12a+ 19)
+4(−3a3 + 17a2 − 25a+ 11)],
d2g
da2
(a)= 1
a2
[
6 ln(a)3a2 + 3 ln(a)2(7a2 − 3) + 4 ln(a)(−2a2 + 4a− 5)
+6(−4a3 + 9a2 − 4a− 1)],
d3g
da3
(a)= 1
a3
[
18 ln(a)2(a2 + 1) + 2 ln(a)(21a2 − 8a+ 11) + 8(−3a3 − a2 + 5a− 1)],
d4g
da4
(a)= 1
a4
[
18 ln(a)2(−a2 − 3) + 2 ln(a)(−3a2 + 16a− 15) + 2(25a2 − 48a+ 23)],
d5g
da5
(a)= 1
a5
[
36 ln(a)2(a2 + 6) + 12 ln(a)(−2a2 − 8a+ 1) + 2(−53a2 + 160a− 107)],
d6g
da6
(a)= 1
a6
[
108 ln(a)2(−a2 − 10) + 12 ln(a)(12a2 + 32a+ 31) + 2(147a2 − 688a+ 541)].
Notice here that
g(1) =
dg
da
(1) =
d2g
da2
(1) =
d3g
da3
(1) =
d4g
da4
(1) =
d5g
da5
(1) = 0.
Moreover, we have
d6g
da6
(a) =
1
a6
[
108 ln(a)2 (−a2 − 10)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+12 ln(a) (12a2 + 32a+ 31)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ 2(147a2 − 688a+ 541)
]
<
1
a6
[
108(1− a)2(−a2 − 10)− 12(1− a)(12a2 + 32a+ 31)
+ 2(147a2 − 688a+ 541)
]
=
2
a6
[
− 54a4 + 180a3 − 327a2 + 386a− 185
]
=
2
a6
(1− a)
[
54(a− 7
9
)3 + 103(a− 7
9
)− 2146
27
]
<
2
a6
(1− a)
[
54 · (2
9
)3 + 103 · 2
9
− 2146
27
]
= −112
a6
(1− a) < 0.
Combining this, it follows for all a ∈ (0, 1) that
d5g
da5
(a) > 0⇒ d
4g
da4
(a) < 0⇒ d
3g
da3
(a) > 0⇒ d
2g
da2
(a) < 0⇒ dg
da
(a) > 0
⇒ g(a) < 0.
Taken together, we have indeed that
C(λ, a)− Φ(λ, a) = λ g(a)
2 ln(a)2
(
2 ln(a)a+ 4 ln(a) + a2 − 8a+ 7
) > 0
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which concludes the proof of the theorem.
4.A.6 Proof of Corollary 4.4
By applying l’Hôpital’s rule three times, we calculate
lim
a→0
C(λ, a) = λ lim
a→0
3 ln(a)− 3a2 + 3a2 ln(a) + 3
8 ln(a)− 16a+ 2a2 + 4 ln(a)a+ 14
= λ lim
a→0
3/a− 6a+ 6a ln(a) + 3a
8/a− 16 + 4a+ 4 ln(a) + 4
=
3λ
4
lim
a→0
1− a2 + 2a2 ln(a)
2− 3a+ a2 + a ln(a)
=
3λ
4
lima→0[1− a2 + 2a2 ln(a)]
lima→0[2− 3a+ a2 + a ln(a)]
=
3λ
4
lima→0[1]− lima→0[a2] + lima→0[2a2 ln(a)]
lima→0[2]− lima→0[3a] + lima→0[a2] + lima→0[a ln(a)]
=
3λ
4
1− 0 + limx→∞[2 ln(1/x)/x2]
2− 0 + 0 + limx→∞[ln(1/x)/x]
=
3λ
4
1 + limx→∞[−2x(1/x2)/2x]
2 + limx→∞[−x(1/x2)/1] =
3λ
4
1 + limx→∞[−1/x2]
2 + limx→∞[−1/x] =
3λ
8
.
The stated result follows immediately since we established in Corollary 4.1 that
lima→0Φ(λ, a) = 0. On the contrary, by again using l’Hôpital’s rule three times,
we get
lim
a→1
C(λ, a) = λ lim
a→1
3 ln(a)− 3a2 + 3a2 ln(a) + 3
8 ln(a)− 16a+ 2a2 + 4 ln(a)a+ 14
= λ lim
a→1
3/a− 6a+ 6a ln(a) + 3a
8/a− 16 + 4a+ 4 ln(a) + 4
= λ lim
a→1
3− 3a2 + 6a2 ln(a)
8− 12a+ 4a2 + 4a ln(a)
= λ lim
a→1
−6a+ 12a ln(a) + 6a
−12 + 8a+ 4 ln(a) + 4 = λ lima→1
12 ln(a) + 12
8 + 4/a
= λ.
According to Corollary 4.1, we have lima→1Φ(λ, a) = λ which concludes the proof.
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4.A.7 Proof of Proposition 4.4
We calculate
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] =
∫ 1
0
pjfPj |G(pj,G1j)dpj =
∫ 1
0
pjfPj(pj | G ∈ G1j)dpj
=
∫ 1
0
pj
fPj ,G(pj,G1j)
fG(G1j)
dpj
=
∫ 1
0
pj
fG(G1j | Pj = pj)
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
fPj(pj)
fG(G1j)
dpj
=
∫ 1
0
pj
fG(G1j | Pj = pj)∫ 1
0 fPj(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
fG(G1j | Pj = x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(G∈G1j | Pj=x)
dx
dpj
=
∫ 1
0
pj
λa|p1−pj |︷ ︸︸ ︷
fG(G1j | Pj = pj)∫ 1
0 λa
|p1−x|dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
ln(a)
(ap1+a1−p1−2)
dpj
=
ln(a)
ap1 + a1−p1 − 2
∫ 1
0
pja
|p1−pj |dpj.
Focusing on the integral ﬁrst gives
∫ 1
0
pja
|p1−pj |dpj =
∫ p1
0
pja
(p1−pj)dpj +
∫ 1
p1
pja
(pj−p1)dpj
=
ap1 − p1 ln(a)− 1
ln(a)2
+
a1−p1(ln(a)− 1)− p1 ln(a) + 1
ln(a)2
.
It follows that
E
P (Pj | G ∈ G1j) = a
p1 + a1−p1(ln(a)− 1)− 2p1 ln(a)
ln(a)(ap1 + a1−p1 − 2) (4.13a)
=
1
2
+
(ap1 − a1−p1)(1
2
− 1
ln(a)
) + 2p1 − 1
2− ap1 − a1−p1 .. (4.13b)
4.A.8 Proof of Corollary 4.5
Considering the functional form (4.9), we prove the properties in question one after
the other. Regarding Part (i), by using equation (4.13b) we calculate for a ∈ (0, 1)
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that
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j]
∣∣∣
p1=
1
2
=
1
2
+
(
√
a−√a)(1
2
− 1
ln(a)
) + 1− 1
2−√a−√a =
1
2
.
Next, we consider Part (ii). Again applying equation (4.13b), we get for p1 ∈ (0, 1)
that
lim
a→0
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = 1
2
+
(0− 0)(1
2
+ 0) + 2p1 − 1
2− 0− 0 = p1
and for the marginals we have
lim
a→0
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j]
∣∣∣
p1=0
=
1
2
+
(1− 0)(1
2
+ 0) + 0− 1
2− 1− 0 = 0,
lim
a→0
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j]
∣∣∣
p1=1
=
1
2
+
(0− 1)(1
2
+ 0) + 2− 1
2− 0− 1 = 1.
To establish Part (iii), we have to apply l’Hôpital’s rule. For p1 ∈ [0, 1] we get
lim
a→1
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] (4.13a)= lim
a→1
ap1 + a1−p1(ln(a)− 1)− 2p1 ln(a)
ln(a)(ap1 + a1−p1 − 2)
= lim
a→1
p1a
p1−1 + (1− p1)a−p1(ln(a)− 1) + a−p1 − 2p1a
1
a
(ap1 + a1−p1 − 2) + ln(a)(p1ap1−1 + (1− p1)a−p1)
(4.14)
while using l’Hôpital’s rule once. However, we obviously need to apply it second time.
For this purpose, we calculate the derivatives of the numerator and denominator of
the term on the right-hand side in equation (4.14). We get
∂
∂a
[
p1a
p1−1 + (1− p1)a−p1(ln(a)− 1) + a−p1 − 2p1
a
]
=p1(p1 − 1)ap1−2 + p1(p1 − 1)a−p1−1(ln(a)− 1) + (1− p1)a−p1−1 − p1a−p1−1 + 2p1
a2
and
∂
∂a
[
1
a
(ap1 + a1−p1 − 2) + ln(a)(p1ap1−1 + (1− p1)a−p1)
]
=− 1
a2
(ap1 + a1−p1 − 2) + 2
a
(p1a
p1−1 + (1− p1)a−p1)
+ ln(a)(p1(p1 − 1)ap1−2 + p1(p1 − 1)a−p1−1).
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By recalling equation (4.14) and using l’Hôpital’s rule the second time, this gives
lim
a→1
E
P [Pj | G ∈ G1j] = p1(p1 − 1) + p1(p1 − 1)(0− 1) + (1− p1)− p1 + 2p1−(1 + 1− 2) + 2(p1 + (1− p1)) + 0 =
1
2
which concludes the proof.
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